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Abstract 
The international literature refers to many studies on the application of DNA technology 
by the police. These studies cover topics such as police use of forensic evidence, the 
ethical use of DNA, the application of DNA evidence in courts and the implications of 
an unchallenged proliferation in DNA legislation. The literature pertinent to the police 
use of DNA technology identifies that when the police do use DNA to investigate crime 
the results are good, confirming that DNA is an effective means by which to identify 
offenders and the police should make use of it. However, there is no in-depth research 
about how the police actually use DNA technology to investigate crime, nor about the 
effectiveness of the New Zealand national DNA database. This unique research adds to 
the international literature through a New Zealand case study.  While police forces 
worldwide have a history of adopting new technology in the belief it will make them 
look professional and improve their effectiveness in preventing or solving crime, they 
have not necessarily maximised the full capabilities of this technology. From a 
theoretical view there are two key issues that prevent the effective use of DNA 
technology: 1) ineffective application of organisational processes to use it efficiently; in 
that there is reluctance by staff to change their behaviours leading to a likelihood that 
new processes will be circumvented; 2) the cultural resistance to change at both the 
middle management and front line levels. These two are intrinsically linked as they 
drive each other. When there is resistance to change it can prevent an organisation from 
implementing sound business practices. This leads to limitations of buy-in from staff as 
they do not perceive the value of this new technology and they have not been provided 
with the organisational framework to make the best use of this technology. This is 
interpreted from the theoretical construct of Chan’s ‘field and habitus’ of policing and 
the impact that police culture can have on the successful implementation of new 
technology. Police culture can impede change within the organisation as they have a 
definite comfort zone that does not include any great change to their processes or 
practices. They are content to try new technology as long as they can continue to police 
in the way they have always done. This research looks at one district within the New 
Zealand Police to examine how they use the national DNA database to investigate 
crime. Files from the 2005 calendar year where DNA was found at the scene of a crime 
were reviewed. To add more depth to the data recovered from the files, a range of 
practitioners was interviewed to establish their views on DNA use by the police. The 
vii 
results of the study were the identification of several issues with the data entry and the 
capturing of statistics. While the data was limited due to the vagaries of police 
information, it was discovered that despite all the time and energy the New Zealand 
Police have spent on DNA technology they have not reduced crime or in some cases 
even solved crime in spite of its use. The empirical evidence gathered from police files, 
interviews and other literature showed that although the New Zealand national DNA 
database functions as intended, the police do not make the best use of it to investigate 
crime. New Zealand Police needs to appear legitimate in the eyes of the public when 
enacting its powers and a topic such as DNA is always going to generate emotive 
responses. Moreover, the police need to be more aware of the impact on the public of 
the use of their powers, therefore the taking and retaining of DNA samples needs to be 
for legitimate reasons. For this to be acceptable to the public the police need to be seen 
to be making the best use of DNA technology to investigate crime. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
This research aims to establish if police culture prevents the New Zealand Police from 
making the best use of DNA technology to investigate crime.  The emphasis has been 
placed on police culture as the theoretical construct adopted for the research is Chan’s 
adaptation of field and habitus   as applied to policing. That is the environment, arena or 
‘field’ of struggles within which the police operate and the culture or ‘habitus’ that may 
enable or disable that environment.  To contextualise the research the thesis reviews the 
history of the discovery of the double helix and the first use of DNA to identify a 
suspect.  The establishment of DNA databases and corresponding legislation is also 
explored as these might impact on the legitimate use of the new technology by the 
police. Although police culture is a focus of this research; legitimacy, change 
management, police technology and police hierarchy are also looked at.  This research 
focuses on the use of DNA technology to investigate crime and is specific in its aim by 
reviewing DNA files and interviewing police staff who use DNA as part of their work. 
This is to compare the perception or views of staff as to the benefits of DNA technology 
to investigate crime and the reality of what those interviewed actually do with DNA 
when investigating crime, A search of literature in relation to this subject suggests that 
this type of research has not been done before therefore the police (or the public) cannot 
be sure that DNA is used effectively to investigate crime. Conclusions might be drawn 
that by using DNA the police are merely ‘ticking a box’ to present the appearances of 
being professional in their approach to the use of modern technology to fight crime.   
Due to the nature of the subject matter and the length of time taken to complete this 
research, changes in legislation, technology and policy have occurred since the original 
files were examined.   This is acknowledged and updates given where appropriate in the 
form of footnotes and in the final chapter.  The nature of the research has also evolved 
over time with conclusions being drawn as a result of the data and interviews which 
focused more on the police culture than at first realised. 
The remainder of this chapter will lead the reader through the background of the New 
Zealand Police, DNA, databases, legislation, budget and therefore setting the scene for 
the research.  The chapter concludes with a break-down of the content of the remaining 
chapters   
 
1.1   Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) 
The first concept of an inherited characteristic can be traced back to 1865 when an 
Austrian monk, Gregor Mendel, published his work on the study of pea plants. He 
stated that they inherited their physical characteristics from their parents and passed 
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them on to their offspring (Guerin, 2007). DNA is the chemical code specifying a 
person’s genetic makeup, appearance and lineage and is unique to all individuals except 
identical twins (Kirby, 1992). The existence of DNA was validated by Watson, Crick, 
Wilkins and Franklin in 1953 with the discovery of the double helix, and it was in the 
early 20th century that researchers began suggesting that it might store genetic 
information (Watson, 2003). In 1984, Jeffreys found that portions of DNA contain 
regions that are made up of an unusual sequence of 10 to 15 DNA bases (called a core 
sequence), repeated several times. These repeated sequences, called ‘hypervariable 
regions’, seem to be harmless bits of DNA, with no purpose. Jeffreys also discovered 
that these gene sequences in the hypervariable regions were different in every individual 
except for identical twins (GeneTalk, 2004).  
 
This uniqueness provides necessary differentiation for the identification of a DNA 
fingerprint for all people. Jeffreys' method of identifying offenders was first used 
successfully in 1986 in the case of a serial murderer/rapist in Enderby and Narborough 
in England (Wambaugh, 1989). The police arrested a young man who eventually 
confessed to the rape and murder of one of the victims but they suspected that he was 
also responsible for another murder. They contacted Jeffreys to ask if his new discovery 
would be able to connect their suspect with the other murder. Jeffreys was able to 
confirm that the same person had in fact raped and killed both girls. However, the DNA 
profile did not match the man they had in custody. Eventually, DNA fingerprinting 
identified Colin Pitchfork as the offender.  He became the first person to be identified 
using DNA whilst the youth became the first person to be exonerated due to the use of 
DNA technology (Wambaugh, 1989).   
 
In 1995 the UK became the first country in the world to have a national DNA database.  
By 2006 the British Government had spent 300 million pounds on the database and had 
enacted legislation that has enabled the database to increase to 3.1 million profiles 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2006). The UK database is the 
largest in the world and its aim is to eventually hold all the criminals in the UK. It is 
important to note that of the 3.1 million profiles at least 1 million belong to people who 
have never been convicted of any offence (GeneWatch, 2006). This immediately calls 
into question the legitimacy of this database if its purpose is to identify offenders. 
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1.1.1   Gregor Mendel 
Gregor Mendel was an Augustinian friar who developed a strong interest in botany. In 
1866 he published his major work on the subject of hybridisation of peas. This paper, 
“Versuche uber Pflanzen-Hybriden”, was largely ignored by the scientific community 
for 34 years (Weiling, 1991). Mendel used peas to try to unravel the mystery of how 
traits were passed down from one generation to the next. With a background in physics, 
his approach to his research was different from the usual methods employed by 
biologists. The cross-breeding of red and white flowers resulted in some red and some 
white offspring. Mendel realised that the significance lay in the ratio of red to white 
flowers and by using a quantitative approach he counted the flowers to work out this 
ratio (Watson, 2003). In cross-pollinating plants that produced either yellow or green 
seeds, Mendel discovered that the first generation always produced yellow seeds; 
however, the second generation consistently produced a 3:1 ratio of yellow to green  
(O'Neill, 2011). What Mendel had discovered was that there are specific factors that are 
passed from parent to offspring. He determined that these factors came in pairs and that 
the offspring received one from each parent. These factors were later to be called 
“genes” (Watson, 2003). By the late 1800s scientists had applied the word 
“chromosomes” to describe the long, stringy bodies in the cell nucleus. In 1902 Mendel 
and chromosomes were finally linked, largely due to the work completed by Morgan 
using fruit flies to prove or disprove the finding of genes on chromosomes. Morgan was 
able to prove that genes were to be found on chromosomes. Moreover, his research 
established that a particular characteristic was disproportionately represented in one sex.  
This is called sex-linkage. Mendel died in 1884 with his work largely ignored, even 
discredited, in his lifetime. Watson (2003) suggests that Mendel’s work was ahead of 
his time and that most scientists of that era would not have understood it. It was for this 
reason that it remained buried in an obscure journal. The scientific community was not 
able to catch up with Mendel until 1900 when his work was re-discovered. It is believed 
that it was ignored for 34 years because it was not published as widely as it should have 
been (Hartl & Orel, 1992; Watson, 2003). However, some researchers state that 
Mendel’s work was widely published at the time but that it was simply too difficult for 
scientists to comprehend (Weiling, 1991; Zirkel, 1951).   
 
While Mendel was working with his peas, another of his scientific contemporaries was 
making a breakthrough in Switzerland. Friedrich Miescher’s studies would aid the work 
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picked up again in 1944 by the likes of Avery, MacLeod and McCarty (Avery, 
MacLeod & McCarty, 1944). Miescher was a Swiss physician who wanted to 
understand the building blocks of life. He chose leucocytes (white blood cells) as his 
source material and initially looked at the protein in these cells.  It was during these 
studies that he noticed a substance with unexpected properties that did not match those 
of the proteins. Miescher had obtained the first crude purification of DNA. He further 
examined the properties and composition and was able to show that it differed 
fundamentally from proteins. Due to its occurrence in the cells’ nuclei, he called the 
new substance “nuclein”, a term still used today in the name deoxyribonucleic acid 
(Dahm, 2005). As with Mendel, Miescher’s work on nuclein was largely ignored until 
long after his death. The majority of scientists remained convinced that the more 
complex proteins must be the carriers of genetic information. DNA is made up of only 
four different nucleotides; too few, it was believed, to store the enormous amount of 
genetic information (Dahm, 2005). This belief would continue unchallenged until 
finally proven wrong in 1953 by Watson and Crick. 
 
1.1.2   The Double Helix 
In 1953 in a public house in England, Crick announced that he and Watson had found 
the secret of life (Watson, 1968). Although this may seem a portentous statement the 
significance of their discovery would, in fact, have an impact on society that neither of 
them could have imagined (Scheck, Neufield & Dwyer, 2001; Tracy & Morgan, 2000).  
Prior to 1953 scientists were trying to establish exactly how genetic information was 
passed down through generations. It was believed that DNA was too modest to be the 
bearer of such complicated code scripts even though DNA was found on every 
chromosome (Dahm, 2005; Watson, 2003; Yee, 1994). By the 1930s it was established 
that DNA was a long molecule containing four different chemical bases: adenine (A), 
guanine (G), thymine, (T) and cytosine (C) (Watson, 2003).   
 
However, it was still unclear how the subunits (deoxynucleotides) of the molecule were 
chemically linked. If DNA were to be the code script then the molecule would have to 
be capable of existing in numerous different forms. Work on DNA remained dormant 
until the mid-1940s when Avery became curious to know how a genetic change could 
occur in different strains of pneumonia. He was able to prove that the transforming 
factor was DNA. Although geneticists accepted his findings, biochemists were doubtful 
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that DNA could possibly hold so much biological material. They continued to believe 
that proteins, the other components of chromosomes, were more likely to be the 
hereditary substance.  Their logic was that it would be easier to encode a vast body of 
complex information using the twenty-letter amino-acid alphabet of proteins than the 
four-letter nucleotide alphabet of DNA (Dahm, 2005). By 1951 Todd at Cambridge had 
managed to prove that the backbone of the DNA molecule was very regular. It was also 
apparent that more scientists were trying to prove how the code was transferred and it 
was likely that this information was contained within DNA. In 1953 Watson and Crick 
discovered the chemical spatial structure of the DNA molecule (Hanner, 1990). The 
physical shape of the DNA molecule is a double helix structure (Hanner, 1990; Tande, 
1989; Watson, 2003).  The double helix demonstrated that the two chains were held 
together by strong hydrogen bonds between adenine-thymine and guanine-cytosine base 
pairs. The complementary nature of the base sequences along the two chains meant that 
if the order of bases along one chain was known, the sequence along the other was  
automatically known also (Watson & Crick, 1953). The double helix illustrated how the 
genetic messages of cells are copied exactly when chromosomes duplicate prior to cell 
division. The molecule would unzip to form two separate strands.  Each separate strand 
then could serve as the template for the synthesis of a new strand, one double helix 
becoming two (Watson, 2003).   
 
DNA carries the body’s genetic information and every cell carries a complete blueprint 
of the unique characteristics of each person. DNA determines everything from sex to 
eye colour and this information is passed from one generation to the next (Hanner, 
1990; Tande, 1989; Yee, 1994).  Watson and Crick’s work on the double helix did in 
fact go some way to unravelling the secret of life so Crick’s statement was not too much 
of an exaggeration. The work started by Watson and Crick ultimately led to the 
sequencing of the human genome. By decoding the DNA that constitutes the human 
genome, researchers are able to understand the cause of hereditary diseases and possibly 
eliminate them (Venter et al, 2001).  The sequencing of the human genome enables 
doctors to assess which treatment will work best on a patient according to his DNA 
(Bell, 2003). This obviates the need to experiment until the right type of medication is 
eventually happened upon. When DNA is passed down from parent to child it contains 
half the chromosomes of the mother and half the chromosomes of the father (Hanner, 
1990; Yee, 1994). A scientist in England, Jeffreys, made a discovery that he thought 
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would enable authorities to test the adults travelling with refugee children to ensure they 
were in fact related.  As it transpired, his discovery was taken further than that. 
 
1.1.3   The DNA fingerprint 
Alec Jeffreys was working in Leicester in 1977 analysing the human myoglobin gene 
when he and his team discovered a region consisting of 33 base pair sequences repeated 
four times with an intervening sequence (Kirby, 1992). Base pairs refer to the bases 
A=T or C=G, linked by hydrogen bonds, binding DNA complementary strands (Kirby, 
1992).  Approximately ninety-nine percent of an individual’s DNA is identical to all 
other humans. However, the remaining one percent of the DNA sequence varies from 
person to person (Peterson, 2000). Within these sections of DNA, sequences of base 
pairs are often repeated hundreds or even thousands of times. These sequences are 
called Variable Number of Tandem Repeats (VNTR) (Peterson, 2000). Tandem repeats 
are the end-to-end duplication of a series of identical or almost identical stretches of 
DNA (Kirby, 1992).  This tandem repeat was referred to as a minisatellite1 and similar 
regions as being hypervariable2 because the number of tandem repeats is variable both 
within a locus3 and between loci. They also discovered that each repeat unit contains a 
smaller 16 base pair core in common with other minisatellites. When DNA is isolated, 
split with a specific enzyme and hybridised under low stringency conditions with a 
probe consisting of the core repeat, a complex ladder of DNA fragments is detected 
(Kirby, 1992).  This profile appears to be unique to each individual except for identical 
twins who share the same DNA. Different core repeats were later isolated and used to 
produce a number of different probes useful for fingerprinting (Kirby, 1992).   
 
DNA fingerprinting allows scientists to compare two samples of organic material to 
determine whether they are from the same person (Hanner, 1990). The process cuts 
DNA into fragments and arranges them into a bar-code pattern according to number and 
size (Tande, 1989). DNA is examined by taking it from the cell, isolating and then 
analysing it to see what sized fragments are present in that particular strand.  The 
method used for this procedure is called restriction fragment length polymorphism 
                                                            
1
 regions of tandem repeat sequence DNA scattered throughout animal (and probably plant) genomes 
2
 a segment of a chromosome characterised by considerable variation in the number of tandem repeats at 
one or more loci 
3
 a specific position on a chromosome 
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(RFLP) analysis (Hanner, 1990). Other tests used in the past, such as blood tests, could 
only eliminate a person as a suspect but this test made positive identification possible 
(Hanner, 1990). Due to the unique nature of an individual’s DNA, no two people 
(except identical twins) should produce the same DNA patterns (Gill, Jeffreys & 
Werrett, 1985; Tande, 1989). They were able to separate sperm nuclei from vaginal 
cellular debris obtained from semen-contaminated swabs. Therefore it was believed that 
DNA fingerprinting would revolutionise forensic biology, especially in relation to 
identifying rape suspects (Gill et al, 1985). The ability of DNA to repair and replicate 
itself as well as being the fundamental mechanism of life is the basis for modern 
forensic DNA profiling techniques (ESR, 2009). In their 1985 article in Nature, 
Jeffreys, Wilson and Thein wrote that the DNA ‘fingerprint’4 can be used for a variety 
of research. In particular, they comment on it providing a powerful method for 
maternity and paternity testing and being used in forensic applications. However, it also 
had the potential to be used for a variety of other genetic linkage implications such as 
gene-linked diseases and the ancestry of groups of people.  
 
With this understanding of the potential for the use of DNA, the door had been opened 
for its use as a forensic tool. With police forces' penchant for adopting new technologies 
and championing them in a public forum as a means of promoting legitimacy, it would 
be only a matter of time before DNA was taken up as a tool for law enforcement; as a 
new and novel way to secure the arrest of offenders.  
 
1.1.4   Narborough: An Illustrative Case Study of the First Use of DNA Technology 
to Identify an Offender  
In 1983 a 15-year-old girl was raped and murdered in the Leicestershire town of 
Narbrough in the UK (Wambaugh, 1989). Forensic examination of a semen sample 
found on the body showed that it was a type found only in 10% of men and was from 
someone with type A blood. This was the only forensic test available to the police at 
that time. The police were unable to find a suspect for this crime. Three years later 
another 15-year-old girl was raped and murdered in the nearby village of Enderby. The 
attack and consequent murder shared similarities with the earlier crime in Narborough 
(Wambaugh, 1989). Semen samples recovered from the body showed the same blood 
                                                            
4
 Jeffreys used this term to refer to the multi hypervariable regions 
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type.  After an extensive investigation the police arrested a 17-year-old local boy with 
learning difficulties who admitted to raping and killing the second girl but not the first. 
The police were sure that one offender was responsible for the two killings (Tande, 
1989; Wambaugh, 1989; White & Greenwood, 1988). The officer in charge of the case 
had read about the work that Jeffreys and his team had been doing on DNA 
fingerprinting. He wrote to Jeffreys asking if DNA fingerprinting would be able assist 
him in his investigation. The samples were sent to Jeffreys who analysed them and sent 
his response back to the police.   
 
Jeffreys confirmed that the girls had been killed by the same man but not by the male 
they had in custody. Having received this information, the police then began a large 
operation to screen, via blood tests, every male in the Enderby and Narborough areas. In 
1987 the police and forensic scientists screened blood and saliva samples from 4000 
men aged between 17 and 34 without an alibi in the two villages and nearby 
Littlethorpe. Although they had a turn-out rate of 98% the screen did not find a match.  
They then extended the screen to include those with an alibi, also with a negative result 
(Tande, 1989; Wambaugh, 1989; White & Greenwood, 1988).  As there were no laws 
supporting this course of action the samples were acquired voluntarily. By happenstance 
a man socialising with friends in a pub stated that he had given blood samples twice: 
once for himself and again for a friend who had already given blood for another friend 
with a previous minor sexual offences conviction. This information was passed on to the 
police. The man in question was Colin Pitchfork who was arrested and had a sample 
taken from him. The sample matched those of the samples found at the scene of both 
murders. It was the first time that DNA fingerprinting was used to identify and convict 
an offender. It was also the first time that DNA was used to exonerate an innocent man 
(Tande, 1989; Wambough, 1989; White & Greenwood, 1988). DNA was considered a 
major breakthrough in forensic science and some believed it would be possible to 
identify each individual’s unique DNA with near-perfect accuracy (Tande, 1989). 
However, it might be more accurate to suggest that a forensic geneticist tries to identify 
with as much certainty as possible the origin of a biological sample (Jobling & Gill, 
2004). This application of Jeffreys’ science by the police began a revolution in crime 
fighting and with this revolution came a new set of problems. 
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1.1.5   Implications for Law Enforcement Agencies 
The rise of DNA technology has huge implications for law enforcement agencies 
throughout the world. A growing number of countries have introduced the use of DNA 
technology into their criminal justice systems and this growth has been rapid and far 
reaching (Williams & Johnson, 2008). The New Zealand Police have embraced this 
technology with investment in the National DNA Databank and continue to invest in 
DNA sampling. In the New Zealand Police’s Statement of Intent 2009/10 – 2011/12 
(The New Zealand Police, 2009a) the then Minister for Police, Judith Collins, refers to 
improving the Police’s toolkit with more formal DNA investigation powers. In the same 
document the then Commissioner for Police, Howard Broad, discusses “the expansion 
of DNA sampling to improve investigation and resolution rates” (p.6). The Statement of 
Intent is a contract with the government entered into by the New Zealand Police and 
particularly the Commissioner. It is presented to the House of Representatives and is 
covered by Section 39 of the Public Finance Act 1989.  The Public Finance Act 
“represents the foundation of accountability systems for the resources provided by 
taxpayers to the New Zealand Government, which the government administers on our 
behalf” (Whitehead, 2005 p.1). The statement of intent is the document on which all 
police policies will be based until 2012 and it is the document that the government will 
be closely following when looking for results. For these reasons, whatever is published 
in the document will receive funding, support and encouragement.  This suggests that 
DNA is very much in the forefront of New Zealand Police policy making. 
 
In relation to the arrest of offenders and reduction of crime, there is a need to establish 
what actually is accomplished by having a national DNA databank. This is important 
because a key reason the public support the police is that they view them as legitimate 
(Hinds & Murphy, 2007). This public perception of legitimacy enables the police to do 
their job and while this perception is not necessarily situated in reality, this is not 
important as long as it is real to the public. According to Samkin, Allen and Wallace, 
(2010), it is the extent of stakeholder support for an organisation that determines its 
legitimacy. Therefore, investment in this new technology is acceptable to the public 
only as long as DNA profiling is perceived as an effective investigative tool and does 
not violate any human-rights issues in the taking and retaining of DNA profiles. This 
research explores beyond the media rhetoric that surrounds high-profile cases that have 
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enhanced the perceived success of the database in the eyes of both the police and the 
public, to establish if the police make the best possible use of DNA technology. 
 
Various commentators have espoused the efficacy of the National DNA Databank and 
made claims for its success (Allsop-Smith, 2005; Goff, 2004; Key, 2009). One such 
avid supporter is the Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) which is a 
crown entity owned by the New Zealand Government but operating with an independent 
board of directors. The ESR covers all aspects of serious crime scene examination, 
drugs and alcohol, physical evidence and DNA testing. The ESR is the sole provider of 
the aforementioned services to the New Zealand Police and would stand to lose 
considerable income and investment in equipment if the police no longer used DNA 
evidence. 
The ESR (2011a) states that:  
"Since the operational start of the DNA Databank in 1996, more than 108,000 
individual profiles have been completed to the National DNA Database (NDD).  Most 
individual profiles held on the DNA Databank now come from buccal scrapes (taken 
from inside the mouth). The overall success rate in DNA matching in NZ is world-
leading. 63% of all unsolved cases loaded to the crime sample databases are linked to 
individuals, and more than 30% linked to another crime." 
When the Criminal Investigations Blood Samples Act 1995 was amended in 2004, then 
Minister for Police, George Hawkins, along with Phil Goff, then Justice Minister, 
suggested that this would result in an increase in burglary resolutions, more offenders 
being convicted and historic cases being resolved (Goff, 2004). Inspector Allsop-Smith 
(2005) from the New Zealand Police claimed that the results from the number of links 
on the national DNA database have enabled more cases to be resolved and prove that 
offenders who are in prison are rightfully there. However, it is not known exactly what 
these results are. The ESR refers to links made on samples obtained from crime scenes 
and the profiles they have on their databank. Moreover, this information from the ESR 
can be misinterpreted. Saul (2001), a legal officer with the Australian Law Reform 
Commission, states that: 
"Statistics on the number of matches between DNA profiles and crime scene stains are, 
however, misleading in some crucial respects. Firstly, “matches” do not signify guilt, 
nor do they represent arrests made or convictions secured. A match simply means that 
a particular person may have been, but was not necessarily, present at a particular 
crime scene at some point in time" (p.26).  
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Yet, based on perceived successes, the New Zealand Government appears to be 
committed to giving the police more powers to obtain DNA samples. It was the 
government of New Zealand Prime Minister John Key which passed the Criminal 
Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act in 2009 and the same government 
which pledged to assist the police to provide a better service to the public. Key (2009) 
announced that DNA testing would identify offenders who have previously been 
unidentifiable and more importantly have previously escaped conviction. From Key’s 
comments it is apparent that there is a real belief (by him) that DNA can assist the 
police in making an impact in the detection of crime.   
 
It is noticeable that there is a dearth of criminological analysis in the field of DNA 
profiling in New Zealand. There has been no independent systematic study that offers a 
credible critique of the New Zealand Police use of DNA technology. A review of the 
literature shows that a lot of research has been done on other jurisdictional police use of 
DNA technology. However, there is a lack of literature on the investment of police time 
and money into DNA technology, the true results of this investment and, depending on 
what those results might be, why. Hence the need for this study. 
 
1.2   Historical and Institutional Framework and Context 
Essential to any investigation of criminal activity is the ability for investigators to 
identify suspects (Bennett & Hess, 2003). From an historical standpoint the police have 
often been quick to adopt new technologies both for self-reference when identifying 
suspects and as a means of publicising known offenders. In 1879 the New Zealand 
Police requested photographs of Ned Kelly's gang to be circulated around New Zealand 
in case they should try to land here. According to the Commissioner's Chief Clerk in 
1884, “the use of photography by the police in connection with the arrest of offenders is 
as old as photography itself” (Hill, 1989 p.347). Although photography was the main 
tool used for identification, it could not always identify the culprit. In 1887 in Oamaru, 
South Island, New Zealand, a local constable found a footprint at the scene of a 
burglary. He apprehended the perpetrators and compared inked footprints with theirs. 
The print was an exact match with one of the suspects and this became the first such 
detection in New Zealand (Thomson & Kagei, 1987).  There were also attempts to 
formalise the use of forensic technology by the police. According to Hill (1995) the then 
Commissioner of the New Zealand Police, Dinnie, sought to: 
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“Professionalise such procedures and systemise the use of several recent developments 
in forensic science – most particularly, to maximize the benefits from the fingerprint 
system of identification (‘dactyloscopy’) recently introduced to the colony” (p.166).  
 
While Tunbridge, the Commissioner prior to Dinnie, was sceptical about the use of 
fingerprints, it was the head of the prisons system, Hume, who appreciated the value of 
fingerprinting as a way of identifying recidivist prisoners who supplied false names 
(Hill, 1995). In 1903 fingerprinting of all prisoners was introduced into New Zealand 
prisons (Hill, 1995). Tunbridge expressed concern that there was no law that allowed 
the police to force prisoners to provide a set of their prints. This was a concern not 
unlike the situation facing the New Zealand Police regarding the taking of blood 
samples for DNA testing prior to the passing of the Criminal Investigations (Blood 
Samples) Act 1995. 
 
The new Commissioner, Dinnie, was already convinced of the efficacy of fingerprinting 
and in 1903 the Police Fingerprint Branch was established at Police Headquarters in 
Wellington (Hill, 1995). The New Zealand Police took control of all fingerprinting in 
New Zealand including those taken in the prisons. The Fingerprint Branch at Police 
Headquarters would store all the records. Hill (1995) states that at the time the public 
were fascinated by the idea of fingerprints and wanted to hear stories about the use of 
this technology at any opportunity. Fingerprinting was the DNA profiling of its day and, 
just as DNA has had its detractors, so too did fingerprinting. The tabloids of the time 
referred to fingerprint experts as “fakirs and palmists” and printed stories that attempted 
to discredit fingerprinting (Hill, 1995).  Commissioner Dinnie knew that the only way to 
gain full acceptance of fingerprinting was to have many successful identifications. He 
also appreciated the need to ensure that the police had a professional public image as a 
means of promoting organisational legitimacy.  Dinnie provided this by ensuring that 
there were good systems in place with robust methods for checking results and linking 
prints to prison photographs (Hill, 1995). This would be a lesson that the fledgling New 
Zealand DNA database would also have to learn.  
 
1.3  The UK National DNA Database  
The UK DNA database was established in 1995 and was deemed a success which led to 
it being considered the world leader in the use of DNA evidence (Briody & Prenzler, 
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2005; Krimsky & Simoncelli, 2011). It was thought that having a comprehensive 
database would speed up the process of identifying offenders and reduce the number of 
hours police would need to spend investigating a case, as well as assuring convictions 
(Krimsky & Simoncelli, 2011; McCartney, 2004; Van Camp & Dierickx, 2008). This 
was at a time when conventional policing methods were seen to be failing with an 
increase in crime rates and a drop in detection rates (Gunn, 2003; Maguire, 2000).  
Therefore the database and the use of DNA were highly regarded by both senior officers 
in the UK and successive governments as a significant help in the fight against crime 
(Gunn, 2003). It was within this environment that the laws were steadily added to, 
allowing the police to obtain and retain DNA samples. The Home Office DNA 
Expansion Programme was launched in 1999 and funded with 182 million pounds 
between April 2000 and March 2004 (Townsley, Smith & Pease, 2005). Tony Blair 
announced that he wanted to see the entire criminal population on the database by 2004 
(Wallace, 2006). However, over the last few years concerns have been raised regarding 
the justification of such laws and the need for such a large database. While its 
supporters argue that the bigger the database the more effective it is, sceptics believe 
that there is no evidence to support such claims (McCartney, 2004). In fact, there are 
real fears that individual privacy is slowly being eroded in the name of solving crime 
(Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010; Williams, 2010; Prainsack, 2010). Indeed, some believe 
that the government is trying to implement a universal-coverage database by stealth 
(Williams & Johnson, 2006).  
 
1.4  The New Zealand Police 
The New Zealand police force was first established in 1886 and was modelled on the 
British system with the exception that New Zealand Police is a national service whereas 
Britain is divided into 43 separate forces. The first rules and regulations governing 
police were borrowed extensively from the summary of the principal constabulary rules 
prescribed by British law (The New Zealand Police, 2010).  From the time of Hobson in 
1840, prior to the formal establishment of the New Zealand police force, there were 
police officers in New Zealand. These officers were armed paramilitary who took part 
in the Land Wars during 1846-47 as well as keeping civil order. With the passing of the 
Police Force Act 1886, the police were no longer routinely armed and started policing a 
community that largely respected the law (Winfree & Taylor, 2004). Although the early 
commissioners were former army officers, Tunbridge (1897-1903) was an experienced 
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British police officer who was brought to New Zealand to supervise the transition to 
modern civil police.  Therefore the New Zealand Police was established, not 
surprisingly, with a heavy British influence and based very much on the Westminster 
legal system.   
The 1958 Police Act dropped the word ”force” and the service has since been known as 
the New Zealand Police. It was felt that this better reflected the philosophy of policing 
by consent which was a strong part of the policing ethos inherited from England.   In 
England and Wales there was substantial resistance to the establishment of the police 
and therefore there was an urgent need to achieve some legitimacy among the general 
population (Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1996).   
 
The New Zealand Police Mission is:  
“The New Zealand Police seeks to be a world-class police service working in 
partnership with citizens and the community to prevent crime and road trauma, to 
enhance public safety and to maintain law and order” (The New Zealand Police, 
2010a). 
New Zealand has one national police service. It provides policing services 24 hours a 
day and operates from more than 400 community-based police stations around the 
country. It has more than 11,000 staff and at time of writing it responds to more than 
600,000 emergency calls each year (The New Zealand Police, 2010a). The functions of 
the New Zealand Police include: 
• Keeping the peace 
• Maintaining public safety 
• Law enforcement 
• Crime prevention 
• Community support and reassurance 
• National security 
• Participation in policing activities outside New Zealand 
• Emergency management 
 
The concept that the public consent to the authority of the police was pushed by early 
London Metropolitan Police Commissioners such as Mayne and Rowan who were keen 
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to show that the police were impartial and fair when enforcing the law (Reiner, 1992). 
This idea of policing by consent was also adopted by the New Zealand Police. As with 
other jurisdictions, the New Zealand Police relies on the majority of the public to obey 
laws and follow orders when given by them. This means that the New Zealand Police 
needs to be able to prove that their authority is legitimate (further explored in chapter 8, 
section8.4). However, if the police are seen to do things that are deemed incompetent, 
unfair or illegal the public may begin to lose confidence in them. According to Rowe 
(2009) the New Zealand Police has enjoyed a positive public/self image for much of the 
past 50 years. As a result of New Zealand’s strong link to England there is a perception 
that the justice system was developed with a view to creating the “Britain of the South 
Pacific” (Rowe, 2009, p. 124). There is a view that the New Zealand Police are an 
example of genteel policing and as there has been no evidence of endemic corruption 
there may be a misconception (by the New Zealand Police) that they have the total trust 
and respect of the community.   
1.4.1   The History of New Zealand National DNA Databank 
In 1983 Joseph Stephenson Thomson committed his first known rape in Auckland. It 
would be another eight years before he would be caught. In 1995 he pleaded guilty to 
129 charges, 61 of them being for sexual violations. His youngest victim was 10 years 
old, his oldest 43; 32 of his offences were against girls aged 16 years and under. In 
order to find this serial rapist, the police took blood samples from 4,500 men in South 
Auckland, targeting Polynesian and Maori males as they had a general description of the 
suspect. At the time, a lawyer’s response to this mass screening was: “the recent mass 
screenings of Polynesians in South Auckland in the serial rapist investigation may well 
be the first sign of legalised abridgement of civil rights” (Corbett, 1996 p.145) as the 
police had no legal right to compel people to give a sample of their blood. It was 
suggested that the police had put subtle pressure on the men by intimating that they 
would let their employers know they had refused to cooperate in the investigation. After 
all, if you had nothing to hide, why would you not want to give a sample of your blood 
(Corbett, 1996)? With the advent of new technologies, especially DNA, it was 
becoming evident that the law (at that time) was not adequate to allow police to make 
use of such technology.  The Police Act 1958 allowed the police to take a person’s 
particulars, such as fingerprints and a photograph, but only under certain conditions. 
There was no provision in the 1958 Police Act to take a bodily sample. Although the 
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2008 Policing Act5 has now superseded the 1958 one, it is the Criminal Investigations 
(Bodily Samples) Act (1995) that gives the police the powers to take and retain DNA 
samples6.   
 
The lack of legislation supporting the police in taking DNA samples resulted in several 
cases being taken to the Court of Appeal. Two such cases occurred in 1991: R v 
Pengelly and R v Montella.  In 1989 Pengelly was convicted of killing an elderly 
woman. DNA was used to link him to the woman and subsequently convict him. The 
police obtained blood from him (with his permission) in order to compare it to blood 
found at the scene. At the appeal, his lawyers argued that had Pengelly understood what 
he was consenting to he would never have agreed to provide a sample.  The appeal was 
dismissed on the grounds that Pengelly had had everything explained to him and he had 
fully consented. The court concluded that even though technology was more advanced, 
additional information was not required to be given (NZLR 545, 1992).  In the case of R 
v Montella,  Montella was convicted of sexual violation of a 12-year-old boy.  Semen 
was found in the boy’s underpants. The police discovered that Montella had provided a 
blood sample for an HIV test and used this sample to extract DNA to compare it with 
the semen found. The profile matched and he was arrested and convicted. The appeal 
was held as Montella had never given his consent for his blood to be used for anything 
other than an HIV test. The appeal judge made a plea “for the legislators to give urgent 
consideration to providing a statute which sets out the position both of the police and an 
accused when DNA testing is a possibility” (NZLR 63, 1992, p. 68).  
 
In 1992 the government agreed to enact legislation governing the taking of blood 
samples for DNA purposes. Early in 1993 the police raised a new proposal involving 
additional powers to take blood samples from convicted offenders for the purpose of 
maintaining a DNA databank. On 12th August 1996 the Criminal Investigations (Blood 
Samples) Act 1995 was enacted, enabling the national DNA databank to be established. 
In 1996 New Zealand became the second country in the world to create a national DNA 
databank. It took four years for this legislation to be passed. This length of time may 
                                                            
5
 This will be covered further in chapter 5 
6
 This Act is covered further in this chapter 
17 
 
have been due to the contentious nature of DNA and consultation with many sections of 
society would have been required.  
 
The databank, although owned by the New Zealand Police, is maintained by the ESR; 
they are the guardians of the databank. There are two databases. One is the national 
DNA databank which at time of writing (2013) holds profiles of 135,000 people. This 
equates to about 4% of the population. According to the ESR, they add approximately 
1000 profiles to the national DNA databank each month. The other is the crime sample 
database which holds samples from 23,000 crime scenes (ESR 2011b). The ESR 
regularly compares samples held on the national DNA database with those held on the 
crime sample database.  It is this comparison that enables them to identify potential 
suspects. The ESR laboratory was accredited by The American Society of Crime 
Laboratory Directors, Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) in 1995. 
ASCLD/LAB is an international organisation that ensures that crime laboratories 
maintain high standards when evaluating scientific evidence. The ESR is the only DNA 
laboratory in New Zealand to have ASCLD/LAB accreditation (ESR, 2009).   
 
1.4.2   The Science Behind ESR 
In 1988 a selection of forensic scientists from the DSIR7 was sent to the UK to study 
DNA technology at the Home Office. On their return they began establishing DNA 
profiling laboratories. In 1990 DNA evidence was presented in a New Zealand court for 
the first time (R v. Pengelly as discussed above). The early 1990s saw Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (PCR) based methods being used to extract and amplify DNA (a copying 
process that is repeated many times, doubling the number of DNA molecules present at 
each stage) in order to obtain a DNA profile. Just prior to the database being 
implemented in 1996 the ESR introduced more discriminating DNA technology which 
involved using three STR DNA loci plus a gender test. Short Tandem Repeats (STR) 
are short sequences of nucleotides that repeat themselves multiple times at certain points 
in the genome. Different people tend to have different numbers of the repeat unit in their 
DNA and this allows individuals to be identified on the basis of their DNA (ESR, 
2010).  SGM Plus is the STR multiplex used to generate DNA profiles from biological 
                                                            
7
 Department of Scientific and Industrial Research since re-named the Environmental Science and 
Research Institute Limited (ESR) 
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samples. It contains 10 different STR loci as well as the sex test Amelogenin (ESR, 
2010). Over the years the technology has become more advanced and between 1996 and 
2000 ESR increased the number of STR loci tested from three to six to 10 (ESR, 2010). 
By increasing the loci sites to 10 it enabled the testing to be more discerning. In 2002 
ESR opened a purpose-built DNA testing facility in Auckland and in 2006 the ESR 
introduced Low Copy Number (LCN) technology to New Zealand."The LCN technique 
equates to a 50-fold increase in sensitivity and can be used to obtain profiles from items 
that have only been touched" (ESR, 2010, p.8). By 2007 ESR had increased the number 
of loci tested to 15 which made the testing even more discerning. 
 
1.5   Legislation 
It is claimed that the single most important factor in making a database effective is the 
legislation that regulates it. “It is the quality of database laws that make DNA an 
effective investigative tool” (Asplen, 2003 p.1). Admittedly, without the appropriate 
legislation DNA would be difficult to use evidentially. However, it could also be argued 
that if the police do not act on this ”evidence” then DNA and all its surrounding 
legislation is redundant. Legislation for the creation of national DNA databases differs 
profoundly from one country to the next.  
The UK has comprehensive legislation which affords its police forces far-reaching 
powers to obtain and retain DNA samples (GeneWatch UK, 2006a). The UK laws 
governing the taking of DNA samples are found in: 
• The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) 
• The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
• The Criminal Evidence Act 1997 
• The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 
• The Criminal Justice Act 2003 
• The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
• The Crime and Security Act 2010 
• The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
Each successive Act prior to the 2010 Act had given police more powers by amending 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) which is the main legislation governing 
police powers. When DNA was first used by the UK Police, it was limited to certain 
offences – primarily violence. If a person was acquitted at court, their DNA profile had 
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to be removed from the database. More recent legislation had allowed police to take 
DNA samples from every person they arrested. Should that person be acquitted, their 
DNA profile was still kept on the National DNA Database. The 2010 Act has made 
changes to this whereby, depending on the offence, profiles will be retained on the 
database for a specified period. It is also worth noting that the Forensic Science Service 
is able to retain the actual sample whereas most other jurisdictions have legislation 
stating that the sample must be destroyed once a profile is obtained (UK Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology, 2006). In fact, Kimmelman (2000) argues that the 
UK has by far the most aggressive data-banking law in the world. Scotland’s DNA laws 
are different to those of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland DNA from 
people acquitted at court cannot be kept and in May 2006 the Scottish Parliament 
rejected legislation to bring it into line with the rest of the UK. England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland were the only countries in the world where DNA from innocent people 
could be stored permanently (Genewatch UK, 2006b).8 
 
In contrast, New Zealand’s original DNA legislation was less permissive, with the 
police having limited powers to obtain samples. "The Act focuses strongly on the rights 
of the individual and places rigorous requirements on police investigators obtaining 
blood samples" (Harbison, Hamilton & Walsh, 2001, p.34). This legislation is contained 
in the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995. The initial Act covers in detail 
the submission of reference blood samples from the following people: 
 
• suspects in any criminal investigation who volunteer a DNA sample for 
comparison with that  particular investigation and/or inclusion on the DNA 
databank 
• all persons convicted of a relevant offence for which a databank request is made 
• any individual who volunteers a DNA sample to be included on the databank 
• suspect and/or databank samples that are obtained by compulsion  (ESR,2006) 
 
The storage, disclosure, confidentiality, destruction and deletion of samples are 
carefully covered in the Act. The ESR is required by law to destroy all samples once a 
                                                            
8
 The 2012 Protection of Freedoms Act allows innocent people to  have their DNA and fingerprint records 
removed from the databases 
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profile has been obtained. In spite of this, the Act was referred to by lawyer and writer 
AK Grant as “disgusting and degrading”. Writing in The Independent in 1995, Grant 
compared the Act with Dr Mengele’s experiments at Auschwitz, the only difference 
being that organs were not removed. This legislation was amended in 2004. The main 
changes to the Act included allowing police officers to obtain compulsion orders to 
require people suspected of burglaries to provide a DNA sample so that it could be 
compared to the one found at the scene and to use buccal (mouth) swabs rather than 
only blood samples for the DNA database. For this last reason the Act was renamed the 
Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995.  
 
 In 2009 the newly elected National Government made yet more changes to the Act. In 
expanding police powers, Justice Minister Simon Power (2009) commented that the 
legislation was required by the police so as to make New Zealand a safer place to live. 
This pronouncement was made after the passing of the Criminal Investigations Bodily 
Samples Amendment Act 2009. This new legislation covers databank samples taken 
when police intend to charge an individual with a relevant offence (including youths 14-
17 years). Maori MP Rahui Katene (2009) felt that this law would enable police to 
target young Maori9, quoting statistics that the UK database had an unequal number of 
DNA samples from young black males compared to those of young white males. 
However, the New Zealand Police national forensics manager in a statement to the 
media said that the new law would not lead to racial profiling but would be used to 
catch those who had committed serious crimes and exclude those who had not 
(McNeilly, 2010). This law came into effect on 1st July 2010 with further changes to the 
Act being added in 2011. These changes included replacing the term “indictable 
offence” with “imprisonable or relevant offence”, thereby giving the police a wider 
range of offences for which DNA samples could be obtained.   
 
1.5.1   Limitations for the New Zealand Police with the Legislation 
In 1995 the New Zealand National DNA database was established. The database was 
created to deal with the new technology of DNA evidence being used to identify 
possible suspects and the police required laws to allow them to take and retain samples. 
This legislation was the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995 and was 
                                                            
9
 Maori are the indigenous people of New Zealand 
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described at the time as focusing on individual rights and placing strict controls on the 
police obtaining blood samples (Harbison, Hamilton & Walsh, 2001). Police were given 
powers to take blood samples either voluntarily or through a compulsion order and the 
samples had to be taken by a registered medical practitioner. A compulsion order was 
one issued by the Court permitting the police to take a sample from a person who fitted 
the criteria and could be either a suspect compulsion order or a post-conviction 
databank compulsion order. A suspect compulsion order was required when a person 
refused to supply a sample to be compared with the sample found at the scene of a 
crime. A suspect compulsion order could be issued only for indictable offences such as 
rape and serious assaults.  A databank compulsion order was issued when a person was 
convicted of a relevant offence10 but whose DNA was not already on the databank. A 
person could be asked to voluntarily give a sample for inclusion on the database. They 
would be told that this database was regularly checked against the crime sample 
database to see if there were any matches (The New Zealand Police, 2010b). This 
speculative search is conducted regularly by the ESR. The volunteer would also be told 
that they could have their sample withdrawn from the database whenever they chose. 
However, if they were convicted of a relevant crime in the interim, that sample would 
no longer be considered voluntary but would become a permanent profile and could not 
be withdrawn from the databank.   
 
If the person refused to provide a voluntary sample, a compulsion order would be 
requested from the court. These compulsion orders could be issued only for specific 
crimes which included rape, murder and serious assaults. The government was very 
mindful of the impact this legislation would have on the public which is possibly why 
the initial Act was cautious regarding the powers the police had to request DNA 
samples. The offences that it did not include were volume crime and, more specifically, 
burglary. If an offender was identified by DNA left at the scene of a burglary the police 
were required to take a sample of the DNA from the suspect so that it could be 
compared with the sample found at the scene. However, if the suspect refused to 
provide this comparative sample the police could not compel him/her to provide one. 
                                                            
10
 A relevant offence means an offence against any of the provisions listed in Part1, Part2 or Part3 of the 
Schedule to the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act, 1995 
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When dealing with burglary offences, this left the police with the ability to make use of 
DNA only to identify a possible offender but not necessarily arrest him/her. 
 
In 1995 when the principal Act was established it was known as the Criminal 
Investigations (Blood Samples) Act as the only samples permitted under the law were 
blood samples. In 2003 the Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 
was passed.  One of the changes in the law was the ability to take buccal (mouth) swabs 
as well as blood samples. Another significant change under the amendment was the type 
of crimes that would permit the police to obtain compulsion orders for comparative 
samples. Initially these orders could be only for more serious crimes such as murder, 
serious assaults and sexual assaults. This amendment included volume crime such as 
burglary and theft. The Amendment received Royal Assent on 30th October 2003 and 
came into law on 15th April 2004 (Ministry of Justice, 2009).  This change in the law 
would enable the police to make changes in the way they dealt with volume crime and 
especially burglary.   
 
1.6  New Zealand Police Forensic Process  
In each New Zealand Police district there are different permutations on the collection of 
forensic evidence although certain elements are common as part of national policy. The 
contract with the ESR is relevant nationally and districts are required to adhere to this 
although how each district spends its budget is a matter of choice. Districts differ on 
how they deal with the notification from the ESR. This notification is an intelligence 
link, in that the ESR has linked a person to a crime scene. This person may or may not 
be at the scene legitimately, so once the police receive this intelligence link they then 
investigate further to establish why the DNA was found at the scene of a crime. 
Although the ESR may refer to their ”hit” rate, an intelligence link is a more accurate 
term for the information they are providing to the police. If the person is found to have 
been involved in the crime then it becomes a ”hit”. In the subject district a Crime Scene 
Attendant (CSA) or Scenes of Crime Officer (SOCO) will attend a crime scene and 
search for forensic evidence. If a DNA sample is found it is sent to the ESR for 
processing. For the period relevant to the subject data the police and the ESR had an 
agreed six-to-eight-week turnaround for general cases with the possibility of a shorter 
period for serious cases, for example homicide. The turnaround as of April 2010 is five 
days. The ESR then uses an agreed format to inform the police of the identification. 
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This identification is generally referred to by the ESR as a ”hit” although a hit has 
several different meanings. Crime-to-crime hits may indicate that the same person was 
at both scenes, whereas a crime-to-individual hit may signify that a particular person 
was at a particular scene (Walsh & Buckleton, 2005). A hit is not the same as detection 
and, for the purpose of this research, detection or resolution denotes that a person has 
been charged with an offence. A hit means that a person has been identified through 
their DNA profile. At the subject district the information is sent to the File Management 
Unit where the details are entered onto the National Intelligence Application including 
an alert to let staff know that this subject is implicated in a crime.  From there the report 
is sent out to the appropriate Detective Senior Sergeant (as identified by the district) so 
that the suspect can be spoken to and the investigation progressed in some way. A 
Detective Senior Sergeant is responsible for managing the workload of a team of 
investigators. It is the job of this officer to prioritise the files and to decide the direction 
of an investigation.  
 
The Detective Senior Sergeant is also responsible for the budget and makes decisions on 
which samples will be sent to the ESR for analysis. The report is sent out with a form 
requesting that the case have some work done on it within a 28-day timeframe and the 
notated form is then returned to the File Management Unit so that the National 
Intelligence Application can be updated. The district may have difficulty in tracking the 
progress of DNA files if the officers are not vigilant in updating the National 
Intelligence Application with what enquiries they have made. When the case has been 
completed, the alert on the person should be removed, indicating that the subject is no 
longer a person of interest.  However, this alert is not always removed. Often the only 
way that staff can establish if a suspect has been arrested is to check on the National 
Intelligence Application to see if any charges have been filed against the suspect for that 
offence. This is a time-consuming process as it requires a staff member to check on each 
individual DNA result. This method only indicates when a person has been charged. It 
does not show the enquiries that have been made nor does it identify when a suspect has 
been eliminated from the enquiries. The consequence is that tracking of DNA results is 
very difficult and unreliable and does not represent the amount of time that the police 
have spent on enquiries relating to the link. 
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1.7   Financial Considerations 
In the 2000-2001 financial year the New Zealand Police budget for forensic services 
was $9.9 million. By the 2005-2006 financial year this figure had doubled to $18.8 
million for DNA work conducted at the ESR and this figure was expected to increase 
for the 2006/2007 financial year (Controller & Auditor-General, 2006). The New 
Zealand Police budget for the same year was one billion dollars, which means that 1.9% 
of that budget was allocated towards the use of the new DNA technology. The police’s 
rationale for spending this money is that DNA is a great crime-reduction tool (Broad, 
2009). Using a considerable part of the annual police budget for the DNA database is 
indicative of the political and financial faith being invested in this technology. 
 
The New Zealand Police has encouraged its staff to collect as much forensic evidence as 
possible at scenes of crimes. For example, the majority of burglaries are attended by 
either Crime Scene Attendants (CSAs) or Scenes of Crimes Officers (SOCOs) to collect 
exhibits with forensic evidence potential. Furthermore, the ESR encourages the police 
to send all possible samples to them to examine. The result of all this crime scene data 
collection is a lot of information being sent back to the police from the ESR. If the 
police with their limited budgets are investing monetary resources in this new 
technology, it is possible that what is regarded by some as the more traditional and 
effective aspects of policing, such as community policing, may suffer. In these 
circumstances, the results that are gained from new technology would need to be well 
worth the investment. The police are committed to crime and crash reduction and they 
perceive DNA as an effective means to reduce crime (The New Zealand Police, 2009a). 
However, it is possible that DNA profiling has the potential to solve but not reduce 
crime in that DNA technology is used as a reactive tool rather than a proactive one, 
which means the crime, has already happened before DNA technology is applied 
 
1.8   Police Legitimacy in the Eyes of the Public 
Police departments struggle to legitimate themselves to the public they serve (Herbert, 
2006). Reiner (2000a) argues that, if the police expect citizen compliance with their 
directives when seeking to uphold the law and keep the peace, their authority depends 
on the good will of the public. Accordingly, a legitimate police institution fosters more 
widespread obedience of the law itself (Hawdon, Ryan & Griffin, 2003).  The police 
also rely on willing public cooperation to report crime and offer aid in criminal 
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investigations (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Furthermore, Tyler (2004) asserts that public 
cooperation with law enforcement is motivated by the perception that the police are 
performing effectively in their efforts to uphold the law and keep the peace. From this 
perspective, if the police are perceived as ineffective the public may withdraw their 
goodwill and be less cooperative with police investigations, thus making it harder for 
them to do their job effectively. However in the last four Citizens’ Satisfaction surveys 
carried out on behalf of the New Zealand Police by Gravitas, three positive trends are 
identified: 
 
• trust and confidence (share with full/quite a lot of trust and confidence up from 
72% in 2008/09 and 75% in 2009/10 to 77% in both 2010/11 and 2011/12) 
• safety in neighbourhood after dark (share feeling safe/very safe from 66% in 
2008/2009, 70% in 2009/10 and 72% in 2010/11 to 73% in 2011/12)  
• safety in town centre after dark (share feeling safe/very safe up from 45% in 
2008/09, 48% in 2009/10 and 53% in 2010/11 to 54% in 2011/12) (Gravitas, 
p.4, 2012) 
 
These trends suggest that the public, based on the questions they were asked, believe 
that the police are doing their job effectively in upholding the law and keeping the 
peace. The real test would be to ask specific questions regarding the police use of 
technology to investigate crime. However, the public can make informed answers only 
if they know exactly how the police use DNA technology. The following paragraph 
looks at research that does specifically address the DNA question, albeit on a smaller 
scale, and addresses the issue of the public’s knowledge of DNA. 
 
In research conducted by Curtis (2009), the questions were specifically about the use of 
DNA as a crime-fighting tool. The participants were 100 New Zealand residents aged 
16 years and over with a booster sample for Maori (n = 25). Sixty females and 40 males 
were drawn with phone numbers taken from a randomly selected database (Curtis, 
2009). The results showed that the majority of participants were informed of forensic 
use of DNA from the media and  37.5% of those interviewed gained their knowledge of 
DNA forensic use from fictional TV series leading to a possible misunderstanding of 
why and how DNA is gathered, stored and utilised in criminal investigations. Curtis 
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found that European participants were more likely to approve of DNA sampling than 
other ethnic groups, including Mäori. Mäori, however, were more concerned about 
privacy issues and DNA being “planted” at crime scenes. Participants of European 
descent were more likely to agree that DNA was a good crime-fighting tool (Curtis, 
2009). The areas of concern highlighted from this research, by the researcher, were 
ownership of the DNA samples and the potential for misuse, further complicated by the 
fact that few people interviewed had a clear understanding of the legislation, use and 
storage of DNA samples.   
 
Curtis's research identified that the police need to be careful when dealing with new 
technologies, especially if they are perceived by the public as intrusive or having the 
potential to be misused. Neyroud and Disley (2008) suggest that the police cannot 
merely claim that the use of technologies makes them efficient. They further posit that 
the police must be able to identify and demonstrate the value that the new technologies 
add to their service to the public. In addition the police need to reassure the public that 
this technology will not be misused or that individual privacy will be compromised.  
The very nature of policing makes policing by consent a problematic issue. Reiner 
(1992) describes policing as an “inherently conflict-ridden enterprise” (p.59) with 
Herbert (2006) suggesting that the police have the hardest time of all state institutions in 
establishing legitimacy. Hinds and Murphy (2007) state that people will obey directives 
from legitimate institutions because they respect the institutions’ authority, not because 
of the fear of sanction for disobedience.    
 
Driven by the need to preserve the legitimate authority of the organisation, the police 
have embraced an “intelligence-led” policing model that utilises cutting-edge 
technologies. These technologies supposedly improve policing organisations' efficiency 
(Nunn & Quinet, 2002), while enhancing their legitimacy (Erickson &  Haggerty, 1997; 
Ericson & Shearing 1986; Manning, 1992). However, Neyroud and Disley (2008) 
caution that the effectiveness of new technologies should not be at the expense of civil 
liberties especially due to the close relationship between the effectiveness of the police 
and public perceptions of police legitimacy. They argue that the public perception of the 
police could be damaged if these new technologies are not deployed carefully. Their 
argument is supported by research conducted by Sunshine and Tyler (2003) who 
concluded:  
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"A procedural justice-based approach to regulation creates social order by engaging 
public cooperation with law and legal authority.  Such cooperation is engaged when 
people in the communities being policed experience the police as exercising their 
authority fairly  
(p. 535)." 
 
1.9  Impact of New Technology on Police Organisational Framework  
With the growth of new technology, monitoring the work of the police has become far 
easier (Moore, 2003; Walsh, 2001; Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNalley, Greenspan & 
Willis, 2003). The introduction of computers meant that police officers were able to be 
held accountable for their movements and their workload and quality of this work were 
able to be monitored. Manning (1992) argued that the most important recent innovations 
in technology involved computers and related software. According to Chan (2001) 
technology promised to improve effectiveness and efficiency in policing. She further 
suggests that one of the reasons police introduced new technology was to improve their 
performance in order to be more accountable to the public. Manning (2001) agrees, 
stating that technological changes in policing are driven by the need for efficiency, 
accurate information gathering for outside agencies and to meet new requirements for 
police management and public accountability.   
 
In 1998 the New Zealand Police attempted to implement a change management 
programme called Policing 2000. This programme endeavoured to utilise state-of-the-
art technology and strategic case management practices normally found in the public 
sector (Duncan, Mouly & Nilakant, 2001). Policing 2000 struggled with ongoing delays 
and technological problems. After spending an estimated $200 million and amidst much 
political and public debate, the Policing 2000 project was ended with limited 
technological change. Duncan, Mouly and Nilakant (2001) interviewed nine front-line 
officers from medium-sized New Zealand metropolitan police stations, who indicated 
that Policing 2000 was unsuccessful because it had failed to capture the imagination and 
support of those most affected: front-line officers. Chan (2001) would argue that the 
social game (field) was changed without new systems (habitus) being put in place to 
help the officers deal with the new rules. Although Policing 2000 was discontinued in 
2000, anecdotal evidence is that officers were still affected by that experience in 2007 in 
that when new technology or change was introduced, front-line staff were sceptical of 
its need and efficacy.  
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According to Chan (2001) there are many things to take into consideration when 
introducing new technology to the police. It is dependent on how technology interacts 
with existing cultural values, management styles, work practices and technical 
capabilities. If any of this is handled badly it may make the successful introduction of 
subsequent new policing technologies more difficult. DNA evidence is a new 
technology that gives the police greater ability to solve crime but has it changed the way 
in which the police conduct their business? DNA evidence can be described as a 
resource but one of the constraints of this new technology might be the increased 
workload that could be created by the ESR. If the police knew that the introduction of 
DNA evidence might add to their workload, then strategies would need to be put in 
place in order to make the most of this new capital.  
 
1.10   The CSI Effect on the Public 
According to Tyler (2006b) the “CSI Effect” is a term used by the media and legal 
authorities to describe the impact that certain US television shows have had on juror 
behaviour. It is possible that due to a high media profile the public are aware of the 
investigative potential of DNA. This knowledge comes from TV shows such as CSI, 
CSI Miami, CSI New York and Cold Case. These crime shows imply that DNA evidence 
is found at all crime scenes and that it and the scientists who interpret it are infallible so 
all crimes will be solved. The fictitious crime laboratories do not take into consideration 
the time-consuming and tedious aspect of policing as well as the financial constraints 
placed on all public sector departments. The media also reports many DNA successes at 
length.    
 
For example, in 1987 in New Zealand a six-year-old went missing on her way to school.  
A week later her body was found on a beach in a shallow grave. She had been raped and 
killed. At the time, hairs found on her body were gathered and stored. For 15 years the 
person responsible for this girl’s death remained unknown. In 2001, with advances in 
forensic technology, a profile was extracted from a small amount of semen saved on a 
microscopic slide. A massive screening exercise was begun to find a possible match. 
Jules Mikus was identified as a possible offender and in order to confirm a match the 
hairs found at the scene 15 years previously were sent to the US and exposed to 
mitochondrial DNA extraction. The profile matched that of Mikus. In October 2002 
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Mikus was convicted of the rape and murder of Teresa Cormack 15 years after her death 
(ESR, 2009). 
 
 Likewise, in the case of Jarrod Mangels who was convicted of the 1998 murder of 
Maureen McKinnel whose body was found in the Arrow River, Arrowtown, New 
Zealand. Mangels was 15 years old at the time of McKinnel’s death and although he 
was a suspect the police had nothing to connect him to the death. The police were able 
to take some scrapings from underneath the victim’s fingernails but at that time there 
was not enough of a sample to obtain a profile from them. In 2002, after the success of 
the Teresa Cormack case, an officer on this case asked that the samples be retested 
using new DNA testing methods. The tests resulted in DNA profiles being identified for 
two males. One profile belonged to a legitimate male contact, the other to an unknown 
male. After being arrested for disorderly behaviour in 2003, Mangels agreed to provide 
a voluntary blood sample for inclusion on the national DNA databank, at which point he 
was linked to the murder (ESR, 2009). Mangels pleaded guilty to the murder in 2004. 
More recently, in 2008 a male was arrested and charged with the rape and murder of 
Marie Jameson. Her body was recovered in Auckland, New Zealand, nine days after she 
went missing in 2001.  His DNA matched the DNA found on her clothing (Gay, 2008). 
These highly publicised cases have reinforced the public’s perception of the 
effectiveness of DNA as an efficient means of identifying offenders. These examples 
are just a few of the highly publicised cases but in searching one on-line New Zealand 
media website and entering ”DNA & crime” in the search engine, 933 hits came back in 
50 seconds. DNA is clearly a popular topic for the media, suggesting that the public 
have an appetite for it. 
 
Pyrek (2007) also describes the ”CSI effect” as the impact that such shows and media 
publications have had on jurors in the US. He suggests that the public fascination with 
forensic capabilities could be tracked back to the OJ Simpson case in 1995.  The belief 
is that without any DNA evidence the defendant must be innocent, regardless of the 
other evidence presented. For this reason jurors are more likely to acquit defendants 
where there is a perceived lack of forensic evidence. However, Tyler (2006b) and Cole 
and Dioso (2005) observe that there is no empirical evidence to back up these claims. In 
fact what the CSI effect could really mean is that the quality of expertise on the subject 
is marginal and such shows merely confuse jurors (Pyrek, 2007).  Tyler (2006b) argues 
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that in fact the opposite could be true and that by watching CSI jurors may be more 
likely to convict. Tyler (2006b) posits that the type of person who watches such crime 
shows wants to see justice done – to see the offender punished – which invariably 
happens in a fictitious setting. For this reason he does not believe that they would raise 
the bar for required evidence to acquit the offender. Lynch, Cole, McNally and Jordan 
(2008 p. X) state that “the CSI effect appears to be more of a media panic about the 
pernicious effects of the media than anything else”. They go on to say that at a deeper 
level the CSI effect could be that people are in awe of the perceived power of scientific 
evidence, especially DNA.   
 
In essence it could be said that there is no empirical research to back up the existence of 
a CSI effect and the actual impact on decision making by jurors. However, what could 
be taken from this is that the public do know about DNA, whether factually or 
fictionally, and therefore there is an expectation that the police use and need DNA to 
fight crime. In order to retain credibility with the public there needs to be some hard 
evidence of success other than just one or two examples every 15 years. 
 
1.11 The Research Question (and its conceptual context) 
The introduction to the police of DNA technology was never going to be seamless and 
according to Chan (2003) “technology has always shaped policing – in both visible and 
invisible ways” (p.655). Due to media coverage, DNA has become a highly visible and 
popular, if somewhat romanticised, investigative tool. However, the uptake and 
effective application of DNA technology by the police is quite a different matter. When 
new technology is introduced to the police, it can have an impact both good and bad on 
police culture (Chan, et al. 2001; Chan, 2003; Ericson & Haggerty, 1997) and it is this 
culture that will determine if a new technology will be fully utilised.  
 
The term “police culture” is often used to “explain and condemn a broad spectrum of 
policing practice” (Waddington, 1999a, p.287).  Waddington uses the words “explain” 
and “condemn” but not “praise” or “exonerate”. This is probably because police culture 
is often seen as a negative concept (Crank, 2004) when the culture is merely the 
environment in which the police situate themselves and respond to the many changing 
requirements of the society which they police. There is a vast array of literature on 
police culture and some of this literature will be explored in Chapter 3. Police culture is 
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mentioned at this point in the thesis as it is inextricably linked to this research because it 
forms a large part of the theoretical construct.  
 
In New Zealand, Casey and Cullen (2003) and the Controller and Auditor General 
(2006) have looked at ways of enhancing the police use of DNA technology. However, 
this view is only one aspect of the effective use of DNA technology and perhaps is not 
the right perspective to establish if the application is effective within the New Zealand 
Police. This research aims to discover if the New Zealand Police make the best use of 
DNA technology and what might prevent them from using it effectively. Therefore the 
research question is: Does police culture prevent the New Zealand Police from making 
the best use of DNA technology to investigate crime? To fully explore this question, 
police files where DNA was used were examined. Practitioners were interviewed for 
their insights into DNA to attempt to find out why the files were completed as they 
were. The history of the culture of the New Zealand Police was reviewed to better 
understand the use or lack of use of DNA to successfully resolve crime. When the 
police introduce new technology there is an implication for society as well. For this 
reason the public perception of police legitimacy is also explored with examples given 
of past experiences and the impact of these on both the public and the police. 
 
1.12   Outline of Chapters 
The research question is broken down into sub-questions, each of which is addressed in 
one of the following chapters: 
 
Chapter 2: Once the background to the research has been covered in the previous 
chapter, the methodology chapter is then introduced and the explanation for the chosen 
methodology is given. The methodology chapter fully explains the methods employed. 
It covers topics such as: grounded theory, the theoretical framework, the difficulty and 
limitations of the data, sampling, the research procedure, the interviews and the 
participants, the analysis and the subject district. The question of the researcher's bias is 
discussed and what has been done to mitigate this bias, bearing in mind the subjective 
nature of this research. This chapter also discusses the researcher’s access to the subject 
matter and the interview participants. 
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Chapter 3: This is the literature review and its purpose is to illustrate some of the 
research that has already been completed in the area of DNA, highlight the size of this 
field and the potential for and the need for more research within specific fields of DNA. 
This chapter covers literature written about many aspects of DNA technology which 
includes: the ethics of DNA, the application of DNA evidence at court, the impact of 
DNA use on civil liberties and the police use of DNA technology to identify offenders. 
This review of the literature identifies the research that has been done on the subject of 
DNA and also identifies the gaps in the research.  
 
Chapter 4: This is the first chapter containing data that begins to answer the research 
question. This chapter is primarily about burglary which is the largest sub-set of volume 
crime but it will discuss other volume crimes. As well as defining burglary, it provides 
statistics about burglary in New Zealand as well as comparing these figures with the UK 
and the US. There is also a section, for comparative purposes, on burglaries in the UK 
and the UK use of DNA technology to resolve burglaries. This chapter looks at how 
data is captured by the New Zealand Police and the impact this has on tracking results. 
The case histories of two burglary files are reviewed as they illustrate how one offender 
can be responsible for many burglaries. They are a useful example of how the police use 
DNA technology to investigate volume crimes. Results from interviews are reviewed 
and the opinions of the participants show their perspectives on DNA use for 
investigating volume crime. 
 
Chapter 5: This chapter aims (through the perspective of the interview participants) to 
establish how effective DNA is at identifying offenders and whether that alone ensures 
that they are prosecuted and convicted. The interview participants are asked their views 
on DNA, how it aids investigation and if DNA is all they need for a successful 
investigation. It finishes with a discussion on the topic of interviewing and whether 
police officers know how to interview suspects as it has been suggested (by 
interviewees) that this is a reason why suspects who are linked to a crime scene by the 
ESR are not being interviewed. 
 
Chapter 6: This chapter discusses whether DNA deserves its exaggerated reputation. It 
reviews the subject district’s application of DNA technology to investigate serious 
crime and illustrates this by the use of case studies. It looks at the conundrum posed to 
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the police when deciding whether to provide the best evidence or be fiscally responsible 
and whether the two are mutually exclusive. This chapter finishes with the views of the 
participants on the various questions put to them about budget, DNA training and what 
they consider to be their best investigative tool. This chapter differentiates between 
what the participants believe DNA to be good for (see chapter 5) and their actual use of 
DNA to successfully investigate crime. 
 
Chapter 7: This chapter reviews the perceived (by interviewees) constraints of using 
DNA technology by examining the responses to the questions around the frequency of 
DNA use and their views on the current (at time of writing) DNA legislation. As a result 
of the responses to these questions there is a section on the Guthrie test as well as a 
discussion on police legitimacy, privacy and ethics in relation to the application of DNA 
technology to investigate crime. 
Chapter 8: The previous chapters discuss the results of the data and what they highlight.   
This chapter explains possible reasons for those results and reviews what factors may 
impede the police in effectively using DNA technology to investigate crime. Therefore 
it examines police culture and the impact this has on its ability to implement change. 
This is done from the theoretical construct of Chan’s ”field and habitus” 
conceptualisation of policing and the impact that police culture can have on the 
successful implementation of new technology. This chapter also explores what outer 
limits are placed on the police by the public, which adds more pressure on the police. In 
this instance it is the importance of legitimacy as a significant means by which the 
police continue to receive support from the public. It explains why there is a need for 
this legitimacy when introducing new technology which may be considered contentious. 
The use of technology by the police is also covered in this chapter and it discusses the 
link between legitimacy and police culture and the impact both have on the successful 
application of technology to crime investigation. 
 
Chapter 9: This final chapter summarises a (theoretically based) answer to the research 
question posed in Chapter 1 section 1.0. It does this by reviewing the qualitative and 
quantitative data as a whole. It discusses all the results from the research and the 
implications they have for the New Zealand Police and its continued use of DNA and 
the National DNA Database.  This chapter also updates the reader on recent changes to 
practice by the New Zealand Police and the ESR in relation to DNA use. There are also 
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recommendations made to the New Zealand Police as to how they can maximise DNA 
technology to investigate crime as well as suggestions for further research in this area. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to give the reader an idea of the topics relevant to 
this research and to understand the environment in which the police have tried to 
implement change. The following chapter discusses the methodology applied to this 
research. It begins with background information on the researcher and what led her to 
this research question. From there it moves onto Grounded Theory and explains the 
decision to choose this theory. This chapter also discusses the difficulty with the official 
data, why this was expected and what was done in mitigation. From there the chapter 
moves onto the analysis and what methods were employed to do this, concluding with 
information regarding the interview participants. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.0   Introduction 
This methodology was chosen in order to best answer the question: Does Police Culture 
Prevent the New Zealand Police from Making the Best Use of DNA technology to 
investigate crime? It was believed by the researcher that by reviewing files where DNA 
was found at the crime scene and interviewing practitioners, useful conclusions could be 
arrived at to answer the research question.  
 
There are 12 districts within New Zealand Police (The New Zealand Police, 2010a) but 
it was decided that there was enough data to be gathered from using only one district, 
especially given the time constraints placed on this research. This district is one of three 
in Auckland, which is the largest city in New Zealand, so there was a sizeable volume 
of work with a variety of crime types in which to gather data. The year 2005 was chosen 
because it was the year in which one police national computer, the Law Enforcement 
System (LES), was decommissioned and another, the National Intelligence Application 
(NIA), was fully implemented. These systems made a difference as to how files were 
tracked and data gathered and NIA contained more information than was able to be 
stored previously on LES. 
The researcher's background and subsequent employment led her to this research topic 
and consequently has influence over her research which means there is a subjective 
element to this study. This potential for bias can manifest itself in two ways. The first as 
expressed here, in that the researcher is part of the habitus (culture) in which she is 
researching and secondly as discussed further in this chapter (see chapter 2 section 2.1). 
Being immersed in the culture may impact on the conclusions that the researcher draws 
from the research. This is acknowledged and has been mitigated when practicably 
possible. The researcher was a police officer in the Metropolitan Police in London when 
the practice of taking DNA samples from arrested people was first introduced.  Initially, 
DNA was taken only from people arrested for violent offences or for burglaries. The 
belief was that taking DNA samples would enable the police to identify an offender 
should they re-offend. At this initial stage the Metropolitan Police decided that samples 
would not be taken from all arrested people. It is possible that there was a financial 
consideration to this decision as well as a capacity issue as DNA was still in its infancy. 
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People arrested for violence and burglary offences were considered to be the most 
suitable from whom to obtain DNA samples. Taking this idea further, once the offender 
was identified they would be arrested, charged and convicted, hopefully leading to a 
term of imprisonment and therefore preventing them from committing more offences 
and thus preventing further crime. It was in 1999, while the researcher was still in the 
Metropolitan Police, that changes were made so that DNA was taken from everyone 
arrested. The UK government invested heavily in the national DNA database, believing 
that the larger the database the more effective it would be at solving crime (Townsley, 
Smith & Pease, 2005). This idea and the consequences of this approach as well as the 
change of mindset will be explored further in the body of the research. 
The researcher left the Metropolitan Police in 2002 to return to New Zealand. She was 
employed by the New Zealand Police, not as a police officer but as a police employee,  
holding no constabulary powers. In her role of establishing a File Management Unit 
(FMU) it was noticed that forensic results in the Auckland City district appeared to be 
dealt with in a disparate and ad-hoc manner. Forensic results referred to both fingerprint 
results from an internal department and DNA results received from the Institute of 
Environmental Science and Research (ESR). Interested by this, she suggested that the 
FMU should deal with all forensic results in the district so as to give some cohesion to 
the process. Once some method was applied to the collation of the results, she then set 
about reviewing the action that was taken when these results were received by the 
officer. At this stage she was merely establishing what actually was done with forensic 
hits in the district so as to better understand the process. 
It emerged that when a forensic result was received in the FMU this information was 
sent out to the Detective Senior Sergeant responsible for the geographical area where 
the crime was alleged to have been committed so that further investigation could be 
conducted. This result was in the form of a name. This name had been taken from the 
national DNA databank and had been linked to a crime scene sample.  The main 
difficulty as perceived by the researcher at this point was trying to track the progress of 
these results. Without the ability to track them it made it difficult to quantify the success 
or failure of forensic evidence. However, what quickly became of more concern to the 
researcher was the number of files being returned to the unit for filing when the forensic 
result had not been resolved. This meant that a person had been identified as having 
been at the scene of a crime but that named person had not even been interviewed by the 
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police. When the researcher enquired of officers why files were being filed, the general 
response tended to be that they were too busy, but this information was gathered only 
anecdotally. On a superficial level it was concerning that files with forensic results were 
being filed. However, the researcher did not know if this was truly an issue or if it only 
appeared to be a problem as she did not have the oversight of every forensic file in the 
district.  
At this time the use of DNA technology by the New Zealand Police was gaining more 
publicity and TV shows such as the CSI franchise, where DNA evidence is portrayed as  
the prominent tool to solve crimes and all within 60 minutes, were gaining a wide 
audience (Pyrek, 2007; Roane, 2005; Toobin, 2007).The public were beginning to have 
expectations of DNA not necessarily based in reality. Also at this time, 2003, the police 
were requesting greater powers to obtain and store DNA profiles. Some of the reasoning 
behind the greater use of DNA technology was that it was a good tool to aid the police 
in identifying offenders and therefore solve and ultimately reduce crime (Power, 2009). 
For this reason the researcher decided to focus on DNA technology and exclude 
fingerprints from the main research question.  
At the time of writing the researcher worked in the subject district and had a good 
working knowledge of the machinations of the police. Likewise she had access to all the 
required files and data as well as a professional relationship with those interviewed. 
This intimate knowledge of the files and processes placed the researcher in an ideal 
position to gain access to the necessary data to complete the research. However, the 
researcher has now moved to a more strategic position at police national headquarters. 
This position enables her to have a more holistic view of the New Zealand Police and so 
has the ability to observe other practices that are relevant to this research, such as police 
culture applied to a variety of change management processes.  These observations form 
part of the methodology and the theory of this research in that the researcher is 
embedded in the habitus of the police. The advantage of the researcher being in this 
position is that she can observe things that other people cannot.  An example of this 
related to a change to the process of capturing intelligence notings for entry into the 
police national computer. Police officers were used to writing these notings on paper or 
creating word documents and sending them to data entry staff. The New Zealand Police 
issued iPads and iPhones to all front-line staff and requested they use these devices to 
enter intelligence notings directly on to their iPads or iPhones.  However, the new 
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business process was not communicated effectively with staff, the technology had 
problems with coverage, internet access and security all of which slowed the process 
down.  As a result the staff reverted back to the old system as they found it easier and 
quicker.  Anecdotally, some staff referred to the iPad as a great paperweight with others 
saying it was the best ‘piece of kit’ the police had ever given them.  The front-line staff 
were happy to have the devices but only if they could use them for checking people and 
vehicles. This is completely unacceptable as the police have invested a huge amount of 
money in the devices with the long term plan to have the police fully electronic (i.e. no 
paper files) and police officers only needing to go to the station if they arrested a person 
or at the beginning and the end of shifts.  For this reason it is important that the staff 
make full use of the devices, however the organisation needs to ensure that the officers 
are supported, trained and are given the right equipment that will allow them to do this. 
When the devices were rolled out, this was not the case. The researcher is in a unique 
position to observe this disconnection between the policy of Police National 
Headquarters and the implementation by front-line staff. Officers can actively oppose 
national policy if they do not agree with it or of they consider it impractical (Chan, 
1996; Grant & Rowe, 2011; Reuss-Ianni, 1983).  As noted and experienced by the 
researcher, this example is comparable to the introduction of DNA and how the culture 
of the police impacts on the success or failure of new technology. This culture includes 
attitudes to organisational change by those who should be driving the change (i.e. 
managers) and those working within the changing environment. This inside knowledge 
is of benefit to the research as it enables the researcher to understand why the police 
officers may act as they do.  The organisation has an expectation of the staff but does 
not communicate what those expectations are or provide them with the necessary tools 
achieve the expected goals. 
 
2.1   Researcher’s Access to the Police 
The material that researchers can access from the police depends on who they are and 
their connection with the organisation (Reiner & Newburn, 2008). Police researchers 
have been categorised into four distinct groups by Brown (1996). They are inside 
insiders, outside insiders, inside outsiders and outside outsiders. Whichever category the 
researcher falls into will determine the level of access and the quality of information 
that will be given to the researcher. The categories are likewise defined: inside insiders 
are police officers who conduct research. The advantage of this is that they have easy 
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access to police information. However, if the researcher holds a position of authority 
there could be a possibility that other officers feel compelled to take part in the research 
and may not feel comfortable being honest in their answers, which may skew the 
results. The outside insiders are usually former police officers who have left the 
organisation to pursue academic careers. While they will have good knowledge of the 
police environment, the manner of their departure will be pertinent to the type of 
responses received. If the researcher lacks credibility with the staff, access and staff 
willingness to cooperate and be unfettered in their responses will continue to be 
problematic. Likewise, if such researchers feel that they have intimate knowledge of the 
police they may believe that they can interpret all the data with an understanding 
superior to that of outsiders. This may lead to bias at the analytical stage. Inside 
outsiders are non-police officers who are employed by the police or other government 
departments specifically to perform research on the police. This group may have easier 
access to the police but they may be treated with distrust as they will be seen as part of 
the management. Outside outsiders have the greatest difficulty in acquiring access to the 
police. These researchers are usually academics with no affiliation to the police or 
government bodies. In this instance there is no strong impulse for the police to 
cooperate with the researcher and the police feel that such research is often critical 
(Reiner & Newburn, 2008).  
 
For this thesis, the researcher has the advantage of being embedded within the research 
environment, which facilitates access to the data and allows for an understanding of the 
working culture (habitus) of the police. Both can be considered advantageous for this 
type of research. Within Brown’s paradigm, this researcher would be a combination of 
an outside insider and an inside outsider. The researcher is a former police officer who 
left the Metropolitan Police Service to return to her home country. Although the 
researcher is employed by the police it is not in the role of a researcher but as the 
manager of a file management centre. In this position the researcher has built up many 
professional relationships and was able to identify appropriate people to be interviewed. 
The researcher had no position of authority over any of those interviewed so there 
should not have been any feeling of coercion by the participants and the research is 
independent of the management. However, although the researcher felt this to be true 
there is no evidence to support this claim, other than the researcher’s belief that the 
interviews were carried out in an open and honest environment. 
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It was within the researcher’s work environment that the phenomenon that is the subject 
of this research was first noted. However, being this close to the subject matter can lead 
to bias and preconceived expectations about the findings and may lead the researcher to 
interpret data in a manner that fulfils these assumptions (Drapeau, 2002). Heidegger 
believed that interpretations free from suppositions are impossible as a person’s 
interpretations are already based on life experiences which have become part of that 
person’s existence (Nystrom & Dahlberg, 2001; Mak & Elwyn, 2003). Gadamer (1975) 
refers to these pre-conceptions as ”pre-understanding” which originates from our ”being 
in the world”. Pre-understanding is formulated from one’s past experiences, 
perspectives and anticipations of what to expect in interpretation (Mak & Elwyn, 2003). 
As the researcher is from the environment where the research was being conducted it 
was considered appropriate to use an interpretive paradigm as the situation lends itself 
to this methodological orientation. In acknowledging that the researcher has pre-
understanding of the subject and the environment of the research, a research method 
was chosen that, at least conceptually, avoids the use of pre-conceived assumptions by 
focusing on the meaning of the data.  
 
2.2   Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory is based on the proposition that the data is the most important part of 
any study because it is from the data that theories are constructed. In other words, the 
theory emerges from the data rather than the theory imposing on the data (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967; Glaser, 1998). According to Glaser and Strauss (1967) the researcher 
must abandon any preconceptions they hold about the topic being studied. From this 
perspective the researcher starts by examining the initial data and formulating ideas that 
then inform the next stage of data gathering. It is from the results of this data that the 
next stage of the research will be directed. The grounded theory approach uses the cycle 
of data collection followed by analysis which then informs the subsequent avenues of 
investigation until such time as the categories/theory in the study are saturated with 
information and it is considered that no further substantially new information could be 
added (Glaser &, Strauss 1967; Glaser, 1998). In short, the data collection stops when 
no new information emerges. The grounded theory approach will be applied to all the 
data collected; data from the files will direct how the data will be collected from the 
interviews. The combined data will be analysed until no substantially new material 
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emerges. Grounded theory was chosen as it is about starting the research with nothing; 
no preconceived ideas, no assumptions or presumptions. Ideally there will be no idea 
what information will be found. This enables the researcher to enter into the research 
with a reasonably open mind, not knowing what the data will identify. This method was 
chosen to reduce the likelihood of bias. Although a quantitative approach is also used in 
this research, qualitative data is the main research approach and this lends itself well to 
grounded theory.   
The researcher considered both a quantitative and qualitative research design. The 
quantitative approach provides statistical measures of the data being studied whereas 
qualitative research aims to reach qualities that can be used to interpret and explain 
behaviour. “The quantitative approach provides researchers with breadth while the 
qualitative provides them with depth” (Tolich & Davidson, 2003, p.122). The researcher 
wanted to know why certain decisions were made as to when and if a file would be 
investigated and the best way to achieve this was by using a qualitative approach.  
However, as statistics were required to put the research question into context, a 
quantitative approach was also required. It was felt that the two approaches would 
complement each other, allow for greater validity from the data and provide stronger 
evidence. In order to validate the qualitative data, triangulation (Bryman, 2013; Ruben 
& Babbie, 2010) was used to obtain information from several different sources. These 
sources included reviewing files and then interviewing participants based on the 
findings from those files. Once this data was collected, further reading was done to 
better understand the findings of the files and interviews. This reading included New 
Zealand Police policy documents and ESR policy documents in addition to relevant 
research completed by other New Zealand Government agencies such as the Auditor-
General. Moreover, the researcher made observations on what she experienced within 
the research environment (see chapter 2 section 2.1). By doing this the researcher was 
able to come to conclusions based on different sources and differing opinions.  The use 
of triangulation corroborates the data and enhances the credibility of the interpretation 
of the data as well as offering the possibility of enhanced confidence in the data 
(Bryman, 2013). It also helps mitigate the likelihood of bias from the researcher and 
from those being interviewed because if a proposition is able to be confirmed by 
different measures it reduces the uncertainty of the results (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz 
& Sechrest, 1966). The data gathered from the files is one source of information but, 
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because of limitations of this data-set, other sources are useful to qualify this 
information. Interviews provide another viewpoint and can either mitigate or support the 
findings from the files. Interview results can also prevent the researcher from 
interpreting the data in such a way that it may pre-determine the outcome of the 
research. The quantitative method provides numerical evidence from the phenomenon 
whereas the qualitative explains the data.  
 
2.3   Difficulties with the ‘Official Data’ 
Much of the data used for this research comes from information entered into the 
National Intelligence Application (NIA). It needs to be stated that this data is not 
necessarily accurate due to a lack of guidelines for data entry staff and a variety of 
methods by which data can be entered into the NIA. Therefore it is acknowledged that 
this data may be flawed but this is accepted as part of the research limitations and 
accounted for accordingly.    
 
The NIA is the police national computer and as well as storing police intelligence it is 
also used to track files. From this system statistics are extracted to monitor workloads, 
identify the number and types of recorded crime and establish the success or failure of 
police work. The process begins when a member of the public informs the police that a 
crime has occurred. An example of this would be a burglary. A CSA or SOCO attends 
the scene of the burglary and obtains a DNA sample. An offence report is recorded 
either directly into the computer or in hard copy before being transferred to the 
computer. In this instance it is noted that a DNA sample was obtained from the scene 
and has been sent to the ESR for examination. For ease of data entry into the NIA the 
New Zealand Police use codes to classify crimes (see Appendix 1). These codes need to 
be entered correctly to accurately reflect the reported crimes. Once the initial report has 
been entered the officer completes an investigation with the outcome of his/her findings 
either entered into the NIA or the report being placed on the file. If there is DNA 
evidence the investigation will be suspended awaiting the results.  If a profile is able to 
be extracted from the sample that has been received from the police it is loaded onto the 
crime scene sample database at the ESR. The original sample is destroyed in accordance 
with legislation. The profile on the crime scene sample database is then compared with 
samples on the national DNA database.   
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If this profile is matched to a name, this information is then passed onto the police using 
a generic e-mail address relevant to the appropriate district. Once a DNA result has been 
received by the police and a suspect identified, the NIA is updated with this information 
and the file is sent to an officer for further investigation. The suspect should then be 
interviewed and, if appropriate, arrested and charged. At this point the NIA should be 
updated with an apprehension code (see Appendix 3) which identifies how the suspect 
was apprehended. A resolution code should then be entered to explain how the offence 
was resolved (see Appendix 2). It is important that these codes are used accurately as it 
allows the police to quantify the effectiveness of various types of processes. The use of 
DNA or fingerprint evidence to catch offenders would be captured by the use of 
”forensic” as an apprehension code. It should be noted that “forensic” data is not 
available before 2003 because there was not an option on the Law Enforcement System 
(see page 37) to enter ”forensic” as an apprehension code. The difficulty with using 
”forensic” as a generic resolution code rather than specifying fingerprint or DNA is that 
the police cannot provide figures to show how often DNA has been used to resolve a 
crime. Likewise if the apprehension code or resolution code is not entered into the NIA 
the ability to track what methods are the most successful in solving crime becomes 
difficult. All the codes are agreed to by the Organisational Performance Group based at 
Police National Headquarters in Wellington. These codes allow the Organisational 
Performance Group to provide the government with data relevant to police performance.  
The appropriate use of these codes would ensure that the information presented to the 
government is an accurate reflection of the work and achievements of the police.   
 
2.4   Legislation and the Forensics Process  
The forensic processes employed by the New Zealand Police (see chapter 1 section 1.6) 
relate to practices that were in place in one district relating to files that were filed in 
2005.  Some of these practices will have changed during the writing-up process of this 
thesis. Where possible these changes will be indicated via a footnote or further explored 
throughout the body of the work. It is important to note these changes as it will impact 
on the conclusion and recommendations of this thesis. The data for this study involved 
files that date from 1997 to 2005. This period encompassed two pieces of legislation 
relevant to police powers and the use of DNA evidence. The Criminal Investigations 
(Bodily Samples) Act 1995 will go through two iterations during this research. When it 
is referred to in the thesis prior to the 2003 amendment it is called the Criminal 
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Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995. Anything after the 2003 amendment refers to 
the Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995. These are important distinctions 
as they gave the police different powers (see chapter 1 section 1.5). The legislation had 
an impact on how the police were able to investigate crime as it placed limitations on 
police powers and their ability to obtain and retain DNA samples. It may well explain 
why there are some delays in suspects being interviewed or their DNA being entered 
onto the database.  
 
2.5   Police Case Files  
This research looked at police case files where DNA was found at the scene of the 
crime. The information was gathered at the subject district by entering individual DNA 
results received from the ESR onto a separate spreadsheet. Each district may have its 
own method of storing this data or it may choose not to capture this data separately. 
Nationally this data can be captured via the apprehension code on the NIA but as stated 
above this does not differentiate between fingerprint and DNA, using instead the 
generic ”forensic” apprehension code. There is no guarantee, either, that police from 
different districts enter the appropriate apprehension code, with the more common 
”interview” or ”patrol” being used. One school of thought is that an officer interviews 
an offender because DNA was found at the scene and therefore the apprehension code is 
”forensic”.  However, other officers argue that if the person admits the offence it is due 
to the interviewing skills of the officer and therefore the apprehension code should be 
”interview”. It can be argued that the only reason the person is being interviewed is as a 
result of DNA evidence being found at the crime scene and ESR linking the sample to a 
name. It may be that the ego of the investigating officer has some part to play in this. 
Irrespective of the reasons, these complications added to the difficulty of tracking the 
effectiveness of DNA in resolving crime.    
 
Policing statistics tend to refer to the financial year which runs from 1st July through to 
30th June. For the purpose of this research the files and statistics relate to the calendar 
year unless otherwise stated as the researcher found it easier to gather data based on the 
calendar year. The data available spanned a 12-month period from 1st January 2005 to 
31st December 2005. This involved 302 files which provided both quantitative and 
qualitative types of data. At the data level, a mixed method was used in order to extract 
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the best information from the data. The quantitative data held within the police case 
files provided numerical information on the following: 
• Offence codes (burglary, unlawful taking, theft from motor vehicle, etc) 
• Number of case files altogether 
• Number of case files where DNA was the only evidence available 
• Number of case files where cases were prosecuted  
• Number of case files where offenders  were convicted 
• Number of case files where DNA was superfluous to the investigation because  
                   other forms of evidence took precedence 
• Number of case files where the suspect was unable to be located  
 
While the quantitative aspect of the study provided a framework, it was the qualitative 
data that was examined, which provided an explanation for this framework. The 
qualitative data included reports completed by the arresting officer explaining their 
decision-making process, the court results and why that decision by the court was made. 
Moreover, the qualitative statements made by the investigating officers had been 
expected to provide insight into the reasons why DNA profiling was used. In some 
cases where there were no concluding statements on the file, inferences were made 
based on the information to hand, the results from the court and the knowledge and 
experience of the researcher.  
 
Although there is the potential for the researcher to come to biased conclusions from the 
inferences, Gadamer (1975) explained that a person who has previous knowledge has 
not only come through events but is also open to new experiences. As a result of this 
background the person is often undogmatic and is very open and willing to learn 
(Nystrom & Dahlberg, 2001). Therefore the experience that the researcher brings to the 
study will not necessarily be prejudiced but likely to put the information into 
perspective. 
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2.6   Sampling 
Where the quantitative aspect of the study was concerned all available DNA case files 
from the subject district in the year 2005 were analysed. The year 2005 was chosen as it 
was anticipated that these files would be old enough for the court process to have been 
completed but recent enough to be relevant to the research. Cases can sometimes take a 
long time to get to court and often the officer will spend a lot of time finishing the 
paperwork before filing it. The figure of 302 files initially seemed large but there was 
no guarantee that all 302 files would be located. Due to the method of crime reporting in 
the New Zealand Police, one file does not equate to one crime. One file may contain 
more than one offence as it is possible for several offences to occur during the same 
incident. For example, a burglary file may have an unlawful taking offence attached to it 
or even an assault. If 53,615 crimes were reported it does not necessarily mean there 
would be 53,615 files corresponding to those crimes. Moreover, those files are often 
associated with many other files with which they are linked, mostly because the crimes 
have been committed by the same person or persons. Of the 302 DNA files, only 146 
were available to view in the subject district case study but when they were examined it 
became clear that there were more than 146 files involved. Of the 84 files classified as 
burglary, closer examination revealed that there were many more files associated to the 
main files. On this occasion the 84 burglary files increased to 459 files with some 
unlawful taking and aggravated burglaries also associated to the main files.  Of these 
files, three had more than 50 associated files with one file having 98 associated files. It 
should be stated that DNA was not mentioned on all these files but only on the original 
302 files, yet DNA was one way of bringing these crimes together and identifying the 
offender. These large associated files slowed down the data-gathering process as they 
were often difficult to navigate and it was not always easy to separate the one DNA file 
within the 459 files. 
 
There are always issues with locating files due to the nature of the tracking system and 
whether staff remember to update the computer with the movement of the file. It was 
expected that, due to the serious nature of some offences, some files would still be held 
by the investigating officer. This meant that there would be more of certain crime-type 
files available and less of others. The researcher incorporated this into her study. The 
resolution rates for serious crime are much higher than that for volume crime. For the 
purpose of this research, serious crime encompasses violence and sexual offences 
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whereas volume crime refers to burglaries, unlawful taking of motor vehicles and theft 
from motor vehicles. Arguably this difference in resolution rate is because there is less 
reported serious crime than volume crime. It could also be as a result of more funding 
and staffing to investigate serious crime. Given these realities, it is not surprising that 
there were more volume crime files available to view. This subject is explored more 
fully in Chapter 4.  
 
Although grounded theory encourages researchers to continue looking through the data 
until no more new information emerges, it was felt that examining the entire available 
corpus from the archives would give a more rounded picture of what was happening 
with DNA files.  However, the question of whether it would be impractical to analyse 
all the 302 files was uppermost in the mind of the researcher as qualitative analysis is 
time consuming.  Initially there was a problem selecting which files to analyse as the 
majority of the files were volume crime. As the majority of DNA hits relate to volume 
crime, it was decided that all the case files should be examined so as to fully explore 
what was happening with volume crime files. In this case, although the information 
coming out of the data might be the same, it was felt that the quantity of files would 
only benefit the results of the study.  
 
The potential limitation with this data set was that there was an expectation that all the 
files would fully explain what happened with the case. There was no guarantee that this 
would be so as these files had been completed by different officers with varying styles 
and skills of paperwork. Some of the files dated back to 1998 when methods for 
recording crime were different. The previously used Law Enforcement System was used 
only to track the files and contained no useful information regarding the case. Often 
these old files contained very little information which appeared to be the accepted 
practice of the day; this was particularly true of volume files. There were case files 
where the researcher simply could not ascertain the final outcome of the investigation 
and why such decisions were made. As expected, some files contained better 
information than others.  
 
Dummy Files 
When a file cannot be located an officer will create a ”dummy” file so that something 
tangible can be filed. The form used at the subject district to create these dummy files is 
48 
 
known as a B form. Once the original file is located it replaces the B form. Some of the 
files in the data set were B forms and so there was little information regarding these 
files. Some details could be gathered from the NIA but otherwise there was very little 
with which to work.  
 
2.7   Procedure 
Given the complexity of the multi-method approach to the research, it is best explained 
in a three-stage format. During the first stage there was an exploratory examination of 
the data.  The second stage expanded upon information gathered during the first stage 
and further consolidated the analysis of the data. In the third and final stage steps were 
taken to gather further information to confirm the results of the study and to fill any 
gaps in the data. Furthermore, this was where data was gathered to contextualise the use 
of DNA profiling within the New Zealand Police and the ESR. 
 
2.7.1   Stage 1  
A small exploratory pilot study was used to gain a better understanding of the potential 
information that could be yielded by the data. This was achieved by choosing 10 
available files from the 302 files from 2005. The method employed to choose these files 
was probability sampling using a simple random way to identify the files to be 
reviewed. This method was decided upon as an effective process to identify 10 files for 
review.  This was achieved by taking every 10th file, if that file was not available then 
the next file was chosen and then the 10th file after that. In this pilot study it was 
expected that files may not be available due to the file unable to be located or still with 
the investigating officer.  Therefore some of the 10 identified files were not available or 
could not be located which illustrated from the beginning the difficulty associated with 
accessing police files. The number 10 was chosen because it was believed that that 
number of files would yield enough information for an exploratory study (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000).  These 10 files were used as a sample to develop a standardised analysis 
sheet and to identify the relevant categories, both quantitative and qualitative, that were 
important for the study. The files were initially examined to establish what information 
they contained and whether the information obtained was of value to the study.  
 
The first problem encountered was that files chosen were not all available to be viewed. 
This was expected as the researcher knew that files can sometimes remain with 
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investigating officers for a period after the closure of a case. In addition, files can 
occasionally be misplaced due to the difficulties that some officers experience using the 
NIA. For these reasons it was planned to view 302 files but if all these files were not 
available there would still be enough to form the basis of the study. The results from the 
10 files were entered onto a spreadsheet where they were analysed. From this what 
information could be expected to be found on a file was identified and a heuristic (a 
matrix that can be used to organise themes) was derived from this. The remainder of the 
available files were examined and the data was entered onto this heuristic.  
 
2.7.2   Stage 2  
During this stage the quantitative categories developed in Stage 1 were employed on all 
the available files. The quantitative data was analysed, forming the framework for the 
study. There were several variables to consider when examining these files. The files 
were a mixture of offence types: burglary, theft from a motor vehicle and unlawful 
taking of a motor vehicle. Mixed in with these were some violence and sexual offences 
on various scales of seriousness. This information provided the researcher with an 
understanding of which crimes most used DNA profiling. These crime types in the 
police files were compared with other official crime statistics in order to find out how 
often DNA is used overall. These statistics were obtained from Statistics New Zealand 
and the District Risk and Performance Unit based at the subject district. 
As well as DNA evidence there are several other methods employed by the police to 
identify offenders:  
• Other forensic science  
• Closed circuit television footage 
• Interview/admission 
• Offender caught at the scene 
• Witness identification 
By going through the police case files, it was hoped to establish whether DNA was the 
only evidence present or if any of the above were also factors in the investigation.  
Another important variable was the method by which the officer recorded the 
resolution.  This method of capturing the resolution enables the police to count how 
many files have been resolved via forensics as opposed to the other methods of 
detection stated. The information is captured by means of a code entered onto the police 
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national computer. However, the choice of code is open to interpretation by the data 
entry operator or the officer. Therefore the disparity on the computer of how a crime is 
shown to have been resolved made it difficult to identify how often DNA was 
responsible for the resolution of crimes. Consequently it was important to compare the 
resolution code with the report the officer had put on the file.   
 
The qualitative categorical framework developed in Stage 1 was utilised in a wider 
context to gather, capture and analyse the interviews as well as review the police case 
files. When an officer has completed a case file, the decision-making process should be 
explained in a final report contained on the file. This should always be the final entry on 
the case file and the first report seen when the file is opened. This report should contain 
all the evidence that was found in the course of the investigation and work through the 
officer’s decision-making process. In line with the grounded theory approach to 
qualitative research, data gained from the police case files influenced which questions 
were asked in the subsequent stage.  
 
2.7.3   Stage 3  
This stage involved the interviews. They were conducted with people closely involved 
with and considered specialists in the use of DNA in the investigative process.  
• Crime Managers – control the DNA budget and so decide what samples 
should be sent to ESR 
• Supervisors – responsible for DNA budget and overtime and prioritise the 
work of the constable 
• Detectives – receive hits from ESR and decide whether to arrest the named 
offender 
• Scenes of Crimes Officers and Crime Scene Attendants – attend crime scenes 
and obtain crime scene samples to send to ESR 
• Constables – attend crime scenes and preserve scenes for SOCO 
• ESR Case Manager – encourage police to send all crime scene samples to 
ESR for testing   
 
The interviews were conducted at the workplaces of those interviewed. These were 
chosen by the participants as they stated this was where they were most comfortable. 
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The interview space was private. Participants were given a participant information sheet 
(see Appendix 19) that informed them why they had been approached, exactly what 
would happen with their interview and that they would remain anonymous. The 
agreement detailed counselling information should they feel the need for it. The 
participant was also given a consent form (see Appendix 20) which explained what they 
were consenting to and informing them that the interview would be recorded. This 
consent form was signed by the participant and kept by the researcher. The consent 
forms and the interview tapes are kept in a locked cupboard by the researcher and will 
be retained until the thesis has been published. Once the required time has expired, the 
forms and recordings will be destroyed in accordance with agreed protocol. The 
researcher began each session by building up a rapport with participants but as she was 
known to most of them and being a former police officer herself, she enjoyed some 
credibility with them. The researcher was not in a position of authority over any of the 
participants and so shared an equitable relationship. The interview began only when 
participants indicated they were ready. At the end of the interview the researcher spent 
time talking to each participant to ensure they had not been distressed by the interview 
and were in a calm frame of mind before she left the room. The interviews were 
transcribed by a third party who signed a confidentiality agreement (see Appendix 21) 
and was experienced at transcribing research interviews. The transcriber was also 
warned of the nature of the interviews and was regularly spoken to by the researcher to 
ensure that she was not distressed by the interview content.  
 
Those interviewed were a mixture of gender, length of service and police officers and 
police employees who did not hold the office of constable. This diverse group helped to 
obtain a range of opinions in order to prevent bias in the data. The interviews were 
semi-structured so as to enable participants to introduce their own topics which may 
have arisen from the questions and this allowed the researcher to discuss topics relating 
to DNA that were important to the participants. All the participants were asked the same 
nine questions although the wording of some questions was changed to accommodate 
the ESR manager’s different role in DNA (see Appendix 4). The aim of the interview 
was to find out how the participants interacted with the DNA technology, to establish 
what training, if any, they received and the role DNA evidence plays in police 
investigations. The interview for ESR staff was different to that for New Zealand Police 
staff, given their more exclusive corporate role. Further information such as official 
52 
 
reports and studies completed by other government departments and other policy 
documents written by police and the ESR was gathered to support the findings of this 
study. 
 
2.8   The Analysis 
The quantitative material was analysed using descriptive statistics. Initially the files 
were examined to gather the raw data. After this stage of the research the data was 
quantified by converting it into a numerical format. Some of the data, such as the 
number of offences, was easily quantifiable. Other data obtained from the files was 
entered onto a heuristic and memoing (as discussed further in this section) was used to 
try to explain and understand the information gathered. The heuristic contains the 
information from the files that the researcher determined would be of the most use to 
the research. This heuristic consisted of a table with the following information: 
 
• file number  
• offence code  
• DNA found 
• other evidence available 
• offence date 
• result 
• other information 
• whether DNA was superfluous 
• the investigation team 
• file inactivated or filed   
 
Some of the decisions made by the researcher were subjective, such as whether, based 
on the information on the file, she deemed if DNA was superfluous to the investigation 
or not. The memoing was done on the heuristic wherever it was needed to add more 
information or further explain a finding from a file. This enabled the researcher to form 
conclusions based on information from files after all the data from these files was 
collected.   
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Coding was used to collate the interview responses and identify any emerging themes 
from the interviews. Once the interviews were transcribed, the researcher went through 
all the questions and wrote the responses on a whiteboard using differently coloured 
markers for the different answers. This was done to establish whether any themes were 
emerging from the data. The colour scheme very quickly identified patterns and from 
these the researcher was able to pick out similar answers and put them into sub-
headings, therefore establishing a hierarchy of responses. The answers that are not 
highlighted are the ones that did not form any patterns (see Appendices 6-15). The 
qualitative data collection and analysis were iterative. This means that the data was 
regularly subjected to the constant comparative method in order to see what 
information was emerging from it. Babbie (2005) suggests that there is a continuing 
interplay between data collection and theory. This part of the research is dynamic and 
involves the researcher constantly reviewing the data. The use of coding is one way of 
doing this but the coding process in grounded theory involves more than just 
categorising the data. Although coding is used to compare the data and look for 
emerging theory, memoing is also used to search for meaning within this data and as a 
way of looking for patterns and concepts. These memos are notes made by the 
researcher who is continually recording what new information is emerging from the 
data. As the emergent data provides categories of information, a heuristic is used to 
capture this information. A heuristic is a matrix that can be used to organise themes in a 
way that relates to each file.  By setting out the information in such a manner, any 
patterns that emerge will be easier to observe (see Appendix 18). Furthermore, the 
heuristic can also be compared with the data to check for bias in the analysis. To 
triangulate the data, it was collected from police case files, interviews with police 
employees, interviews with members of the ESR and official documentation. This 
multi-method approach solves the problem of possible bias that may have occurred had 
the study relied only on the accounts of police officers. If the interpretation of one set 
of data can be corroborated with other sources then bias is reduced and the validity of 
the findings is enhanced.  
 
2.0.9   Limitations of this Data Set 
For the 2005 calendar year 302 files had DNA attached to them in some way. Not all 
these files were available, due either to them being unable to be located or being still 
with an investigator. A file may remain with an investigator because that investigator is 
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taking a long time to complete the filing process. This might involve updating the 
victim, disposing of exhibits or adding the final touches to paperwork. In some cases 
this may take up to six months after the case is finished at court. The files were 
reviewed, amongst other things, to establish if DNA had been found at the scene and 
what the police had done with this information. While it could be argued that the files 
the researcher could not find were those that had been successfully investigated, there is 
nothing to suggest that the remaining 156 did all result in a successful prosecution or 
that they did not. However, it is an acknowledged part of police research that all data 
will not always be readily available. In this instance it is important to note that the 
missing files and difficulties with the data entry are all part of this research and add to 
the concerns of police use of technology.  
 
However, of the 146 files reviewed, every file contained something that the researcher 
could use but not all had 100% of the required information which was hoped for. The 
fact that there were missing or inaccurate apprehension codes or resolution codes is an 
important part of the research. This may highlight a bigger problem in that the 
institutional design may be part of the issue for the police when trying to manage not 
only DNA technology but other technology as well. There was missing data with case 
files not being available or unable to be located but allowances were made and enough 
case files were available to make the study viable. “Criminological researchers confront 
missing data problems in practically every analysis they perform” (Brame & 
Paternoster, 2003, p.55).  As well as missing data there was also limited quality 
information available which is not unusual in police data due to the many opportunities 
for distortion both when the data is being gathered and then stored, i.e. in terms of data 
entry (Alison, Snook & Stein, 2001).  In the New Zealand Police there is a lack of 
consistency with the data entry which makes it difficult to make any definitive 
comments regarding the statistics. It also causes problems when trying to compare 
districts both in terms of workloads and crime resolutions.  Likewise it becomes more 
difficult to monitor the effectiveness of DNA evidence in solving crime. However, as 
the issues have been highlighted the results can then be treated with caution and in 
context. In comparing statistics from the ESR and the New Zealand Police it is 
important to note that the police and the ESR gather their statistics differently and for 
different purposes.  
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Moreover, the problem with under-reporting or the ”dark figure” of crime will also have 
an impact on crime statistics (Skogan, 1984). This lack of citizen reporting may well 
hinder the police in obtaining a complete picture of the number of crimes being 
committed in New Zealand. Although the data was available through Statistics New 
Zealand, it would have received all this information from the police and therefore must 
rely on the police for the accuracy of their data collection. To mitigate the police data 
and to add strength to the results, official documentation was used wherever possible to 
obtain more information and, more importantly, to obtain information from different 
and hopefully unbiased sources. In reviewing the 146 files for the research, it was noted 
that there were many inconsistencies in the manner in which the information was 
captured. Although there is a national standard for file preparation, files are often 
assembled differently from one district to another, even from one station to another. The 
format can often depend on the sergeant who may require staff to prepare files in a 
certain way.  Likewise, the information entered onto the computer can also differ 
depending on the district and the training of the staff. Therefore the data that is analysed 
from file to file is only as good as the information that has been entered and as stated 
there will be inconsistencies in this data. However, as the researcher was reviewing only 
one district, there is some consistency around the processes and decision making 
employed with the DNA files. 
 
Another variable that was considered was the age of the offender at the time of the 
offence.  The law does not allow for a voluntary DNA sample to be obtained from a 
young person.  Their profile could be entered onto the national DNA database only if 
they had been convicted of a relevant offence or a court had issued a compulsion notice 
compelling them to provide a sample for inclusion on the national DNA database. This 
would explain why there was often a delay in a young person being identified as a 
possible suspect in a burglary when the crime might have been three years old. This was 
because often a sample was not taken from this offender until he/she reached the age 17, 
thus becoming an adult for the purpose of the law. 
 
2.10   The Subject District  
Auckland City District is geographically small compared to the other metropolitan 
districts. It is about 200km2, approximately 10km north to south and 19km east to west. 
Its resident population is approximately 404,658 and it is the largest point of entry for 
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visitors to the country. The district has a very diverse population. As taken from the 
2006 census data, the ethnic breakdown is: European, 54%; Maori, 7.8%; Pacific 
Islander, 12.9%; Asian, 23%; Middle Eastern, 2% and other, 8.3% (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2006). The number of residents within this district who were born overseas is 
40.1% as opposed to 22.9% in New Zealand as a whole. Of these, the most common 
place of birth is the Peoples Republic of China. For the rest of New Zealand Britain is 
the most common country of birth (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). At the time of the 
study the district had a staff of 881 with 702 being police officers and 179 being police 
employees. It has the most recorded crime per 10,000 population in the country (The 
New Zealand Police, 2010c). The decision to use only one police district may have 
limited the ability to make a conclusion based on the results for all of the New Zealand 
Police. However, if Auckland City has the highest reported crime in the country then 
certain conclusions can be drawn from the busiest district. Likewise it has a high 
turnover of experienced staff leading to less entrenched behaviour which can make the 
staff more open to using new technology and policing methods. For these reasons 
certain assumptions can be made regarding all of the New Zealand Police and its use of 
DNA technology.  One major assumption could be that if DNA technology was not 
being used well in the subject district then it is unlikely it is being used well anywhere.   
    
2.11   The Interview Participants 
Not every person employed by the New Zealand Police uses DNA as part of their daily 
work. The decision on whom to interview was based on a variety of factors:   
 
• Is DNA part of their work? 
• Are they in a position to make decisions? 
• Would their role bring them into contact with DNA alerts? 
 
Once those requirements had been met, the next criteria was to gather a mix of gender, 
length of service and different roles within the organisation. The length of service was 
important as it afforded the interviewer a depth of experience. The researcher also 
wanted to compare the experiences of staff who had worked in the police prior to the 
advent of DNA evidence with those who had always been aware of DNA evidence. 
These comparisons were important to establish whether DNA evidence had negatively 
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(or positively) impacted the way the police conduct their business. The role of the 
participant in the police would determine the use and value placed on DNA evidence. 
For example, a uniformed senior sergeant with responsibility for ensuring there was 
enough staff on the street to deal with frontline policing issues would have a different 
perspective to that of a detective sergeant in charge of a child abuse team. This is also 
true of a detective constable who works in a burglary squad and a detective constable 
who works in an adult sexual assault team.  
 
There are different responsibilities and different expectations depending on the role of 
the interviewee. Appendix 17 breaks down the roles of those interviewed, what type of 
crime they predominantly investigate, whether they are responsible for a budget, 
whether they are responsible for the deployment of staff and whether their work is 
reactive or frontline. These roles and responsibilities will affect the way they view DNA 
evidence and how it should be best used. The number of participants interviewed was 
28: 27 were police employees and one was an employee of the ESR. The participants 
consisted of 20 males and eight females with 24 being police officers, three police 
employees and one a non-police employee. Of those who participated in the research, 
26 were white European New Zealanders and two were Maori; 15 were of the rank of 
sergeant or above. The length of service ranged from a probationer who had almost 
finished two years of service to a senior detective who was very near retirement. The 
age of the participants was not collected as part of the data as it was not deemed 
relevant but nevertheless there was a range of ages. 
 
2.12   Discussion: the Fit between the Method, the Research Question and the 
Theory 
This chapter sets out the aims of this research and the research method. The researcher 
has been particular in choosing a method that will enable her to answer the research 
question while making allowances for the subjective element which must be present due 
to her background. This methodology will enable an answer but not pre-empt one. The 
researcher's position within the organisation has been pivotal to this research. She has 
had access to all the data that is required and has been able to interview subject-matter 
experts without distrust or suspicion. This has allowed open and informative interviews 
which have helped to explain the details contained within the case files. Likewise the 
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researcher has been in a position to observe some of this behaviour and the practices 
employed by the New Zealand Police.  
 
Grounded theory proved to be an effective methodology for this data set which required 
the researcher to constantly review her data due to the obstacles that were encountered – 
for example, when trying to locate files. For this reason there are detailed explanations 
on the ways in which the police capture data and for what reasons. This clarification is 
required to understand the meaning of the information that the police capture and use. It 
is also to emphasise the difficulty of locating, reading and understanding these files.  
 
 Police files give only a one-dimensional view of a case. The interviews were needed to 
give meaning to the files and to offer possible explanations for the information that was 
found in them. To contextualise the study, the location of the district has been described 
in detail as it is important to understand the workload of the district. If staff believe that 
they are too busy, it affects the decision making of supervisors and impacts on what 
work is prioritised. The choice of participants was based on their experience with DNA 
but it was also important to find a cross section of staff so as to gather perspectives from 
a variety of people. DNA means different things to different people, depending on their 
roles.  
 
The theory underpinning this research is Janet Chan’s construct of field and habitus. 
This theoretical framework is a recurring theme throughout the research and is 
important for this study to understand the environment into which the police introduce 
new technology, make use of it and what elements of their culture can have an effect on 
this. This theoretical framework was chosen so as to fully understand how effective the 
police were at using DNA technology to investigate crime.   
 
It is critical to have a robust methodology when conducting research. The mixed 
methodology employed in this research ensured that information was gathered from a 
variety of sources.  It has highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the research and 
the methods that were employed to mitigate any potential for bias. Likewise, it has 
identified the flaws in the data set that is the basis of the research. The importance of 
raising these issues is so that the research results have credibility and the metadata will 
allow the researcher to put the research and the results in context. The identified 
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limitations are common problems in criminological research (Alison, Snook & Stein, 
2001; Skogan, 1984). However, the flawed quality of this data is an important part of 
this research as the issues with the data illustrate the difficulties facing the police when 
introducing any new technology or, in fact, any changes. DNA technology has been 
used in New Zealand since 1996 so referring to it as new technology is probably a moot 
point. The complication is that this technology is constantly being improved upon so in 
some ways the technology is always new. It is through this data that the researcher is 
illustrating the issues connected with technology and the police application of this 
technology. 
 
The following chapter reviews some of the relevant available international literature on 
DNA technology. The literature has been divided into sub-topics so as to make it more 
manageable. The chapter begins with reviewing literature on the ethics surrounding the 
use of DNA. From there it moves onto the application of DNA evidence in the court 
room.  The impact of the DNA database on civil liberties is then reviewed and the 
chapter concludes with the police use of DNA to identify offenders.
60 
 
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.0   Introduction 
This chapter examines the literature surrounding the many aspects of DNA technology. 
There are many facets to DNA technology and most of these will be explored in this 
review. It is important to visit each aspect of DNA technology as they are all relevant to 
the impact of DNA on society and whether society can trust the police to make effective 
and ethical use of it.  
For the purpose of this research, the literature available in relation to DNA has been 
broken down into four sub-topics. (The order was chosen to weave ethics and civil 
liberties into the decision making of the application of DNA technology for the court 
room and to identify offenders.)  
• The ethics surrounding the use of DNA 
• The application of DNA evidence in the court room 
• The impact of the DNA database on civil liberties 
• Police use of DNA to identify offenders 
 
Each topic will be addressed and the relevant literature will be reviewed. This literature 
review is important as it highlights what research has been done and what gaps there are 
in the research. While this is not an exhaustive review of every study on DNA, it is a 
comprehensive and reasonable list given the timeframe available for this research. The 
four topics discussed are significant to the study as they explain the policing 
environment to which DNA technology has been introduced. Moreover, when trying to 
understand how police make use of technology it is helpful to have an understanding of 
past technological innovation and the impact this has had on the police. Likewise, 
understanding how new legislation, technology and policing practices historically have 
impacted on society helps to appreciate why certain elements of society express disquiet 
when these new practices are first mooted.  
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3.1   The Ethics Surrounding the Use of DNA  
Much has been written about the ethics of obtaining, storing and using DNA samples 
(see Dawkins, 1998; Donnelly, 2007; Rosen, 2003). As opposed to other law-
enforcement technologies such as fingerprinting, DNA tends to cause more emotive 
responses. Robust legislation and a trusted police service would go some way to 
allaying those fears.  Although initially referred to as "DNA fingerprinting”, there are 
many differences between fingerprints and DNA which should caution the link between 
them. Fingerprints can identify a person but they tell us nothing else about that person 
and they can be easily wiped off a surface. However, DNA can be used to identify 
possible hereditary illness, it can be used for phenotypic typing and it can be used for 
familial linking (Kimmelman, 2000; Simoncelli, 2006). These profiles can be extracted 
from very small samples and as DNA is very tough it can be collected from very old 
samples (Kimmelman, 2000). It is for these reasons that comparisons between 
fingerprints and DNA are unwise and can be readily refuted (Steinhardt, 1999). 
Although DNA can provide information about the human body, it has been argued that 
samples used to obtain DNA profiles are ”junk DNA” and so do not carry any genetic 
code (Dawkins, 1998; Webster, 2000). However, concerns are still raised by various 
sectors of society regarding the retention of the original samples (Billings, 1992; Jost, 
1999; Webster, 2000). These concerns are based on where these samples are stored and 
who has access to them. There is also a belief that whoever has access to these samples 
also has full access to all the genetic information about that person (Billings, 1992; 
Simoncelli, 2006; Steinhardt, 1999). However, this is not the case as these databases are 
subject to strict laws regarding access and use of this information. 
 
There are feelings of unease in various sectors of society that unscrupulous insurance 
companies could use information gleaned from these samples to refuse to insure people 
with a predisposition to a hereditary illness. Likewise an employer may be reluctant to 
employ a person based on genetic information if he/she had a propensity for heart 
disease, for example, and was not a good employment risk (Dawkins, 1998; Steinhardt, 
1999). More importantly, at the rate technology is evolving what may be considered 
junk DNA today could quickly become a future wealth of genetic information (Rosen, 
2003). For this reason it is important that these concerns are addressed.  In New Zealand 
it is a legal requirement that the biological sample is destroyed once the profile is 
obtained (Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act, 1995). The argument for 
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retaining the biological sample is that these samples can be used to continually improve 
technology to assist with the refining of DNA testing. Yet destroying the biological 
sample would go a long way to allaying the fears of the public (Simoncelli, 2006). 
Moreover, the police have a responsibility to protect the rights and privacy of the 
individual and if a person is not charged or acquitted their profile and sample should be 
destroyed (Saffir, 1999). 
    
A DNA database is assumed to be advantageous for catching criminals but it must be 
used advisedly with an eye on the complex ethical issues involved. Yet Dawkins (1998) 
also cautions that "if a DNA database would substantially help the police to catch 
criminals then the objections had better be good ones to outweigh the benefits" (p.24). 
Williams, Johnson and Martin (2004) acknowledge the concerns of civil liberty groups 
but also state that sometimes they miss the many benefits of forensic evidence, i.e. 
exonerating the innocent and identifying the offender. However, Roach and Pease 
(2006) comment that while the Forensic Science Service in the UK states that its 
mission is also to exonerate the innocent, all its website-published case studies detail its 
success in capturing previously undetected offenders.  
 
3.1.1   The Application of DNA Evidence in the Court Room 
The term ”DNA fingerprinting” brought to mind the older technique of fingerprinting 
which had been accepted by courts for decades in both the US and the UK as an exact 
and reliable method of individual identification (Lynch & Jasanoff, 1998). The process 
now is referred to as DNA typing or DNA profiling which describes the process more 
accurately. Fingerprinting had established itself in court as a reliable scientific process 
that was rarely, if ever, challenged (Cole, 1998). Advocates of DNA identification were 
keen to pursue DNA as the modern and more reliable fingerprint (Cole, 1998). DNA 
profiling, however, was not at this level and calling it fingerprinting was evidentially 
inaccurate. To be accepted by the courts, DNA needed to establish itself as scientifically 
valid. This included establishing robust and consistent processes and protocols at the 
laboratory level (Cole, 1998; Lynch & Jasanoff, 1998). The first use of DNA in the UK 
to identify an offender led to the defendant pleading guilty, therefore eliminating the 
need for a long trial and probable challenge to the use of DNA evidence. By contrast, 
the first man to be convicted in the US utilising DNA technology raised awareness of 
DNA evidence as the defendant disputed the charge in court. He was found guilty of 
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rape after DNA tests matched his DNA from a blood sample with that of semen traces 
found in the rape victim (Calandro, Reeder & Cormier, 2005). In spite of these initial 
concerns there was a general acceptance of DNA evidence in American courts. In 
accepting a new scientific technique, many US courts adopted the test established by 
Frye v. United States. This stated that any new scientific test should be generally 
accepted in its own field before it could be admitted by the court (Burk, 1988). Thus 
some courts adopted the view that if there were any perceived deficiencies in the 
manner in which the analyst conducted the DNA typing test, it tended to affect the 
weight of the evidence but not the admissibility (Imwinkelried, 1991).   
 
One such case related to the deaths of a mother and child in New York City. In this 
particular case the defence counsel called their own experts to allow them to challenge 
the manner in which the prosecution experts had applied the DNA typing 
(Imwinkelried, 1991). In 1987 a male named Castro was living in a Bronx 
neighbourhood where a woman and her two-year-old daughter were murdered. Acting 
on information received, detectives interviewed Castro and noticed a minute amount of 
blood on his watch. This blood was sent for analysis to a laboratory that was performing 
DNA testing. The bloodstain was compared with the blood from both victims. The 
laboratory reported to the District Attorney that the DNA patterns on the watch and 
those of the mother matched and intimated that there were no difficulties or ambiguities 
with the results, yet Lander (1989) disputed this and said there were several 
fundamental difficulties.  His concern was that only three patterns out of the five 
matched the mother. This was enough to cause doubt as the laboratory did not 
satisfactorily explain the existence or provenance of the remaining two patterns. These 
discrepancies were disputed by other experts which led to the prosecution and defence 
experts meeting without lawyers present to identify the problems. When the prosecutor 
attempted to get the DNA evidence admitted for the trial, he could not find one expert 
witness willing to testify. Moreover, former prosecution experts now testified for the 
defence (Lander, 1989). As a result of this, the court disallowed the forensic evidence 
although Castro was later convicted of the crime (Lynch & Jasanoff, 1998). The court 
acknowledged the scientific validity of the technique of DNA but said that the 
procedures used by the laboratory were insufficiently robust to produce reliable results 
for court (Lynch & Jasanoff, 1998). This case highlighted the lack of adequate 
guidelines for the interpretation of results and ensuring that a correct and agreed 
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scientific protocol was adhered to in the conducting of tests offered in court 
(Imwinkelried, 1991; Lander, 1989).  In order to address these issues DNA typing was 
subjected to intense scrutiny. The technical working group on DNA analysis methods  
published three sets of guidelines and after three years the National Research Council 
released its report in 1992 (Lander & Budowle, 1994). Both the working group and the 
council resolved the issues regarding laboratory problems, poorly defined rules for 
declaring a match, experiments without controls, contaminated probes and samples and 
sloppy interpretation of x-ray films that had been exposed to a radioactive source 
(autoradiograms) (Lander & Budowle, 1994). It was felt that a lack of standards caused 
many problems in the court room environment but that these issues had been resolved 
with the advent of guidelines and protocols (Lander & Budowle, 1994).  
 
Lynch et al. (2008) conducted a 15-year study in the 1980s and early 1990s in the US 
when DNA evidence was still in its infancy. The study focused mainly on the role of 
expert evidence in the adversary legal systems and continued through the middle of the 
1990s in England when the UK Government and the Forensic Science Service were 
setting up the National DNA Database (Lynch et al. 2008). This research reviewed the 
progression of scientific methods utilised for forensic DNA analysis and the legal 
challenges that each discovery caused (Love, 2009). A strong theme in this research was 
that, as with other forms of forensic evidence and analysis, it is important to remember 
that the evidential value of DNA evidence rests on a variety of things: specific practices, 
circumstantial knowledge and administrative assurances (Love, 2009). This study by 
Lynch et al. illustrates the difficulty encountered by jurors in understanding the 
complexities of the science of DNA. It also proves that the probative value of DNA 
evidence was fiercely and successfully challenged in the first decade of its use. Some of 
those challenges remain unanswered (Duster, 2009). Lynch et al. question the belief that 
DNA is the ultimate “truth machine”. The controversy of DNA evidence inevitably led 
to tighter processes being put in place regarding the storage and collection procedures 
surrounding DNA evidence. However, the question of the fundamental legitimacy of 
technology employed in the presentation of DNA evidence has not been addressed 
(Duster, 2009). Ultimately all research cited in this paragraph showed that the more 
DNA becomes accepted as a sign of the truth, the more important it becomes for the 
police and judiciary to have sound and robust practices in place for the collection, 
storage, analysis and court presentation of this evidence (Lynch et al.  2008).   
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3.1.2   The Impact of the DNA Database on Civil Liberties 
It is acknowledged that DNA technology has been successful in solving crimes (see 
Chapter 1 section 1.4 & Chapter 1 section 1.10). The use of DNA technology to identify 
offenders has resulted in the creation of DNA databases, the enactment of new 
legislation and quite possibly the erosion of civil liberties. In the edited book Genetic 
Suspects; Global Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing (Hindmarsh 
& Prainsack, 2010) the concept of good governance is a key theme in relation to DNA 
profiling. This book contains contributions from many authors who discuss a variety of 
issues that are at the forefront of DNA use. To give a global view on DNA profiling, the 
book reviews its use in seven countries. These countries range from the UK which has 
the largest database in the world to the Philippines which does not yet have a database 
nor any legislation enabling its establishment, even though DNA evidence is allowed in 
court (De Ungria & Jose, 2010; Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010). There is considerable 
commentary in this book devoted to the UK databank (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010; 
Williams, 2010). This is apposite as the UK databank’s legislation has been through 
several iterations. However, the 2008 ruling from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in the case of S and Marper v. the United Kingdom (2008) has called into 
question this legislation (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010; Williams, 2010). The 
commentary at the heart of this ruling is the need for a government to balance the use of 
technology with the rights of the individual. The chapters discussing the UK databank 
reinforce the need for this balance and for the importance of everyone (law makers, 
scientists, members of the public) to remain vigilant when legislation is proposed 
relating to the obtaining, retention and use of DNA. 
 
This idea is further explored by Washington (2010) in the same book, when she 
examines the use of mass screenings as a way of catching offenders. She argues that 
when used by the police it is often disguised as voluntary when in fact the population 
may be coerced into providing samples. This method employed by the police to gather 
and retain DNA data can be seen as a way of circumventing the law. Certain sections of 
society are justifiably concerned by this behaviour. Some communities in American 
society (and others) are over-represented in prisons and apparently differentially 
wrongly convicted.  "Each year since 2000, between 50% and 70% of the incarcerated 
men freed by DNA technology have been black or Hispanic" (Washington, 2010, p.66). 
This would seem a disproportionately high number compared with the general 
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population of the US. In order to maintain public trust and confidence in DNA profiling, 
there do need to be questions asked about what is clearly a complex issue (Hindmarsh & 
Prainsack, 2010). Williams (2010) suggests that there needs to be openness and 
transparency in the use of databanks so as to maintain (perhaps regain, with some 
communities) public trust and confidence. In writing about the New Zealand DNA 
databank, Veth and Midgley (2010) express concern that DNA legislation has been 
introduced into New Zealand with very little judicial challenge. Acknowledging that 
there has been little research into exploring public perceptions, Veth and Midgley 
(2010) suggest that this lack of judicial challenge is down to the fact that New 
Zealanders are concerned about crime. The general public apparently believe that if 
DNA will help catch offenders and so ensure a safe society that is all that matters.   
 
The overriding message from the above-mentioned book, Genetic Suspects (2010), is 
that society needs to keep a firm hand on the use of DNA profiling and not be blinded 
by its alleged benefits. It is essential that all sections of society have trust and 
confidence that authorities will manage the use of DNA responsibly. The application of 
DNA technology can be fallible due to the human element involved but this can be 
mitigated by sound governance and robust legislation. As the title of the book implies, if 
the proliferation of DNA databases and legislation is left unchecked all of society may 
find itself at one time a genetic suspect (Prainsack & Hindmarsh, 2010).  
 
Similar topics are discussed in the book Genetic Justice. Krimsky & Simoncelli (2011) 
review the rise of DNA technology in solving crime, its effectiveness and the 
implications for countries with a database on which people who have never been 
convicted of a crime have their DNA profiles included.  Krimsky & Simoncelli (2011) 
break down their book into three parts: the history of DNA, its application and 
expansion; comparative systems looking at DNA databases in five countries; and finally 
the critical perspectives, balancing personal liberty, social equity and security. They 
examine the concept that the more profiles on a database the more effective it will be, 
i.e. the bigger the database the more crimes that will be resolved. They form the view 
that it is the addition of more crime-scene samples that will improve the success of the 
database. In fact, the more profiles that are added the more the system can be clogged 
up for little return as laboratories can be extracting profiles from samples that may never 
be found at a crime scene. It is for this reason that strict guidelines for taking DNA 
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samples should be in place. If for no other reason, this should be enough to deter law 
enforcement agencies from wanting to take samples from the entire population.  They 
also posit that the larger the database the greater the chance that the wrong person may 
be identified; likewise the use of dragnets to identify offenders, whereby a large part of 
a population might be pressured or coerced into providing samples to the police in the 
hope of identifying the offender (see Chapter 1 section 1.4.1). The use of familial 
linking to identify an offender may result in innocent people being stigmatised because 
they have a relative who may have committed a crime. The question asked by the 
authors is whether when law enforcement officials or prosecutors adopt an “any means 
necessary” approach, is this not a form of “frontier justice” and does it not violate the 
principles of the US constitution (Krimskey & Simoncelli, 2011)? 
 
The foreword to Genetic Justice is written by the Executive Director of the American 
Civil Liberties Union. His view is that solving crime is undoubtedly important but it 
should never be at the expense of an individual's freedom. He believes that a balance 
between fighting crime and maintaining civil liberties is what is required. This seems to 
be a recurring theme throughout the book with the authors coming to the conclusion that 
the balance should be "between the protection of civil liberties, presumed innocence, 
and procedural rights of persons and the needs of the state to apprehend, punish, and 
rehabilitate perpetrators of crime" (Krimskey & Simoncelli, 2011. p.330). Whilst this 
conclusion may seem fairly obvious to many people, the authors believe that this 
balance has yet to be realised. 
 
Linked with this balance is the need for the police to use this technology legitimately and 
this has been an issue with the Maori11 population in New Zealand who do not appear to 
enjoy the same relationship with the police as the white European population. The national 
survey of crime has highlighted the fact that the police do not enjoy the same level of trust from 
Mäori as they do from other ethnicities. Mäori victims were significantly more likely than other 
victims to be dissatisfied with the police response to them (Morris & Reilly, 2003). Of those 
surveyed, 17% of Mäori said they were very dissatisfied with police service compared to 4% of 
Pacific victims and 11% of New Zealand European/European. Moreover, Mäori believe that the 
                                                            
11
 Maori are the indigenous people of New Zealand 
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police is a racist institution that perpetuates strong anti-Mäori sentiment (Te Whaiti & Roguski, 
1998; Webb, 2009).   
A police request for a law change to grant them more power may comfort one section of 
society but, at the same time, it may alienate another (Herbert, 2006). When the law 
change involves bodily samples, this can cause an emotive response (Kimmelman, 2000) 
and the police can have a much harder time convincing the public to agree to it. Since the 
creation of the national DNA database in 1996 the police have been requesting more 
powers to take and retain DNA samples. The Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) 
Act is now on to its third amendment since it was first enacted in 1996. Each amendment 
has given the police greater powers and at each amendment dissenters have worried that 
New Zealanders are slowly having their freedom eroded by the government. “One of the 
problems with the legislation here is that it creeps towards a surveillance society” (Locke, 
2009). The Mäori political party voted against the 2009 amendment. Mäori believe in the 
sacredness of whakapapa12and so when DNA is an issue they do not like to leave 
anything to chance (Flavell, 2009). However, this was not the main thrust of their 
argument. Put simply, the Mäori political party would not trust the police to follow the 
law as it is written, allowing them to use discretion as from whom they took a sample. 
The Mäori party stated that when it comes to police discretion, Mäori never fare well and 
would most certainly have their DNA taken merely because of the colour of their skin. In 
quoting research completed by the Department of Corrections (2009) they linked this to 
“institutional racism”, “unintended consequences of discretion", "unevenness of decision 
making” and “bias” , all of which are believed to contribute to the over-representation of 
Mäori in the criminal justice system. Mäori are resistant to providing their DNA and need 
assurances that the police would follow and sustain agreed protocols if it was provided. 
The Mäori party did not trust the police to do this, based on their past experiences of 
police behaviour. As previously illustrated in Chapter 1 section 1.8, those of European 
descent do not appear to have the same concerns.   
3.2.3   Police Use of DNA to Identify Offenders 
Williams (2008) states that in the past 10 years a number of studies came to similar 
conclusions (see HMIC, 2000; McCulloch, 1996; Tilley & Ford, 1996; Smith & 
Flannigan, 2000; Williams, 2004). All concluded that there was still a lack of obvious 
                                                            
12
 Lineage 
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partnership between crime-scene examiners and investigative teams. Williams (2008) 
sums up the results of this problematic relationship by suggesting that this will prevent 
forensic science from being maximised in investigations. In various reports 
commissioned by the Home Office (McCulloch 1996; Touche Ross, 1987; Audit 
Commission 1990), all are agreed that the police in the UK are committed to using 
science to beat crime. Furthermore, all reports were critical of how the organisation 
monitored the use and therefore the effectiveness of scientific support. Williams (2004), 
in reference to police use of forensic information, refers to "a lack of comprehensive 
qualitative outcome measures" (p.7). The reports also highlighted that some senior 
police officers appeared to lack understanding of the true potential of the national DNA 
databank. The HMIC (2000) report also noted the lack of quality and accuracy of 
performance data across all aspects of their inspection. The level of understanding about 
the use of DNA seemed to depend on which police area was being examined. Not 
surprisingly, some officers appeared to have a better awareness of forensic technology 
than others. Green (2007) questions the variable rates at which forensic results are 
converted into detections in the UK. He states that he cannot understand why "forensic 
matches in the UK can at times fail to produce a positive investigative result" (Green, 
2007, p.346). The loss of cases through the criminal justice process is referred to as 
attrition (Barrow, 2005, p.vii). In his 2005 research conducted in the UK, Barrow 
reviewed 230 files that contained either DNA or fingerprint results and which had been 
considered closed, i.e. they had a resolution attached to them. Of these files, only 124 
resulted in detections with the remainder not being proceeded with for the following 
reasons: 
• In 26 cases or 25%, no further action was taken on the advice of the Crown 
Prosecution Service. 
• In 32 cases or 30%, no action was taken due to the forensics being at the scene 
legitimately. 
• In 33 cases or 31%, no further action was taken as it was deemed to not be a 
crime  
(Barrow, 2005). 
 
Green’s summation of this study was that it showed weaknesses in the processes in 
place for dealing with forensic results. These weaknesses are not at the scene attendance 
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stage or the analysis stage but further down the process chain. In this context the chain 
refers to the many stages involved in the investigation process which should all loop 
together and present one large picture. If any aspect of that chain is weak or missing, the 
investigation will be incomplete. Green (2007) also suggested that managers of 
individual boroughs should review their practices to account for the obvious variances 
in their procedures rather than accept the attrition rate at face value.  
 
Researchers in Australia noted that targeting the right offenders did achieve some 
results but not an increase in the conviction rate. Research conducted in 2008 by 
Dunsmuir, Tran and Weatherburn concluded that there was no evidence to support 
DNA having added to the conviction rates. Their research looked at the relationship 
between mandatory DNA testing of New South Wales prison inmates and clear-up, 
charge and conviction rates for a variety of crime types. The New South Wales 
Government passed a law in 2000 which, amongst other things, enabled the police to 
obtain DNA samples from offenders serving sentences of imprisonment for serious 
indictable offences in a correctional centre. These samples were then added to the 
database. Whilst there was no apparent improvement in the conviction rate, for other 
police outcomes such as clear-up, charge and charge to clear-up rates, there was 
evidence of a positive association for five (sexual assault, robbery with firearm, robbery 
without firearm, break and enter – dwelling, break and enter – non dwelling) of the 
eight crime categories considered (assault and motor theft had negative impact while 
stealing from motor vehicle had zero impact) (Dunsmuir et al. 2008). The research took 
into consideration the work load of the police, the 10-month delay for the data base to 
be first used, the time it took for the laboratory to analyse each sample and the time lag 
from when a sample was taken from an offender to the offender’s release. However, this 
research reviews one specific area of DNA use by the police. It does not follow the life 
cycle of a crime from first call for police service to the final disposition of the file. It 
does not identify how the police go about tracking named offenders for the more 
common crime types and how effective they are in making optimum use of DNA 
technology to obtain convictions.   
In the US, researchers uncovered other issues associated with the use of DNA 
technology to investigate different crime types. Research has established that DNA is 
effective for the investigation of burglaries and other volume crime but that financial 
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and resource implications have a bearing as to whether DNA could be used to solve 
volume crime. The question raised by the researchers was that if DNA was used to solve 
volume crime, this might come at a cost to more serious crimes such as rape or 
homicide where DNA has traditionally been used (Ritter, 2008; Roman, Reid, Reid, J., 
Chalfin, Adams & Knight, 2008; Wilson, McClure & Weisburd, 2010). However, 
Roman et al. (2008) posit that career burglars committed so many crimes that arresting 
just one burglar would go a long way to reducing the number of burglaries in a 
community. In a later review, Wilson, Weisburd and McClure (2011) suggest that using 
DNA to investigate volume crime would be worth the investment and that research 
conducted by Roman et al. (2008) and to a lesser extent Dunsmuir et al. (2008) provide 
evidence to support this. The main issue in all this research has been that DNA has been 
successfully used to identify offenders. Those who are identified by DNA have a greater 
history of more crime and more violent crime. The research identified that patrol 
officers and specialist forensic staff are equally effective at collecting good-quality 
DNA samples. Some of the key findings in this research that determined the more-
extensive use of technology would be problematic were the expense involved, the 
backlog in laboratories and the need for greater communication between the police, 
laboratories and prosecutors.  
 
While US research highlighted the effectiveness of DNA use at burglaries, the New 
Zealand Police were identified as having a different problem. In 2001 the Controller and 
Auditor General of New Zealand concluded that the New Zealand Police were unlikely 
to be making the best use of forensic science techniques in their crime investigations 
(Controller & Auditor General, 2001). This was the first time that the New Zealand 
Police had been the subject of a performance audit. The purpose of the report was to 
provide Parliament with information on what the police were doing about dwelling 
burglaries, including how the police measured their performance (Controller and 
Auditor General, 2001). As a result of the audit, the report recommended that districts 
prioritise their use of forensics on the basis of cost and effectiveness and improve their 
resource planning for the use of forensic science. In his 2004 review (further explored in 
Chapter 6 section 6.3) the Auditor General noted improvements in the use of forensics 
to investigate dwelling burglary. This report acknowledged the effort the police made at 
having Scene of Crime Officers (SOCOs) attend every burglary scene but made no 
mention of what systems were put in place to deal with the extra work generated. The 
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assumption was that the more crime-scene samples sent to the ESR, the greater the 
chance of there being a match. The review did not look at the number of prosecutions or 
convictions directly resulting from the use of DNA technology which might have given 
a more rounded view of the impact of DNA use by the police, which is what this study 
accomplishes.  
 
Research conducted in 2003 looked at police use of DNA from a different perspective. 
Casey and Cullen (2003) conducted research at Counties Manukau police district in 
Auckland, New Zealand, to look at reported police practices in relation to the use of 
DNA. The research was funded by the ESR in order to better understand police 
decision-making regarding DNA submissions to the ESR. As a consequence, the 
research may have been biased towards encouraging the police to send all samples to 
the ESR for analysis, irrespective of any probative value. The management at ESR was 
looking to "optimise the performance of the DNA database by having more quality and 
quantity of information" (Casey & Cullen, 2003, p.9). This was a pilot study and related 
only to Counties Manukau police. The research consisted of interviewing a total of 11 
staff, sworn and non-sworn of different ranks, levels of service and specialisation. The 
staff all had some connection to DNA in their working environment. The aim of the 
study was to highlight some of the issues relating to DNA sampling which might 
indicate where further research was required. The topics covered in the interviews were: 
 
• Police training (in taking DNA samples) 
• Police guidelines (are they adequate for taking voluntary samples from people in  
custody?) 
• Police budget 
• Turnaround times from the ESR 
• Feedback from the ESR 
 
The conclusions from the research were that a more in-depth study needed to be 
conducted across police districts and include a greater cross-section of police personnel 
as well as staff from the ESR. 
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In 2010 a comparative study between the forensic DNA analysis systems in England 
and the US was conducted. Senior US law-enforcement officials believed that the 
English had made better use of the crime-fighting potential of forensic DNA evidence 
than the US criminal justice system (Goulka, Matthies, Disley & Steinberg, 2010). The 
research concluded that while the English appeared on the surface to have a faster 
turnaround and a higher hit rate than their US counterparts, there were many differences 
which made it difficult and unsafe to make a comparison (Goulka et al, 2010).  In the 
English system there is one National DNA Database servicing 43 police forces with 
only a small number of approved laboratories feeding into the database. In the US there 
are three tiers of databases: the Combined DNA Indexing System (CODIS), the State 
DNA Indexing System (SDIS) and the Local DNA Indexing System (LDIS). There are 
193 CODIS participating laboratories and 18,000 law-enforcement agencies. The FBI 
maintains strict rules about who may put information into CODIS and this practice 
restricts the results that can be obtained. This suggests that there is a fundamental 
difference in strategy and philosophy in the two systems which is not surprising. The 
size of England, the number of its police forces and the fact that there is only one 
database without any tiers lends itself well to a centralised process. The researchers 
identified that there were fewer steps in the English process although the extra steps in 
the US process – confirm identity, verify report accuracy – were added to provide better 
checks in the interests of justice. However, the researchers did note that these extra steps 
had not identified cases where there had been issues with identity or accuracy. It was 
also noted that the English DNA process made full use of productivity-enhancing 
technologies including Laboratory Information Management Systems (LIMS) which 
made their work easier and would reduce any backlogs (Goulka et al, 2010). The US 
laboratories have considerable backlogs and their turnaround times are nowhere near as 
fast as those of the English although they are able to match these times under special 
circumstances. 
 
The same study compared database matching between the US and the UK. It was 
viewed that the number of crime-scene samples rather than the number of offender 
profiles on the database was more effective for identifying suspects. This was contra to 
the initial understanding (especially in the UK) that more offender profiles on the 
database would equate to more crimes being resolved (Krimsky & Simoncelli, 2011; 
McCartney, 2004; Van Camp & Dierickx, 2008). The results from this research (Goulka 
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et al, 2010) suggest that “widening the net” might be less cost effective than allocating 
more effort into taking samples from crime scenes. The obvious differences in the 
manner in which data was collected and the way the systems were constructed made 
comparisons impossible and prevented the researchers from comparing information 
from similar data and similar processes. They struggled to obtain data from the US and 
encountered difficulty in getting information from the FBI and CODIS, whereas in 
England and Wales as much information as possible regarding the National DNA 
Database is published in a public forum via its website and annual reports. Another 
difficulty was that CODIS does not capture different offence code types, making it hard 
to compare which offence codes were having the most success with DNA evidence.  
The researchers agreed that in referring to DNA successes the number of matches 
generated was an output measure – often mistakenly confused with the most desired 
outcome – namely, crimes solved. 
 
This research (Goulka et al, 2010) was useful in highlighting the differences between 
the US and English systems. On the surface it did look as if the US Senior Law 
Enforcement Officials were correct, that the English had capitalised more fully on DNA 
technology. However, it would seem that the biggest outcome of this research was the 
identification of the serious lack of data in the US system and the difficulties of having a 
three-tier approach to their database. 
 
There appears to be a gap in the literature both abroad and in New Zealand regarding 
the number of convictions that are obtained from the use of DNA technology in day-to-
day policing. A pessimistic person might infer that the police in these jurisdictions are 
afraid of what they might find and are not arresting offenders even though a DNA result 
has been received from the laboratory. It might be for this reason that they have not 
commissioned the appropriate studies. However, it is just as probable that these 
methodological problems have gone unnoticed or that research funds are not available. 
The literature review highlights research that primarily looks at the effectiveness of 
using DNA to investigate crime and in particular volume crime. This study does not 
dispute the efficacy of DNA in identifying possible suspects. It aims to establish 
whether the police make the best possible use of DNA technology to investigate crime, 
leading to an offender being arrested and charged. If this is not the case, then what 
reasons would inhibit the effective use of DNA technology by the New Zealand Police? 
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There is a considerable amount of literature and research concerning the use of DNA by 
the police to investigate crime. Inextricably linked with the technology of DNA is              
its ethical application and the implications for civil liberties when legislation is not 
robust in its protection of an individual’s privacy. Although this research is concerned 
with the effective use of DNA technology by the police to investigate crime, this cannot 
be looked at in isolation. It is important to review the historical application of 
technology by the police and which sections of society appeared to be more adversely 
affected by this application. For this reason, several sub-topics of literature were 
reviewed.  However, a notable absence in the literature is detailed research into what 
results the police achieve as a direct consequence of using DNA technology when 
investigating crime. No-one is arguing the efficacy of DNA to identify offenders. 
However, what is absent are the actual statistics relating to the arrest, charge and 
prosecution of offenders as an indicator of the police effectively solving crime by using 
DNA. This research provides statistical and empirical evidence of a police district using 
DNA technology to solve crime.  
The following chapter discusses the police use of DNA technology to investigate 
burglary, This chapter contains data from the research and provides figures regarding 
burglary and volume crime in New Zealand. It provides illustrative case histories to 
highlight the use of DNA technology to investigate burglaries. This chapter also 
contains the first of the interview results in relation to specific questions on police use 
of DNA technology to investigate crime. 
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Chapter 4: Police Use of DNA to Investigate Burglary 
4.0   Introduction 
Chapter 4 begins with the definition of volume crime. It then explores in some depth the 
burglary statistics in New Zealand and specifically in the subject district.  From there, 
the chapter compares the burglary resolution rates in New Zealand, the US and the UK 
which establishes a general overview of difficulties faced by several jurisdictions in 
solving burglaries. The results of the research from the subject district relating to 
volume crime are examined and analysed. Finally, from the results of the analysis, the 
chapter explores the ability of the police to use DNA to solve volume crime. 
 
Most jurisdictions split crime informally into two main categories: serious or major 
crime and volume crime (Adderley & Musgrove, 2001). The files used in the research 
relate to the calendar year 2005. At that time the New Zealand Police had seven crime 
categories: violence, sexual offences, drugs and anti-social offences, dishonesty, 
property damage and new drugs, property abuses as well as administrative which 
included immigration, racial and national interest. Serious crime, including murder, 
armed robbery and rape, tends to be less widespread whereas volume crime, as its name 
suggests, is more prevalent (Adderley & Musgrove, 2001).   
 
Since 2009 the New Zealand Police have adopted the Australian New Zealand Standard 
Offence Classification (ANZSOC) (see Appendix 16). When the New Zealand Police 
reports its crime statistics externally the ANZSOC codes are used but these are not used 
for internal reporting. While ANZSOC refers to burglary along with unlawful entry with 
intent to enter and break and enter, the New Zealand Police code table for the NIA still 
refers to the offence as burglary only so, for the purpose of this research, burglary is 
defined as “any entering of a building or ship with intent to commit a crime, or having 
entered a building or ship, remaining in it without authority and with intent to commit a 
crime” (Section 231, Crimes Act 1961). The definition of burglary was amended in the 
Crimes Amendment Act 2003 which removed the requirement of evidence of a break-in 
before it could be classified as a burglary. This removal of break-in would have made 
the offence of burglary easier to prove but more importantly, for the police, would have 
increased the number of recorded burglaries. 
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The first examples of DNA being used successfully were in identifying the offenders in 
rapes and homicides and so it became expected that DNA would be used primarily for 
serious crime types. High-profile cases were the capturing of serial offenders and the 
resolution of cold cases largely due to DNA technology (see Chapter 1 sections 1.4 and 
1.10). To legitimise creating and maintaining DNA databases and to establish that DNA 
was valuable in solving and preventing crime, it had to be demonstrated that DNA was 
also effective for the investigation of all crime. For these reasons DNA was portrayed as 
a valuable way to solve volume crime. Moreover, the police would invest in having 
laws passed that would allow them to target offenders who commit volume crime. 
 
This chapter compares recorded burglary13 statistics with other crime types including 
the resolution statistics. This is important as it puts into context the impact that burglary 
has on a community due to its prevalence and its low resolution rate. Similarly it is 
valuable to compare the New Zealand resolution rates for burglary with other 
jurisdictions as it illustrates that the New Zealand experience is not an isolated case and 
other countries deal with comparable issues. From there the chapter analyses data 
gathered from the subject district relating to DNA files from the 2005 calendar year. 
The data includes information from DNA files and the results from interviews with 
practitioners based on the findings from the files. There is discussion on how the police 
have encouraged their staff to attend volume-crime scenes and submit as many DNA 
samples as possible to the ESR, the reasoning being that a higher submission rate would 
equal a higher hit rate. This is an idea promoted by the ESR which has stated that not 
enough samples are submitted from volume-crime scenes (Buckleton, 2008).  
 
4.1   Capturing of Data   
With data entered into the New Zealand Police database, there are various ways that a 
crime can be cleared or resolved. This data is entered to show when and how the 
offence was resolved and enables it to be counted as a crime that is now solved. In the 
UK these are referred to as detected crimes. The New Zealand Police utilises different 
clearance codes by which to count the statistics (see Appendix 2). If there is no suitable 
code available at the time ‘Other’ is used initially but can then be changed if required. 
                                                            
13
 Under ANZSOC burglary includes: unlawful entry with intent, burglary and break and enter. The 
statistics used from statistics New Zealand are based on the ANZSOC classification. 
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One method employed by officers to clear an offence is called custody clearance. This 
is used when the evidence is overwhelming or the offender admits to an offence but 
rather than charge the offender they clear the offences.14  The offender will not receive 
any more punishment for the offence but it is acknowledged that this offender is 
responsible for the crime so the offence is cleared. It is believed that custody clearances 
have several benefits. Resolving other burglaries enables officers to concentrate their 
efforts on other unsolved burglaries (Ministry of Justice, 2005). If the offender were to 
re-offend the police would be well aware of the modus operandi employed by the 
offender and so s/he would be more likely to be caught (Ministry of Justice, 2005). 
Custody clearances also alert the police to unreported burglaries which are of benefit to 
intelligence gathering (Ministry of Justice, 2005). An unexpected outcome might be that 
since the offender cannot be tried for these crimes s/he may exaggerate the level of 
offending so as to receive more kudos in the criminal fraternity (Ministry of Justice, 
2005). It also means that those crimes are cleared without penalty against the offender. 
 
As well as clearance codes the New Zealand Police also use apprehension codes. These 
codes identify how a suspect was initially arrested. The accurate use of these codes is 
important in that it allows the police to quantify the effectiveness of various types of 
processes. The use of DNA or fingerprint evidence to catch offenders would be captured 
by the use of “forensic” as an apprehension code. As stated earlier (see Chapter 2 
section 2.3.), prior to 2003 there was no option on the Law Enforcement System to enter 
“forensic” as an apprehension code. Therefore “forensic” data is not available before 
2003. Appendix 3 shows the apprehension codes used to capture this information. All 
the codes are agreed to by the Organisational Performance Group based at Police 
National Headquarters in Wellington. These codes allow the group to provide the 
government with data relevant to police performance. The accurate use of these codes 
would enable the Organisational Performance Group to provide the government with 
data that correctly reflects the work done by the police. As described in the methods 
chapter (see Chapter 2 section 2.5) there are different ways to complete a file. To 
highlight these variations and to illustrate the example of associated files, two files have 
been identified to demonstrate the methods employed by the New Zealand Police to 
capture information (see Chapter 4 section 4.4).  
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 These may be reported and/or unreported crimes. 
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4.2   Volume Crime 
The largest crime category in New Zealand is dishonesty. Within this category, general 
theft constitutes the largest sub-group with burglary being the next largest. The next 
sub-group is vehicle crime. Vehicle crime includes unlawful taking and theft from a 
motor vehicle. As stated previously, the government and the police have singled out 
burglary as being of greater importance than the other crime types due to its impact on 
the community. As illustrated in Figure 1, for the calendar year of 2005 the police 
recorded nationally the unlawful taking of 22,605 motor vehicles with the subject 
district recording 4,423 unlawful taking of motor vehicles. For the same time 50,927 
cases of theft from motor vehicles were recorded.  The subject district recorded 9,589 
reports of theft from motor vehicles for the same time period.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the 146 files examined, 44 related to theft from cars, unlawful taking of a motor 
vehicle, criminal damage and general theft. Unlawful taking of a motor vehicle had the 
most (33 out of 44 files). Of these files, eight were never resolved even though the 
suspect had been in police custody several times. From the 33 files, 11 had a resolution 
which in these cases included charging, custody clearance or a warning. For those 
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Figure 1. 
Auckland v Nationally Reported Crimes  2005 
Auckland District
Nationally
Auckland District 53615 8920 4423 9589
Nationally 407496 57923 22605 50927
Total Crimes Burglaries Unlawful taking Theft ex car 
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suspects who were interviewed regarding the DNA alert, three suspects denied the 
allegation and were released with no further action. Once again there were difficulties 
with the files and the information entered on to the computer. In one case the file stated 
that the offender had been dealt with for the offence and the alert had expired on the 
computer.  However, there was nothing on the computer or the file to show what action 
had been taken. If suspects are not dealt with in a timely manner and/or they have been 
before the courts in the interim, the courts become reluctant to allow them to be 
prosecuted for old offences. It is considered by the judicial system to be an abuse of 
process. This can make it difficult for officers to deal with a suspect if they can see that 
the suspect has been in custody many times previously. Likewise, if an offender is in 
prison and needs to be interviewed regarding a DNA alert, the police liaison officer will 
not interview the prisoner if there is no likelihood of a charge. It is believed to be a 
waste of everyone’s time.   
 
4.3   Burglary in New Zealand 
Most crime recorded in New Zealand is made up of a range of offences included in the 
dishonesty category. The most prevalent is general theft which is followed by burglary 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2010). The Ministry of Justice (2009) states that burglary is 
one of New Zealand’s highest-recorded crimes. Figure 2 shows that in the 2005 
calendar year 57,923 unlawful entry with intent, burglary and break and enter offences 
were recorded, making it the third-highest crime type (14% of all recorded crime). The 
highest recorded crime was theft and related offences at 151,649 (37% of all recorded 
crime), followed by property damage and environmental pollution next at 51,762 
recorded offences (13% of all recorded crime). Therefore volume crime accounted for 
261,334 recorded offences out of the 407,496 total recorded crimes (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2010).   
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Figure 2, Total Recorded Crime in New Zealand 2005 
 
Burglaries tend to be serial in nature as offenders rarely commit only one (Ministry of 
Justice, 2009). It is uncommon for there to be any descriptions of burglars as they are 
likely to operate when people are not around and so it is difficult to link a series of 
burglaries to one offender (Adderley & Musgrove, 2001). Perhaps more significant is 
that individuals who commit property crimes have a higher recidivism rate than those 
who commit other types of offences. Therefore, arresting and imprisoning a single 
burglar increases the chances of a significant reduction in burglaries in a community 
(Roman et al., 2008). Similarly it has been noted that when unknown DNA from a 
murder scene is checked against the national database in the US it has often found a 
match with the DNA of a burglar (Zedlewski & Murphy, 2006). A review of the first 
1000 hits on the New York database showed that 82% of the offenders were already on 
the database for a less-serious crime such as burglary or drugs (Zedlewski & Murphy, 
2006). The resolution rate for total crime in New Zealand for 2005 was 43% with the 
burglary clearance rate for the same period being 16%. In contrast Table 1 indicates that 
the resolution rate for homicide was 87% with rape having a 55% clearance rate 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2009).  
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Table 1.  Recorded Crime vs Resolved Crime in NZ 2005 
Crime Type Recorded Crime 2005 in 
NZ 
Resolved Crime 2005 in NZ 
Homicide and other related 
offences 
103 87%  
Sexual assaults and other 
related offences 
2,465 55% 
Unlawful entry with intent, 
burglary and break and 
enter 
 
57,923 16% 
Total 60,491 
 
It is acknowledged that there is an under-reporting of rape and other sexual offences 
(Neame & Heenan, 2003) and at first glance it may seem redundant to compare these 
figures. However, this research does not seek to examine the under-reporting of crimes 
but rather aims to review those crimes that are reported to police and how the police 
make use of DNA technology to investigate them. This under-reporting of crime is of 
concern to the police as it affects intelligence and crime patterns and as a consequence 
impacts on police deployment (Taylor, 2002). However, this research shows that even 
when crimes are reported to the police the resolution rates suggest that they are not able 
to cope with those numbers. Therefore, this chapter focuses on burglary offences 
because they are a volume crime and research has shown that there are benefits to using 
DNA technology in resolving burglary offences (Dunsmuir et al., 2008; Roman et al., 
2008). Also, the New Zealand Police are committed to using DNA technology to 
investigate volume crime as discussed below. Burglary resolution rates are not high in 
other jurisdictions either with the UK having a resolution rate of 13% for the 2004/2005 
year (The Home Office, 2010).  According to the FBI, the percentage of burglaries 
cleared in the US by arrest or other means in 2005 was 12.7% (FBI, 2006).   
 
Due to the impact of burglaries on the community, the New Zealand Police and the New 
Zealand Government have identified burglary as a priority for crime reduction. The 
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police aligned their strategic outcomes to the government’s crime reduction strategy and 
identified reducing burglary as a three-to-five-year priority plan (Controller and Auditor 
General, 2006). The Ministry of Justice and the New Zealand Police conducted a policy 
review over a three-year period (2002-2004) on police practices of investigating 
burglaries and their effectiveness. A steering committee was formed by the Ministry of 
Justice and the New Zealand Police to develop policy proposals targeting repeat 
burglary victims and burglary locations. The review was conducted in four police areas 
including a mix of urban and rural centres. A combination of factors was examined in 
viewing police practices and the New Zealand Police instigated various strategies to 
help reduce and resolve burglaries with DNA being integral to their policies. They 
focused on the obtaining of voluntary samples from suitable candidates as well as the 
collection of DNA samples from the scene and submitting such samples to the ESR. 
The position of Crime Scene Attendant (CSA) was established to improve the 
attendance rate at burglaries.  A CSA is a police employee who does not hold the office 
of constable but who has been trained in forensic gathering and report writing and 
whose primary function is to attend all reported burglaries (Ten One, 2006). As 
previously described in Chapter 1 section 1.6, a CSA attends a scene and collects 
forensic evidence and intelligence. If any samples are found at the scene they are sent to 
the ESR for analysis. Both the police and the ESR agreed that populating the national 
DNA database with as many personal samples as possible was important and the 
collection of DNA from crime scenes was found to be equally important. One New 
Zealand Police district implemented a policy that once a DNA crime-scene-to-person 
link was received from the ESR the staff were required to act on the result within three 
days.  The report does not state how successful this policy was or how many burglaries 
were resolved as a result. 
 
In 2001 the Auditor General of New Zealand reported on how the police investigate and 
work to prevent dwelling burglaries and made several recommendations (see Chapter 3 
section 3.2.3). In 2004 the government asked the Auditor General to review these 2001 
recommendations and see what progress, if any, had been made. In his 2004 report the 
Auditor General identified that the police did not make the best use of forensic 
techniques because policies on their use differed from one district to another and there 
was no clear business plan for the financing of forensic services. The Auditor General 
made the recommendation that districts prioritise the use of forensic techniques based 
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on cost and effectiveness and develop a budget for the use of forensic services.  In 
summing up his report the then Auditor General commented that the police had made 
many improvements since 2001 in how they dealt with dwelling burglary. He stated that 
the police had made more effective use of forensic and intelligence analysis. Notably he 
mentioned that the police budget for the ESR forensic services had increased from $9.9 
million in 2000-2001 to $18.8 million in 2005-2006. However, this figure refers to the 
amount spent on all work completed at the ESR and not just DNA analysis. The 
increase in budget was due to an increase in the number of cases submitted to the ESR 
and this demonstrated that police were making greater use of forensic services for 
criminal investigations.  By 30th June 2002 this number was 6,532, increasing to 9,466 
in 2004 (Brady, 2006). While the police had clearly made some changes to their 
investigation of dwelling burglaries and had taken steps to follow the recommendations, 
the Auditor General had not been able to measure the extent to which these 
improvements had led to a general downward trend in recorded dwelling burglary 
offences. Attendance at all burglaries is reassuring for victims of crime and it is 
important for them that the police are seen to be proactive. Burglaries have both a 
financial and emotional impact on victims and affect many households in New Zealand.  
Many victims become more cautious and wary and often have problems sleeping 
(Morris & Reilly, 2003). According to victimisation surveys, burglaries can have a 
profound effect on victims and therefore householders are concerned about the 
possibility of being burgled (Clark, 2009).  As shown, burglaries affect more people 
than serious crimes and yet the resolution rate for burglaries in New Zealand is 
proportionately much lower than that for serious crime. The increase in resolution of 
burglaries might ease the trauma of victims of these crimes. However, the statistics do 
not provide the reassurance that more burglaries are being resolved due to DNA 
evidence.   
 
The files relating to this research refer to a time when the New Zealand Police and the 
New Zealand Government were focused on crime reduction and what to do about it. 
During the writing up phase of this research a change in police and government strategy 
has superseded their previous strategies. The Better Public Services Reducing Crime 
and Reoffending Result Action Plan (New Zealand Government, 2012) shifted the focus 
from “what shall we do?” to “how shall we do it”?  The police response to this question 
was Prevention First (New Zealand Police, 2011) which required the police to reduce 
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recorded crime by 13% and 19% fewer (non-traffic) prosecutions by 2014/15.  The 
ultimate objective of Prevention is less actual crime and fewer victims across New 
Zealand (New Zealand Police, 2013). To achieve this, the police have been 
concentrating their efforts in five areas identified as the Drivers of Crime, namely: 
Families, Youth, Alcohol, Road Policing and organised Crime and Drugs. The drivers 
of crime refer to the underlying causes of criminal offending and victims' experiences of 
crime (Ministry of Justice, 2009).  Although these strategies signal a shift from a 
reliance on reactive policing to reduce crime, the over-arching aim is still to reduce the 
number of victims.  Prevention First requires the police to be proactive in preventing 
crime and this would still tie in with using DNA to prevent further crime and therefore 
more victims. If the police were to charge a person where a DNA intelligence link has 
been received from the ESR placing the person at the scene of a burglary then the 
likelihood of this person going to prison and being unable to commit further crimes is 
increased. Whilst the DNA is taken in a reactive way, it could be used proactively to 
prevent further offending. However, if the police do not connect the dots then the 
proactive nature of DNA would never be realised. Therefore, the effective use of DNA 
technology could prevent more victims of crime. 
 
Table 2 below illustrates the number of recorded burglaries versus the number of 
resolutions. In 1996 the database was established and in 2003 the Act was revised, 
giving the police more powers to obtain suspect compulsion orders from burglary 
suspects. The two years after the databank was established show a decrease in the 
resolution rate.  However, 1999 onwards showed a sudden increase in resolutions which 
would coincide with the increase in the number of DNA samples sent to the ESR 
Another factor to be considered is that there has been a steady decline in reported crime 
since 1999.  
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Table 2. Burglary Resolution Rates 1995 – 2005 
 
Year Number of recorded unlawful 
entry with intent, burglary and 
break and enter in NZ 
Resolutions Percentage 
1995 77,961 8,757 11.2% 
1996 80,773 9,158 11.3% 
1997 80,769 9,209 11.4% 
1998 78,550 8,482 10.8% 
1999 74,274 8,098 10.9% 
2000 66,267 10,279 15.5% 
2001 60,148 9,496 15.8% 
2002 60,184 9,411 15.6% 
2003 61,423 9,998 16.2% 
2004 57,476 9,769 17% 
2005 57,923 9,209 15.9% 
 
Nonetheless, this concentration on attending crime scenes, submitting more samples and 
taking DNA samples from suspects is only one half of the equation. Improved reporting 
and an increase in testing DNA samples become redundant if the police do not have 
processes in place once the results are received from the ESR. Arguably, the reason for 
making these changes and investing heavily in DNA is so that offenders can be 
identified, arrested, charged and convicted. If an offender is in prison it is likely that 
there is one less potential burglar committing a crime. The work completed by the 
Auditor General and the Ministry of Justice in conjunction with the New Zealand Police 
has looked at the value of putting robust systems in place to identify offenders and 
support victims of crime. All parties involved state that these policies have been 
successful.  
 
In 2005 there were 407,496 total crimes reported to the New Zealand Police. Of those 
58,133 (14.2%) were classified as a burglary. During the same year in the subject 
district the total number of reported crimes was 53,615 with 8,920 (16%) being 
classified as burglaries (Statistics New Zealand, 2010).  Table 3 shows all the crimes 
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reported in the subject district for 2005. Of these reported crimes, 302 files were 
identified as having DNA found at the scene and of those 84 were burglary files. This 
means that 0.5% of crimes reported to the police resulted in DNA being found at the 
scene. Of the burglaries reported to the police, 0.9% had found DNA at the scene. 
Therefore DNA is found at very few crime scenes as supported by comments from the 
UK that DNA is found at less than 1% of crime scenes (House of Commons Home 
Office Affairs Committee, 2010).  
 
However, according to the ESR, samples from only 2% of volume crime scenes are 
submitted for processing and they are able to extract a profile from 64% of those; a link 
to a potential offender is made in about 38% (Buckleton, 2008).  Looking at submission 
rates for three months in 2007, Auckland had 5,738 recorded volume crimes. Of these 
2.37% resulted in submissions to ESR, which suggests that this district does have a 
slightly higher than average submission rate to the ESR. Buckleton (2008) posits that if 
police submitted more samples from volume crime scenes more burglaries would be 
resolved, offering a greater opportunity to reduce recidivism. This does not match the 
results which show that, of the 146 files examined that contained DNA evidence, 68 did 
not have charges attached to them.  This would refute Buckleton’s assertion that more 
samples would equal more resolutions when the police are unable to manage their 
current workload although it is arguable whether the police are unable or unwilling to 
manage their workload. The difference between the ESR identifying a potential offender 
and the offence being resolved is still great. The real challenge is establishing the 
number of files resolved due to the use of DNA evidence and it is this information that 
tends to elude the police. 
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Table 3. Total crimes recorded in Auckland City 
District 2005 vs  Recorded Number of Burglaries.  
 
 
Auckland 
District Nationally 
Total crimes 
reported 2005 53615 407496 
Burglaries reported 8920 58133 
All files with DNA 
found at scene 302 N/A 
Burglary files with 
DNA found at scene 84 N/A 
 
4.4   Illustrative Case Histories 
Case One 
This particular burglary case relates to one main file with 98 associated files. These files 
are associated as the same offender was allegedly responsible for all the crimes. This 
offender was a prolific burglar with a severe drug habit. These files highlighted 
offending that dated back to 1997 and resulted in over $100,000 worth of property being 
stolen or damaged. In June 2001 the ESR sent the police a databank report linking this 
offender to 15 burglaries. He had been offending from 1997 until 2001 without being 
caught. As well as DNA evidence there was also fingerprint, CCTV and eyewitness 
evidence. The offender was charged with 26 counts of burglary and one count of 
aggravated burglary on 23rd January 2001, five months before the DNA results were 
received from the ESR. The court outcome was that the offender pleaded guilty and, 
according to the file, 89 offences were cleared. 62 offences were cleared using the 
resolution code of ”other” and 27 offences were cleared as ”prosecution”. It is hard to 
establish why the 62 offences were cleared as ”other” as it would suggest that the 
officer did not know how the crimes were resolved. Moreover, there is no reason given 
on the file for the decision made. Likewise, it is difficult to know why samples were still 
sent to the ESR for processing if the offender had already pleaded guilty and there was 
other evidence linking him to the crimes. It could be speculated that once the samples 
had been sent to the ESR the officer did not think to review the file and question the 
need for DNA evidence. Another possibility is that the officer may have wanted to have 
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the best possible evidence at court as a precaution against the offender changing his 
plea.  
 
The apprehension codes used in this case for the many files were Patrol, Interview and 
Forensic. Patrol suggests that the offender was arrested at the scene by police. If so, 
were there outstanding files that could have been dealt with at the time? It is difficult to 
establish at what point the files were associated. When apprehension is shown as 
Interview it means that officers interview the offender who then admits or provides 
more evidence to charge.  However, in reviewing the use of Interview it is clear that the 
only reason the police are talking to the offender is as a result of receiving a DNA hit 
placing the person at the scene of the crime. The argument then becomes which is the 
more accurate reflection of the means of apprehension? If the Forensic code is not used 
there are significant implications for measuring the effectiveness of DNA in the 
identifying and conviction of offenders.   
 
The policy at the subject district was that all DNA results received from the ESR would 
be examined to see if an apprehension and clearance code could be entered at the time 
of receipt. If the DNA evidence was identified as belonging to the victim the offence 
would not be cleared. However, if the DNA result had most probably identified the 
offender the apprehension code was entered as Forensic and the clearance code entered 
as Other. Once the officer had dealt with the case the clearance code would then be 
altered to accurately reflect the disposal of the case. There is a time consideration 
behind this decision making. The police statistics run from the financial year 1st July to 
30th June and if an offence is not cleared within that financial year, plus 14 days, it is 
not counted within the official clearance statistics by the government. Many police 
investigations are time consuming and therefore often run outside the financial year; this 
is more so in volume-crime cases due to the numbers. The clearance of such files using 
the information received from the ESR was one way of overcoming this issue. The onus 
was on the officer on the case to ensure that the statistics accurately reflected the 
outcome of the case. In 2005 there was no national policy on capturing statistics so each 
district had its own local policies regarding recording clearances. This changed with the 
introduction of the National Recording Standards in 2008. The National Recording 
Standards were implemented to give some cohesion and guidance to the recording of 
statistics by the police. It is an information collection standard as opposed to a data 
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entry standard (New Zealand Police, 2008). Previous to this policy, district clearance 
rates were compared without any national standardisation, therefore comparisons were 
flawed.  However, as there is no data entry standard there will still be flaws in 
comparisons as data entry and information collection are inextricably linked. 
 
Case Two 
This case is a burglary file with 82 associated files. The apprehension code is shown as 
Patrol which may be inaccurate due to the same reasons discussed in Case one. This file 
named three offenders and involved the unlawful taking of vehicles as well as an 
aggravated burglary. The method employed by these offenders was dangerous as they 
were unconcerned if they found anyone at home at the time of their offending. This 
usually meant that they were willing to use violence which they did in several cases. 
One of the offenders was linked to four burglaries but the result from the ESR appears 
to have been received after the offenders had been charged. The file does not contain a 
final covering report so it is hard to establish how the offenders were caught and what 
role DNA had in their capture. In reviewing the report written for court, also known as 
the summary of facts, the police state that they spoke to the offenders but it is not made 
clear how they were initially identified. This poor quality of file preparation makes it 
very difficult to establish what impact DNA had on the effective closure of these 
offences. Once again the results from the ESR were received after the offenders had 
been charged. It is not known why the samples were sent to the ESR if the offenders 
were going to be charged irrespective of the results.  If an offender is charged it usually 
means there is a prima facie case, thus suggesting that ESR results would have been 
redundant to the case. Every time a sample is sent to ESR there is a cost to the police15.  
Costs vary depending on what the sample is and as there is a limited forensic budget it 
is important that this resource is not wasted. It is hard to know why the officer sent the 
samples to the ESR. Perhaps he/she did not have the experience to know what evidence 
would be required. Another possible explanation is that the officer wished to have the 
best possible evidence ready for court in case it was required. Another scenario is that a 
lack of supervision of the officer meant he/she did not receive guidance when 
submitting the sample. The supervisor could have decided against sending it to the ESR 
if it was felt that the evidence would be redundant.   
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 This is sensitive information and the police did not want the costings published.  
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4.4.1   Tracking the Results 
These two cases are examples of the disparate manner in which the police capture 
information, yet there are national policies on data entry and file assembly which appear 
to go largely ignored. This could be as a result of new information being given to the 
police so often that it becomes too difficult for officers to understand. Chan (2003) 
would suggest that the rules of the game keep changing, altering the field of policing 
and creating resistance to change amongst officers. There may be a simpler explanation 
in that officers get change fatigue and struggle or do not want to keep up. The UK has 
also struggled to find statistics to support their claim that DNA can make a significant 
difference to the detection rate of volume crime. The Scientific Work Improvement 
Model (SWIM) was a programme of work looking at the police scientific support 
function in England and Wales. It was the most comprehensive study conducted in the 
police use of forensic support in a decade (Evans, 2007). One element of the programme 
was to look at the detection rate. This was broken down into four main process stages 
contributing to the progressive conversion of reported crime into successful detections. 
The four stages were: attendance, submission, identification and detection. The 
conversion of identification into detection was shown to be a weak point in the four 
stages. The reasons for the level of attrition at this stage were given as: 
• Poor processes so that many results were not followed up 
• Many results named the victim or people with legitimate reasons for being at the 
scene 
• ”Insufficient evidence” –used for a variety of reasons including lack of 
supporting information to aid the interviewing officer to secure a detection or 
conducting a poor interview  
• Limited effort employed by the police officers; if initial attempts to arrest the 
suspect were unsuccessful the person was entered on to the Police National 
Computer (PNC) but was then never followed up (Lanner Group Ltd, 2007). 
 
In reviewing the 146 files of the subject district it became clear that there was a high 
attrition rate in turning identifications into detections. As shown in Table 4, of the 146 
files examined 68 did not have any charges attached to them. Burglary accounted for 33 
and of those 31 of the offenders had been in custody but had never been interviewed 
about the offence for which there was DNA. Yet all of the files had an alert on the 
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police computer informing staff that the person had an outstanding DNA intelligence 
link. Alerts are mechanisms by which the NIA automatically prompts a system user that 
some special condition applies to the record being viewed (New Zealand Police, 2008).  
These alerts can be placed on a variety of subjects including persons, organisations and 
vehicles and cover many specific issues. Of those 68 files, 55 of the offenders had been 
in police custody in the interim yet were never dealt with for the outstanding DNA 
matter. 
 
Table 4. Number of Files Examined with Police Charges 
Attached. 
 
  
In Police Custody 
Files examined 146 
 
Charges attached 78 
 
No charges attached 68 55 
 
 
4.4.2   Interview Results 
In view of the findings from the files in relation to police response to DNA hits, two of 
the questions that were asked of interviewees were: 
• When you receive a DNA hit are you pleased or is it just more work? 
• Do you take notice of DNA alerts on offenders? What action do you take if there 
is an alert (see Appendices 6 and 7)? 
The first question garnered a positive response with the majority of those interviewed 
considered a DNA hit as helpful.16 Participant D was a Detective Senior Sergeant who 
managed an investigative team with responsibility for budget and deciding if DNA 
samples will be sent to the ESR for analysis. Participant J had a similar role. 
Participant D: “I’m rapt, it’s great. I guess as you well know in the last two years 
we’ve had a number of quite high-profile matters resolved because of DNA hits that 
are sometimes five or 10 years old and the guys are just like justice finally comes and 
it’s really great to find and see and the complainants are just over the moon their case 
is finally being resolved.”  
                                                            
16
 See Appendix 18  for a breakdown of interviewees and their roles in the organisation. 
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Participant J: “Oh pleased, of course you’ve got to be pleased. Another DNA hit we 
have to deal with. No, it’s excellent, it’s all part of the process, it’s good.”  
These participants see DNA as an immediate help to their work in that it virtually 
assures an arrest. Participant D is referring to the successful use of DNA in old cases or 
what are known as cold cases. Participant F was a Detective Constable who worked in 
an adult sexual assault team.  
Participant F: “Hugely pleased, very, very pleased, it’s great it also just helps you build 
up a profile of your sex offenders and that’s a really big thing. I don’t know if we’ve 
touched on that but just building up this databank, some profiles of sexual offenders 
and that can be used in conjunction with people that commit burglaries and that’s 
obviously a huge stepping stone into invasion-type intruder rapes which is probably the 
homicide if you like of the sexual assault unit.“ 
However, the above staff worked in areas that did not have a high volume of DNA hits 
which may have given them a different perspective. When the same question was put to 
staff working in the area of volume crime their responses, although positive, were more 
muted. Participant O was a Constable in a burglary team. 
Participant D: “I get DNA hits on a regular basis as you know for car crime either theft 
ex car or unlawful taking which is generally done by SOCOs and I get DNA hits on a 
regular basis from exhibits or direct body samples found at the scene obtained by our 
CSA’s for burglaries and I’d probably say in the average month I’d probably get 
between 15 and 25 forensic so it’s probably not the excitement that there would be for 
a sexual violation, a rape. If I can call the car crime and burglary your routine, your day 
to day crime that we deal with on a regular basis.”  
Participant O: Oh it’s just another file amongst many, many files that you know there’s 
no sort of yea or nay, you do think okay this is, hopefully a slam dunk one, or I can 
clear this one and get back to the harder ones that require a more prolonged 
investigation.”  
Participant D sees volume crime as routine, day-to-day crime. This may be why 
burglary has such a low resolution rate in that officers find it to be mundane. It has 
already been established earlier in the chapter (see section 4.3) that DNA is found at 
only a small percentage of crime scenes. This would suggest that those working in 
volume crime would not be receiving a large quantity of DNA results from the ESR. 
These participants are not too excited when they receive a hit as they consider it to be 
just another piece of evidence. Yet those in serious crime stated they are thrilled to 
receive a result. It could be that there is a perception that volume crime and its attendant 
paperwork is not seen as real police work whereas serious crime is perceived as police 
racing about locking up the bad guys (Grant & Rowe, 2011; Graycar, 1999). It seems 
that volume crime simply does not carry the same importance or kudos as the serious 
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crimes and so the officers respond accordingly. In the investigation of serious crime the 
officers see DNA as enabling but when it comes to volume crime it is almost 
constraining. Chan (2001) argues that faced with this the officers can do one of two 
things: they can pervert the use of DNA for their own purposes or ignore it completely. 
In reviewing the responses of participants D and O, combined with the data from the 
files, it would seem that in relation to volume crime some officers may choose to ignore 
the DNA alerts.   
 
When asked about dealing with offenders with an alert the responses revealed some 
common threads. All the interviewees acknowledged that there were problems with 
DNA alerts not being dealt with when the offender was in custody. The top five reasons 
were given as: lack of knowledge; northern communication centre pressuring staff to 
answer calls; unable to locate file; too busy and poor processes. 
 
Lack of Knowledge When Dealing With DNA Alerts 
Of those interviewed, 13 felt that a lack of knowledge was possibly a reason for alerts to 
go unresolved. This encompassed responses that included poor training, incompetence, 
poor interviewing skills or lack of support. Participant E believed that front-line staff 
working through the night when offenders often came in tended to be the most junior 
staff.  Due to their inexperience they were unsure of what to do with the alerts and so 
were reluctant to deal with them. This participant also commented that perhaps it was 
also a lack of supervision that contributed to this reluctance. Participant I believed that 
the supervisory staff were unsure how to investigate and interview and as a result were 
unable to offer support to younger staff. Participant L stated that the front-line staff 
lacked confidence and competence due to their short length of service. There was a 
general feeling from the interviews that most offenders were arrested (not during regular 
hours of work) by junior officers who were neither trained nor supervised well enough 
to handle even the most basic interviews. Interviews were integral to the satisfactory 
resolution of a DNA hit. Participant E was a Detective Sergeant who managed an adult 
sexual assault team.  Participant I was a Detective Senior Sergeant who managed an 
investigation team and was responsible for deciding on what DNA samples were sent to 
the ESR for analysis.  
Participant E: “My feeling is that junior staff who are probably locking up these guys 
on a regular basis for disorderly, drugs-type offences, they’re scared of alerts, they 
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don’t know what to do, they don’t know how to deal with them. Maybe it’s a training 
issue, maybe it’s a supervisory issue but at their direct supervisory level and in the 
watch-house my understanding in central is basically no one should be allowed out of 
the watch-house until all of their Wanted To Arrests (WTAs), Wanted To Interview 
(WTIs) and DNAs are cleared on the system or there’s evidence that they’ve been 
dealt with but I could stand corrected on that.”  
Participant I: “It wouldn’t surprise me I think that you know particularly Incident Car 
staff  and Strategic Traffic Unit (STU) staff they don’t have the luxury of time at jobs 
and they constantly have comm’s on their back you know there’s always jobs stacked 
up in the system and you know they’ve almost been reduced to gathering results as 
statistics rather than policeman rather than taking the time at a job and doing it 
properly. I think some of that’s down to supervision. I think that in a lot of cases 
supervisors don’t know how to interview properly, they haven’t had the benefit of 
investigative experience or investigations training. They themselves are uncertain and 
it becomes a case of the visually impaired leading the partially sighted. It’s just easier 
for the supervisors to ignore the fact and just send the file through.” 
Participant I comments on the police officer being reduced to gathering statistics rather 
than having the time to complete a job properly. It is not unsurprising that the 
participant would feel as if the police role has been reduced to filling out forms and 
ticking boxes. Ericson (1994) refers to the police as “knowledge workers” in that they 
collect a large amount of data as part of their work. However, there is nothing to suggest 
that this would prevent officers from interviewing a suspect. Participant I also believes 
that the supervisors are not trained in investigative techniques and would not be able to 
mentor the younger constables in interviewing suspects. It is surprising that any police 
officer would not be experienced in interviewing as one would expect that to be a basic 
skill taught to all. Participant L was a Detective Inspector with the overall responsibility 
for the effectiveness of the investigative staff in the district. 
Participant L: “Most of the officers who bring people into the custody suite here in 
Auckland are young officers who work in the streets in central Auckland so there’s 
issues of confidence and competence and doing more than a simple interview or a 
simple investigation and there’s pressure on them to get back on the road.” 
This lack of knowledge could also refer back to the police not putting systems in place 
to help officers deal with new technology. DNA evidence was always going to result in 
the need for interviews so officers should have received more training on how to 
interview before DNA was enshrined in law. Although when participants with more 
length of service were interviewed they articulated that interviews were an integral part 
of policing and did not know why that skill had apparently been lost.  
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Northern Communications Centre Pressuring Staff to Answers Calls 
The Northern Communications Centre receives calls for assistance from members of the 
public. Police officers tend to refer to the centre colloquially as North Comms or 
Comms. These calls can range from life threatening to more mundane events. The three 
communication centres (Northern, Central and Southern) deal with 600,000 111 calls a 
year (The New Zealand Police, 2010). Call centres dispatch I (Incident) cars via radio to 
respond to these calls. Call centres have a Memorandum of Understanding with each 
district to provide an agreed level of service. The district expects the call centre to take 
calls from the public and then dispatch these calls to front-line staff in a timely manner. 
The centre feels pressure to perform well and thus puts the onus back on the front- line 
staff to answer calls. There is also a feeling that when urgent calls come in, the I-car 
staff want to answer them. The police are traditionally action-oriented and see a rapid 
response to calls for service as the most effective way of catching offenders 
(Graycar,1999).  They regularly have to balance the need to respond to the public and 
the need to finish the job in the watch-house. The job in the watch-house may be seen as 
less exciting as it involves paperwork. Just under half of those interviewed felt that the 
pressure exerted on them by North Communications was a factor in the reluctance by 
officers to deal with DNA alerts. Participant T was a Senior Sergeant with responsibility 
for the day to day management of a station. 
Participant T: “I think there’s that and the pressure to get back out on the road because 
of the urgent jobs and that’s why they shouldn’t be tied up interviewing.”  
Participant T does not define what an urgent job would be although it is clear by the 
response that interviewing a burglar is not important. Participant Y was a Senior 
Sergeant with the responsibility for the custody suite where prisoners were brought to 
be processed. 
Participant Y: “Quite often they’ll come across my desk in the middle of a night shift, a 
busy night shift and it’s not a priority but if it’s a quiet night and we can get hold of the 
file hey! go and get the file out, have a look at it ,interview them on it, deal with it, 
clear it. We may charge, we may not you know but again it’s having the time and the 
staff with the ability to conduct the interview to actually deal with it. Okay I know 
we’re supposed to do everyone that comes across but realistically we just don’t have 
the time or the staff to deal with it. I can’t afford to grab a car, for a start, as soon as I 
take someone off the street they’ve got to go and do a video interview, they’ve got to 
go and read the file, you know plan some sort of interview with the guy minimum 
we’re looking at probably an hour and a half, two hours.”  
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Participant Y does not see interviewing a burglar as a priority, irrespective of what the 
organisation has stated. This could be due to the gap between the street cop and the 
management cop (discussed further in Chapter 8 section 8.3). However, as a supervisor 
there are other considerations that need to be taken into account. If there is only one car 
on the road it makes sense that he would want that car to remain on the streets.  
Participant M was a Constable working in a tactical support group that provided support 
at large public events. 
Participant M: “Not so much pressure coming from above or anything, it’s more the 
fact that you know your mates are out there doing work and you don’t want to leave 
them with all the jobs.”  
This participant feels guilty about the workload that his colleagues might have if he is 
off the streets dealing with a prisoner.   
 
Unable to Locate the File 
Of those interviewed, 11 believed that being unable to locate a file contributed to the 
reasons for DNA alerts remaining unresolved. Prior to a person being interviewed 
regarding a DNA hit, an officer would need to read the file to prepare for the interview.  
The file should contain a full picture of the case so that the DNA evidence can be put to 
the suspect. Every aspect of the case should have been investigated with the result of the 
DNA evidence being the last piece of the puzzle. In essence, if the file is comprehensive 
enough anyone should be able to read it, get a good overview and then be able to 
interview the suspect confidently. The issues raised by those interviewed were that the 
files could be inaccessible during out of hours or that the quality of the files was so poor 
that an informed interview was impossible. Participant V (a general duties Constable) 
believed that the file should only be dealt with by the original officer as it was too 
difficult to interview someone about a case that you had no knowledge of, whereas the 
other participants implied that they would deal with the case if the file contained enough 
information. Participant A was a Detective Senior Sergeant who managed an 
investigation unit with responsibility for deciding if a DNA sample was sent to the ESR 
for analysis. 
Participant A: “A lot of them now are saying well it’s not our area, it’s not our district, 
it’s not my file, I can’t find the file, I don’t know what it’s all about and, for me, you 
know there’s been times, I talk about the old days and it’s probably not fair to do that, 
but where you had to interview someone blind and that was your job and if you did a 
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good interview you’d find it, you’d get the information although the laws have changed 
and the times have changed so.”  
Participant O: “If he’s going through the watch-house that’s sort of standard, we try to 
clear one way or the other or deal with every point on their alerts where there’s a 
wanted to interview, even (if just) to say we’re unable to interview at this time because 
we can’t get the file.”  
Participant L: “It’s not easy at the time for the arresting officer to access the 
investigating officer or the investigating officer’s file if it’s a LET team (Law 
Enforcement Team) in Otahuhu or Henderson, even Mt Wellington or Avondale, if it’s 
in the middle of the night.”  
 
Too Busy to Interview Suspect for DNA Alert  
It was believed by 11 of those interviewed that officers were too busy to deal with DNA 
alerts. This differs from the pressure felt from the Northern Communications Centre as 
they believed that they had a responsibility to the public as well as to their colleagues. 
Participant N (detective in a burglary squad) states that often the suspects were brought 
in during the early hours when only front-line staff were at work. He states that if other 
squads were available they could deal with DNA alerts. However, other staff 
interviewed felt that people perceive that they are busy with participant B (a detective 
senior sergeant) suggesting that people only think they are busy. Participant Z (a 
detective sergeant managing a child abuse team) was more forthright, stating that you 
can only deal with one job at a time. 
Participant N: “Too busy. I think especially around Auckland Central anyway lack of 
resources for the general or the front-line staff could be one as well. Well I guess not 
enough police to police the streets and because you find a lot of these guys are caught 
sort of two, three in the morning sometimes and the crime squad or the Criminal 
Investigation Unit or Burglary Investigation Unit don’t work 24/7.”  
Participant B: “I know that in the current day and age everybody is so busy or they 
think that they’re so busy that they’ve got to deal with what they’re dealing with purely 
so they can be out and available for the next one but we need to be dealing with all of 
them.”  
Participant Z: “I don’t buy the crap you’re too busy because you’re only as busy as the 
job you’re dealing with.”  
 
Processes 
Only six of those interviewed felt it was the processes that prevented the staff from 
dealing with DNA alerts. The processes employed by the police can either hinder or 
assist in the smooth running of the organisation. With the perceived increase of 
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workload by the staff, the easier the system the more likely it is that they will adhere to 
the policies.  Several participants commented that the processes were not conducive to 
reducing the workload of front-line staff.  Participant C was a Detective Inspector with 
the responsibility for the administrative side of the investigative teams, i.e. the staffing.  
Participant B: “Once again that comes back to people knowing the process, you know 
what I mean, and so if you see a DNA alert or some sort of forensic alert perhaps it’s 
not for you to interview but you need to advise somebody so that somebody from CIB 
comes down or there is some enquiry process.” 
Participant C: “Absolutely failing in our system and it’s bullshit, it’s a lack of 
supervision and a lack of common sense.” 
Participant Z: “A lot of that’s our internal processes but I think if you are arresting 
someone it’s like a warrant to arrest, wanted to interview you should notify someone 
about it and it’s the NCO’s  responsibility.”  
Even though these participants felt the processes were lacking, they all agreed that 
someone should take accountability for the alert. 
 
4.5   Interview Results for Volume Crime 
The staff interviewed regarding the use of DNA felt that it was of value for volume 
crime but they struggled with the sheer numbers, the budget constraints and the 
legislation. Participant K was a Sergeant who managed an enquiry team that 
investigated volume crime. 
Participant K: "Unfortunately it comes down to money at times which is another 
bugbear of mine. I think if we can get convictions for crime okay, some of these 
volume crimes are considered the lesser of the scale however, half these guys start with 
theft ex cars or burglaries, not that we’re involved directly with burglaries and I think 
look if we’re going to go to the problem of taking swabs and things for these sort of 
things it should be followed through to use." 
The participant states that if they are making the effort to attend scenes and finding 
DNA samples then the police should exploit this resource. However, the participant 
raises concerns that perhaps the crime is not serious enough to warrant the effort. This 
participant is also frustrated that money prevents the full use of DNA technology. 
Participant K: "The problem with it is because of the way this law goes we have to get 
a sample off them to prove that, now they don’t want to give it then we’ve got to look 
at compulsion orders and that costs money and therefore if it doesn’t go down that line 
it's a waste of time and that to me is where we’ve either got to go the whole hog or 
don’t stutter in the progress and that’s where I just think the laws are stupid. I think 
surely if they’ve had it taken, why do we have to keep comparing every time this guy’s 
locked up, get another sample." 
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Participant N: "I had fingerprinted one person back in 2002 and he was in prison for 
three years and nobody spoke to him and then I spoke to him not long ago but it’s very 
difficult to charge somebody because the abuse of process. So he’s only been given a 
warning for this particular offence but it’s frustrating." 
Participant O: "There's always too much on I mean I’ve got files sitting here that I’d 
love to put some hours into but I’ve got other things that I need to do more urgently. I 
guess that’s down to the bosses, I mean as long as they resource certain squads at a 
certain level they can only expect so many clearances and so many prosecutions for the 
amount of manpower they’ve got."  
Participant O felt that the workload was too great to be able to deal with all the DNA 
results they receive from the ESR. This participant suggested that the police should 
prioritise the crimes that would be resourced as it would appear that volume crime is not 
always treated as a priority. However, he made it very clear that the decision was down 
to the bosses as to how the squads were staffed which influenced their ability to 
investigate certain crimes. Participant W was a Sergeant in a burglary squad. 
Participant W: "I think it’s the allocation of staff into the crime categories. If you look 
at burglaries in the eastern area, well burglaries across Auckland, we have six 
investigators (...). West have a similar amount and I think the city do as well. West and 
East have a Law Enforcement Team (LET) however our job’s not to do burglaries but 
West operate their Burglary Investigation Unit (BIU) and LET as one. (..) Since our 
sergeant changed here and moved across the LET we’ve started taking forensics from 
vehicles so they don’t go to the Combined Investigation Units  (CIU) because they just 
get inactivated. We’re helping the BIU now with any burglary files so there is more of 
a resource there however a few months ago because of the management of the office it 
was like nothing was leaving the BIU come hell or high water. We go to homicides for 
a month and come back and no one would’ve touched a thing  because the old LET 
wouldn’t, no not our job. Look there’s staff there, (..) you only need to look outside of 
Auckland (...) if you look at Christchurch break team it’s stocked with detectives and 
we have one detective and five constables and the constables probably have an average 
of six to seven months off the I car. (...)." 
Participant W believes that the staffing across the district has at times been mismanaged 
with homicides always taking priority. He compares the subject district with 
Christchurch where they are able to staff a burglary team with detectives. He considers 
this to be impressive as detectives usually have more service and certainly a higher level 
of training in investigation. In the participant’s district the burglary team is inclined to 
be staffed by officers with very little service and not as much investigative training.  
 
Irrespective of what the New Zealand Police and the Government state about the 
importance of dealing proactively with volume crime (thereby reducing the number of 
victims of crime) there seems to be an issue with the resourcing of the units that deal 
with these crimes. From the interviews and the examined files it seems that the 
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difficulty is not the attendance at the scene or the timeliness of the results from the ESR 
but rather dealing with the results once they have been received by the police. It could 
be argued that prioritising responses to crime is a way of dealing with the volume of 
work and the lack of resources. The less serious the crime the less time and effort was 
expended in dealing with it. After unlawful taking of motor vehicle, unlawful 
interference of a motor vehicle had the most number of files. Four files related to this 
offence type with two of those files receiving a conviction. One file required a suspect 
compulsion order to obtain a DNA sample but as he was on remand for other offences it 
was felt that there was no point in pursuing this case. Theft from a dwelling accounted 
for three files and none of these files had charges. One file had the suspect being 
interviewed but he denied the offence and there was deemed insufficient evidence to 
charge in spite of there being a witness. Wilful damage had two files and both suspects 
were charged with the offences.  
 
4.6   Discussion 
Research has shown that volume crime has a significant impact on the community 
(Clark, 2009; Controller & Auditor, 2006; Morris & Reilly, 2003). Of volume crime 
burglary, being one of New Zealand’s highest recorded crimes (Ministry of Justice, 
2010), has been identified as a priority by the New Zealand Police and Government. 
Moreover, as burglars tend to be recidivist offenders and can go on to commit more 
serious and violent offences (Adderley & Musgrove, 2001; Zedlewski & Murphy, 2006) 
there are good reasons why reducing burglary is seen as a priority by both the New 
Zealand Government and the New Zealand Police. Yet there seems to be a 
disconnection between what the New Zealand Police as an organisation promotes and 
the reality at district level.  Certainly in one district the figures tell a different story. As 
shown, of the 53,615 reported crimes, the number of crime scenes with DNA present is 
only 302. From those 302 scenes, 84 related to burglary and of those 84 burglaries, 51 
were resolved by the police. This does not suggest that burglary is high on anyone’s list 
of priorities. This is further evidenced by comments made by interviewees. Several 
comment that staffing is a problem for those investigating burglary and volume crime.  
They state that when a serious crime is committed staff are taken from other squads to 
help in the investigation. This would suggest that the managers in the district 
(responsible for staffing levels in specific squads) are not prioritising burglary either.   
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DNA is viewed as an effective means by which volume crime can be resolved but 
several studies highlight the weaknesses in the application of forensic services both in 
New Zealand and the UK (see Audit Commission, 1990; Auditor General, 2001; 
Williams, 2004; McCulloch, 1996; Tilley & Ford, 1996). These reports reason that there 
needs to be better strategic use of forensic services, especially in relation to crime 
scenes attended. It was believed that the more crime scenes attended the more samples 
would be obtained, meaning that more offenders could be identified. To a certain extent 
this was the case. The police in both New Zealand and the UK attended more scenes 
and tried to obtain as many crime-scene samples as possible. This policy was seen as a 
success in that by obtaining samples they achieved exactly what they intended. The 
DNA expansion programme in the UK achieved its target of having 2.5 million profiles 
on the database by April 2004. This programme also ensured that there was a 10% 
increase in the number of crime scenes attended (Home Office, 2005). The New 
Zealand Auditor General in a follow-up report to his 2001 report concluded that the 
New Zealand Police had made more effective use of forensic and intelligence analysis 
and they had doubled their expenditure with the ESR.  He believed that this was 
indicative of the police making greater use of forensic services for criminal 
investigations (Controller and Auditor General, 2006). However, the Auditor General 
did not define this greater use of forensic service. 
 
The files examined during the research show that there is a disparity between the 
identifying of potential offenders by the ESR and the arresting of these offenders by the 
New Zealand Police. Although the emphasis by the police continues to be on attendance 
at crime scenes it seems that more time should be spent locating and interviewing the 
identified offenders. The participants interviewed highlighted clear reasons why DNA 
alerts were ignored. A lack of knowledge was chief amongst them. An inability to 
interview suspects, to access files, have time to deal with or understand processes all led 
to the DNA alert not being cleared. The strategic application of DNA requires a full 
understanding of the issues facing front-line officers. They are the staff who most 
frequently deal with these alerts and yet they are the least equipped to deal with them 
satisfactorily. This issue is not just a problem in New Zealand. The UK has shown the 
capacity to deal with half the dynamic of DNA evidence but also stumbles when trying 
to turn hits into detections. These similarities in behaviour between the UK and New 
Zealand Police in relation to the use of DNA technology may suggest that police culture 
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has got in the way of it being truly effective. If the New Zealand Police wish to lay 
legitimate claim to the many benefits of DNA technology, it will need to ensure that it is 
in a position to reassure the public and the government that it is utilising this resource to 
its full potential. 
 
The following chapter reviews the interview participants’ views and perceptions of 
DNA in that they discuss what they ‘feel’ and ‘think’ about the technology of DNA.   
This is to illustrate the environment in which this technology is/may be embedded and 
what impact, if any, these views can have on the effective application of DNA to 
investigate crime.  This chapter is placed before the chapter that discusses the actual use 
of DNA to highlight any disparities between what interviewees talk about DNA and 
how they state they actually use it.  
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Chapter 5: The Operational Use of DNA  
5.0   Introduction 
This chapter begins with the interview participants expressing their views on DNA 
technology and explaining how this technology could aid them in the day-to-day 
investigation of crime. This distinction is made as this chapter explores what the 
participants think DNA can do. This is compared to chapter 6 which will review the 
participants’ actual use of DNA.   There is discussion as to whether DNA technology is 
all the police require for a successful investigation and what the implications for the 
police would be if that was a belief held by the majority of those interviewed. This 
concept is linked with accountability and legitimacy when police use DNA technology 
including the taking and retaining of samples. The subject of whether police officers in 
the New Zealand Police are equipped to interview is also explored. The chapter ends 
with a discussion on the responses from participants and whether DNA technology has 
been successfully integrated into operational police use and if not, why not.  
 
The chapter also reviews whether the New Zealand Police make the best use of DNA 
technology in criminal investigations. It explores this subject by analysing the 
interviews of 28 participants. While this topic is a wide and at times subjective one, it is 
appropriate that the question is asked of these practitioners as they are best placed to 
provide an informed view. The aim of these interviews is to delve into the many uses of 
DNA to establish the participants' views on how effectively the police apply its use to 
investigations. The participants are specifically questioned on their use of DNA and in 
which ways they believe DNA aids them in criminal investigations. As discovered 
during the interviews, attitudes to DNA are partly shaped by the experiences of the 
participants in relation to the two types of crime, burglary discussed in the previous 
chapter and serious crime which is covered in the chapter 6. 
 
Identifying participants’ thoughts on the day-to-day use of DNA technology is also 
covered in this chapter. It includes all aspects of their investigations and explores their 
views on how often DNA should be used and specifically how they believe it enables 
the New Zealand Police to be more effective at resolving crime. The responses vary 
depending on the roles of those interviewed but all participants have had some dealings 
with DNA. DNA technology can be seen by the police as being a sexy technology that 
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will assist them in solving crime, irrespective of the reality of its application. In 
reviewing the initial use of fingerprinting in 1903 it would appear that the police 
experienced similar issues with the legitimacy of the use of this new technology as it 
has had with the initial use of DNA (Hill, 1989). As ever, there are always unforeseen 
problems when something new is introduced to an organisation. This has been 
especially so of DNA over the years as the rise of technology in the police has been 
rapid, with an increase in information technology as well as other technology. It could 
be that all these technologies are vying for attention and could almost be a distraction 
for the police.   
 
5.1   What Do You Think of DNA? 
The 28 participants were asked the question, what do you think of DNA (see Appendix 
12), to establish the investigators’ perception of DNA’s effectiveness in criminal 
investigation. All viewed DNA in a positive light, although there was usually a word of 
caution within their full responses. 
Participant C: “Oh look it’s a fantastic investigative aid but it’s got to be taken in 
context. Instead of leaping to the conclusion that it is the offenders, there’s still a lot of 
work that’s got to be done with that so it is a valuable tool. It also gives you a head 
start in what and where you may be looking.” 
Participant D: “I think it’s a great tool, (...). Our ability to use it to identify offenders 
and clear offences is growing by the year, by the month almost to the stage where the 
amount of information coming in to identify offenders through DNA hits is almost 
greater than the staff we’ve got available to go and follow up and interview the persons 
identified by the DNA.” 
Although participant D considers DNA to be a great tool, he tempers his enthusiasm 
with the comment that the number of DNA hits being received is almost more than the 
staff can cope with. This is an important consideration when the ESR are calling for the 
police to send more samples to them or if the police are requesting law changes to allow 
them to take a greater number of samples. The capacity for the police to respond to 
these links is important if the full benefits of DNA are to be realised. Being 
overwhelmed by this workload may prevent the police from making effective use of 
DNA to investigate and solve crime.  
Participant E: “DNA in my opinion is a fantastic crime-fighting tool. It’s a crucial 
element to what I do, it’s something virtually in every investigation we automatically 
look for, it’s not always there, obviously, but it is an absolute crucial element to what I 
do and what my squad do. I think the advances that have been given to us via ESR with 
Low Copy Number (LCN) and the other types of methodology they use are 
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outstanding, we have the ability to look for and think about DNA in so many different 
aspects of the job now, it’s just brilliant, it’s great.” 
Other participants express the opinion that DNA is good as it is conclusive evidence. 
Participant G is a detective working in an adult sexual assault team. 
Participant G: “Because of its certainty, because that’s what a jury is looking for in 
their own minds eyes so you know.” 
This participant notes that juries are looking for DNA evidence. This opinion was 
shared by several other participants. 
Participant O's view was that "DNA is really good just because it’s so specific”. This 
was also true of participant P whose role was that of a Sergeant with responsibility for a 
team of crime scene attendants.  
Participant P: “Love it because it’s conclusive. My staff will do a better scene 
examination because if there is a chance of obtaining DNA they know that there is a 
hundred percent chance if that person’s on the database and it’s good quality DNA 
they’re going to get a result."  
Both these participants feel that the success of DNA is that it can identify a person 
almost without doubt which is always going to be of use to the police. Yet this belief 
has been contested by others who would argue that it is unsafe to rely on DNA evidence 
as it is not as infallible as people would believe (Bieber, 2006; Lynch et al, 2008; Taroni 
& Aitken, 1997). Other participants such as B expressed their doubts regarding the use 
of DNA and believed that it should be treated with some caution. 
 
Participant B: “Well DNA’s not the be all and end all, a lot of the enquiries that 
we’ve talked about before and it certainly assists with perhaps enabling a focus 
that some people will be caught in the trap and you referred to them before 
when you suggested that people get DNA so that’s the be all end all of the 
enquiry and they focus on that. Well no that’s actually a part of the 
investigation but it shouldn’t be the singular focus. DNA is certainly a strong 
investigation tool and there is no doubt about that.” 
 
Participant H: “Well I think it is good; it helps resolve crimes in a faster fashion, 
because you attend a scene, you gather a sample, it gets analysed and a person is 
hopefully identified if the previous samples have been taken and recorded. A lot of 
these crimes are quite intrusive on people such as sexual-related crimes. I guess all 
crimes involve some fear or uncertainty from people but those particular crimes are 
higher (...)”. 
Participant H was a Constable working in an enquiry team and for him the fact that 
DNA enables the police to solve crimes quickly is a bonus as the impact of certain 
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crimes on victims can be great. However, the next participant sees DNA as having many 
disadvantages as well as benefits. 
Participant I: “I think that it has made our jobs easier in some respects and more 
difficult in others; it is very much a double-edged sword. For the likes of offenders 
who leave DNA at the scene whether it be by blood or other body fluids, however they 
leave it there, it’s a great tool for identifying offenders. That said, particularly with the 
sensitivities around DNA analysis now it means that we really have to be on top of our 
game and places a great deal more significance on a thorough and well-managed scene 
examination.”  
Participant I is mindful that DNA is a good method of identifying offenders but the 
police need to be aware of the ease of cross-contamination and not compromise the 
integrity of the evidence at scenes. Yet other participants do believe that DNA is a great 
technique to identify and prosecute offenders. 
 
Participant L: “I think DNA is a very useful investigative and prosecutorial 
tool for sheeting home criminal responsibility.” 
Participant R: “Oh I mean it does wonders, I think it’s definitely something that we’re 
going to progress from a crime point of view certainly but more from a science point of 
view as well you know as far as finding cures.” 
Participant T: “Oh I think it’s become a great tool for us to obtain or to help us 
investigate crimes and solve crimes.” 
These participants see DNA as more than just identifying offenders and it is important 
that those identified are prosecuted. This would be at odds with the results found in this 
research where offenders, although identified through DNA, are not necessarily 
prosecuted. Some participants feel that everyone should be on the database and that way 
more offenders would be identified. Participant X was a uniform Constable working in 
an enquiry team. 
Participant K: “I think it’s great, I think it’s a very worthwhile advancement as far as 
policing goes in general. If I had my way I think everyone should have to give DNA.” 
Participant M: “From my limited understanding of it, it seems like a good tool to me 
obviously I mean if you’ve got nothing to hide every single person should be DNAd.” 
Participant X: "Oh I think it’s a fantastic tool, I think we should have DNA of 
everyone on our database. That’s my personal opinion." 
However, participant F found the paperwork involved so frustrating that the positives of 
DNA were almost lost on him. When he did praise it he noted the importance of DNA 
to a jury as a result of the CSI effect (this is discussed further in section 5.3). 
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Participant F: “I’ve always thought that our procedure, the documentation side and the 
form side for getting DNA, could be upgraded immeasurably. I think in terms of the 
various components from different types of DNA samples that we take, namely from 
every databank suspect dual elimination etc the fact that a lot of these forms are 
duplicated between the various different processes, I think that it is extremely time 
consuming to fill them out. I find them confusing (...) you could probably have a single 
form or perhaps maybe a form that incorporates the disclaimer, the information, the 
consent if it’s applicable and you cross it out if it’s not and then a single form in 
quadruplicate or whatever which outline the details of the person, the offence or the 
reason etc. Then the various parts of that could be distributed to wherever they need to 
go and to be honest I can’t see why there would need to be anything more than that.” 
Participant F: “I think it’s good as our DNA databank gets bigger, I think certainly the 
credibility of it all is getting better and I think it’s probably been mentioned before, the 
CSI effect, juries more and more getting to the point where they almost require as a 
matter of course some sort of DNA evidence whether or not it’s applicable in the 
situation.” 
The paperwork sentiment was echoed by participant N who felt that police procedures 
hampered the use of DNA. 
Participant N: “DNA is a great tool but it can be made a bit complicated by procedures 
in the police. The problem I see with DNA is we get a DNA hit we get a suspect and 
then we ask the suspect for a second DNA sample to compare the one we’ve already 
got from the offender previously. If he doesn’t want to give a sample voluntarily 
you’ve got to go through the whole procedure of a compulsion order which has to be 
sent through a supervisor on this floor then through the O/C CIB upstairs. For some 
reason they don’t always authorise it so then we’re losing out on burglary convictions 
because they’re not willing to go the compulsion order route and it just takes a very 
long time.” 
Some of these procedures are tied up with legislation but it is obvious that this 
participant is discouraged by what she perceives to be excessive bureaucracy which can 
be time-consuming and at times can thwart the use of DNA entirely. This frustration at 
an excess of paperwork and bureaucracy is often a distraction for some police officers 
and can detract from the issue at hand which is preventing crime, reassuring victims of 
crime and crime reduction (Gill, 1998; Goldstein, 1979; Ratcliffe, 2003). However, if 
the police were using DNA technology to its full extent this could perhaps prevent 
crime, reassure victims of crime and assist with crime reduction. This frustration is also 
articulated by the next participant who suspects that DNA is under-utilised. Participant 
AA was uniform Sergeant with responsibility for a team of general duties constables. 
 
Participant AA: “I love it; I mean I was called Dracula for a while there five or 
six years ago. I just think it’s huge to use that word tool that’s probably still 
underutilised. I mean I’ve been out of it for a while with two years in the 
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Solomons where they don’t have DNA. They’ve only just got fingerprinting, 
they don’t do rape kits and things like that.” 
 
5.2   In What Ways do you Think DNA Technology Aids Investigations? 
The participants fully explained what they thought of DNA. Most of them believed that 
it was an excellent tool for investigation. They were asked to describe in what ways 
DNA specifically was able to help the police investigate crime (see Appendix 11).  The 
general view of those interviewed was that DNA can identify suspects, give the police 
focus and make it difficult for a suspect to deny their presence at a scene. However, it 
was clear that some participants believed that while DNA can place a person at the 
scene, the police still have to prove that that person committed the crime. 
Participant B: “Well it certainly brings up if you’ve got a DNA sample in a key 
location or in an exhibit or directly related to the inquiry an immediate link to the 
inquiry, and if that DNA is identified then it certainly provides a quality line of the 
investigation.  Just because somebody’s DNA is present in a certain location or in an 
exhibit doesn’t necessarily mean that they’re the offender.” 
Participant A: “Well if you find DNA, one of the things you are looking for when you 
do a scene examination is for DNA because we have a database, a DNA database and 
if we’re lucky and we find DNA, ESR then checks if the offender’s on the database, it 
immediately gives us a focus.” 
Participant L: “Now that we have a decent number of active criminals on the DNA 
database that’s certainly true, it certainly does focus a lot of criminal investigations, 
yes.” 
These responses were also in reply to a question as to whether DNA meant that the 
police did not have to cast their net so wide. Several participants used similar wording 
to say that DNA was of great use in reducing the range of the investigation and as a 
consequence it identified the suspect more quickly than other investigative techniques. 
 
Participant F: “It would be ID and it definitely speeds up the ID of people. Do 
you want an example?” 
 
Participant F gives an example of two rapes in a local park. The police believed they 
were committed by the same male but they could not be sure. They were able to obtain 
DNA from both victims and extract a profile from the biological samples. The DNA 
came back to one male and this enabled the police to make an arrest with a certain 
amount of optimism whereas without the DNA it may have taken several weeks longer, 
with possibly more victims before they could make such a quality arrest. 
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Participant AA: “Target suspects and eliminate suspects, that’s how I used to sell it to a 
lot of our offenders. Look, you know you’re a Maori male, male Polynesian six feet 
tall. When we get that description having this on file we’re not going to come looking 
for you and interrupt what you’re up to, we’re not going to come and disrupt your life. 
Yep, narrows it right down. I mean think if Thompson’s blood had been on there. They 
had a huge net that first cast.” 
The example given by participant AA could be construed as police coercing members of 
the public into giving a DNA sample for spurious reasons. The suggestion that giving a 
DNA sample is one way of being eliminated from police enquiries is a means of scaring 
the person into providing a sample. This participant is also suggesting that Mäori or 
Pacific Island males are more likely to be offenders, which suggests racial profiling. It is 
this attitude that has prompted some Mäori to be vocal in their distrust of the police and 
refuse to voluntarily supply them with their DNA. One politician compared these 
coercive tactics to those of Nazi Germany (Harawira, 2010).  The participant is also 
suggesting that DNA can not only target suspects but can also eliminate them from 
enquiries which speed up the investigation process. The participant is referring to 
Joseph Stevenson Thompson who was also known as the South Auckland rapist (see 
Chapter 1 section 1.4.1). Thompson’s offending was prior to the creation of the DNA 
database but had there been a database at the time the police would not have had to take 
blood from 4,500 males (dragnet) in order to catch him. Participant AA believes that the 
database would have mitigated the need for the net to be cast so wide. Those 
interviewed also commented on the benefits of DNA preventing suspects from having a 
good excuse for the presence of their DNA at the scene of a crime. 
Participant D: “Firstly probably most importantly it identifies suspects for offences; it 
basically identifies a particular person that was at a scene when an offence was 
committed.” 
Participant K: “Probably once again because it’s very hard for an offender to give 
justification as to why for example a stolen car which is one that we deal with quite 
frequently if a DNA is found in a stolen car, their DNA, it’s very hard for them to give 
a reason why they’re in there.” 
Participant P: “If you get a positive hit then you’ve got that person in the scene, you’ve 
got an interview technique, you’ve got something to throw at them that they’re going 
to find pretty hard to answer or they may well have an answer.” 
Participant S: “It enables Burglary Investigation Units (BIU) to do further enquiries to 
have some solid questions that they can then go and ask the suspect, why was your 
jumper found in this car?"  
All these participants found DNA of great use when interviewing suspects and having 
them explain how their DNA was found at a particular scene. It is of note that two 
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participants (K and S) refer to interviewing suspects for volume crime. In Chapter 4 
section 4.4.2 it was discussed that officers might be reluctant to interview as they are 
not confident in doing so. It was suggested by those interviewed that the reason DNA 
alerts were ignored by officers was the fear of interviewing. It is interesting that the 
same interviewees should feel that DNA is a useful tool to aid officers when 
interviewing. However, the interviewer will still need to ensure that the suspect does not 
have a valid reason for being present. This is where interviewing skills become 
important.  Other participants, whilst commending DNA, also qualify its use in crime 
investigations. There is an acceptance of the benefits of DNA but also that it should be 
used with caution and not prevent the user from conducting a thorough investigation.  
Participant I: “It can speed it up. I would never ever go into an investigation and hang 
my hat on DNA. It is just one tool in the box of tools that is available to an 
investigator.”  
This officer sees DNA as one of many tools that the investigating officer can use.  
Participant I specifically states that he would not rely on DNA to close an investigation, 
a view shared by participant Q whose view is "I think it’s another good tool not just 
solely by itself". Participant Q was a general duties Constable. 
 
Other participants had different thoughts on how DNA could aid an investigation. 
Participant H: “I think it increases the thought process of people going to these scenes 
thinking about what else they may have done in the house such as maybe drinking 
from an alcohol bottle or (...) when they may have gone into a woman’s underwear 
drawer rather than just thinking about they’ve broken this window, I’ll deal with this 
and they took A, B and C or they broke the window and blood was left behind.”  
This response to the question was quite different from others. This officer believes that 
people attending scenes are now more mindful of forensics and give much greater 
thought as to where DNA could be left behind at a crime scene. If crime scenes are 
processed more thoughtfully the chances are increased that DNA will be found, thus 
increasing the likelihood of identifying an offender. 
Participant J: “In New Zealand (...) we’re able to use scientists to give evidence who 
are employees of another organisation. (...) so these people who are highly qualified 
come in and give the evidence who are separate to the police and I guess it’s a way of 
the community standing together in a prosecution but they’re saying, well we don’t 
know what the case is, we don’t know what the other evidence is but I can tell you 
what our evidence is and (...) they don’t say this is the man, the man the police 
arrested, this is his DNA. They use statistics and the statistics they use depend on how 
many sites, how many of the 12 sites they have, they’re able to confirm is a certain 
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person’s DNA. It shows up on their testing and the more sites that show up the more 
probable the person is and they come up with these and there’s only about four million 
people in New Zealand but they come up with these terms like seven hundred million, 
million, million, million times more likely that it’s (...) this person than any other 
person in the general population in New Zealand (...) and they’re separate from the 
police so it’s very strong evidence.” 
The view of participant J is that the DNA evidence is provided by scientists as expert 
witnesses. He believes that this makes the evidence more powerful because it is 
presented in court by a separate organisation and therefore is given more credence. The 
ESR is employed by the police to conduct scientific testing so it could be argued that 
they are merely another arm of the police when presenting such evidence. The ESR is 
also the only laboratory the police can use in New Zealand which might suggest that, 
due to their monopoly, they are not completely independent. However, the participant is 
emphasising that the ESR is able to give the statistics and the probability of the DNA 
belonging to the person in the dock. He believes that this makes the evidence very 
strong. However, a scientist when asked “Do you think juries and even judges 
understand the statistics?” responded with "No, not at all". 
 
This response in some ways detracts from the views of participant J who states that it is 
these very statistics and probabilities that make DNA evidence more reliable in court. 
However, not unsurprisingly, the scientist's view on how DNA aids investigation was 
very positive. 
Participant AB: “Well if we go back (...) the invisible sample so you can get a result 
from something which is pretty hard to see. I mean that has to aid an investigation if 
there’s no big bloodstain or no sort of cigarette butt left there is still the ability to 
possibly find something less obvious and that might be all that there is.”  
So at times there may be DNA evidence but it will be so tiny that it cannot be seen by 
the naked eye. Another participant felt that DNA could aid investigations when nothing 
else was available. Participant R was a scenes of crimes officer. 
Participant R: “When there is no other option, (...) when there is no line of enquiry, it’s 
another tool (...). There’s so many tools that will help find a final outcome (...). It’s a 
tool that to me I use it if I’ve got it that’s the tool that’s going to help me get that 
person then that’s why or when I’ll use it." 
Notwithstanding the participants’ views of the value of DNA, they do not believe it 
guarantees that the offender would be charged and convicted. Participants U and Y were 
crime scene attendants. 
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Participant U: “They might be charged but they might not be prosecuted. You’d think 
so but it doesn’t seem to work like that, funnily enough.” 
Participant Y: “No it doesn’t, it doesn’t. Other elements as well, just because DNA’s at 
a scene it’s like a lot of the DNA hits we get and fingerprint hits we get for that matter 
on cars. You know someone could have said I was in Queen street at 5 o’clock on that 
day and I might have leaned on the car or done this or done that. At the end of the day 
you’ve still got to be able to put that person doing something at that scene so it’s not 
definitive in that regard, no,” 
Participant S: “I don’t think it ensures, no.  I think at the end of the day it comes down 
to the skill of the officer and how thorough they’ve been all over that investigation. 
There’ll still be steps to take and you know if you miss out one of those steps the whole 
thing could be thrown out.”  
The example given by participant Y illustrates the difficulties that police encounter 
when dealing with investigations. A suspect might have a very good reason why his or 
her DNA was found at a crime scene. The police need to look at every aspect of an 
investigation before charges can be laid. 
 
5.3   Do you Consider DNA to be All You Need for a Successful Investigation? 
After establishing how DNA aids investigations, the next question put to the 
participants was whether DNA was all that was required for a successful investigation 
(see Appendix 10). Surprisingly, some of the participants based their answers on the 
views of the juries and the supposed CSI effect. 
Participant A: “Well, in this day and age, juries like the CSI effect and whether we like 
it or not they like to have some form of DNA or forensic evidence and some of the 
studies done on jurors show that even when you’ve got all the evidence in the world, 
without DNA their question will be, well hang on where’s the DNA, but for some 
instances you just don’t have it so in some cases, yes it is all you need, in other cases 
you don’t have it but the jury might expect it.” 
This attitude suggests that the police have to think through the investigation of a crime, 
not just at the investigation stage but at the trial stage as well. However, the research has 
shown that there is no empirical evidence to back up the existence of the CSI effect 
(Cole & Dioso, 2005; Shelton et al, 2006; Schweitzer & Saks, 2006; Tyler, 2006b). 
Participant E: “Sometimes yes, obviously a good proportion of our work depends on 
credibility and likeability of complainants and the jury are looking at him or her under 
a microscope so it’s going to come down to that and DNA then I would be happy to go 
to court with those two items, if it’s a pure identification thing then DNA yes, I’d 
certainly go, go just with that.” 
Participant O: “Assuming there are no questions over where it came from, it’s pretty 
cut and dried. It’s almost unnecessary to go further to where you might if you didn’t 
have it, the need to speak to half a dozen witnesses as long as you’ve got the core 
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witnesses there, DNA’s pretty irrefutable I guess. I mean assuming the sample and you 
can say that it was left by the offender, quite happily, yeah. 
If there is DNA available and it has been found and handled correctly, this participant 
feels that the science of DNA is so good that a case could stand solely on that evidence.  
There are no misgivings about taking a case to court where the only evidence is DNA as 
participant O believes that identifying the offender is the key to the case. However, 23 
of the participants interviewed were firm in saying that they would require more than 
just DNA evidence to take a case to court. 
Participant I: “Emphatically no, as most investigators would tell you that having 
evidence is one thing but the evidence needs to be admissible. To hang your hat on one 
evidence type in a serious crime prosecution is a disaster waiting to happen. DNA is 
much like an interview in that if the process isn’t followed properly and the law isn’t 
adhered to then the interview may be ruled inadmissible. You always have other 
evidence, the interview is the icing on the cake much the same as DNA. It’s one of 
those threads of an investigation, one of those threads of evidence that when taken in 
totality will support the way it’s required by the prosecution. But to rely on DNA alone 
I think is dangerous in a serious crime investigation. Sometimes there are no 
alternatives where there are perhaps burglaries where an offender has cut themselves, 
there is a bit of blood on the glass, no admissions, property’s long disposed of, there’s 
no other evidence but they can’t explain how their blood got to the scene and they are 
not known to the home owner well then of course you’re going to prosecute based on 
that. But for serious crime investigations, major assaults, sexual violations, homicides, 
that type of thing you need more than just DNA to secure a conviction.” 
The emphatic reaction of participant I is that it is not safe to take a case to court with 
only one evidence type. He comments on the possibility of process being mismanaged 
and the consequences of that. Even if blood is found at the scene there is still a need to 
establish how that blood got there which is where a good interview is required. The 
importance of the interview in the investigation process was raised by many of the 
participants. 
 
Participant T: “I don’t know whether I’d say it’s all you need, I think you 
might have DNA but I think with that you’ve got to make sure you interview 
the offender. I don’t think just because there’s DNA that you could 
automatically say oh we don’t need to interview them that’s it done and dusted 
because you just never know, especially (...) in bars or anywhere you’re getting 
offences in those areas there can always be an excuse or a reason that 
someone’s put their DNA there.” 
Participant L: “No, because you’ve got to be able to reconstruct what the offender or 
your suspect did in your crime scene. You’ve got to be able to reconstruct the 
circumstances of the crime so you need good interview skills to interview your 
complainant or your witnesses. You need other circumstantial evidence as well, at best 
DNA is just another piece of circumstantial evidence, powerful but I’d hate to get to a 
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situation where repeatedly we relied only on that. I think that happens sometimes and I 
think we’ve had some difficult cases in court because of that reliance on it.” 
Participant N: “No, not all you need. I still believe (...) a good interview with the 
offender I think that’s always good as well especially on DVD or video (...) when you 
interview them about the offence you can usually see his mannerisms or the way he 
looks on camera and the silences that he has, I think that is just as compelling as DNA 
a lot of the time as well.” 
For these participants the interview is crucial for a variety of reasons. It gives the 
suspect an opportunity to explain the presence of their DNA at the crime scene. It also 
provides a bigger picture and the suspect’s possible role in the events.  One participant 
stated that his aim in interviews is to get a confession. 
Participant W: "No. Confession. I push for, that’s the biggest thing I push for with 
those guys. Enough experience? No. Enough training? No. (...) I tell them all (...) when 
you are interviewing, someone else should be watching the monitor in the other room 
with a notepad and pen because when you’re Johnny on the spot it’s hard to think up 
the smart questions when someone else hasn’t got any pressure. I judge, watch them on 
the camera, it’s easy and I push that a lot with these guys so it’s not so much a formal 
training. I sit down and watch interviews when I can and whoever’s monitoring I give 
them questions to ask and that has (...) a very good success rate and if not getting the 
confession at least getting the obvious lies caught.”  
Interviewing is taken very seriously by this participant. He believes that his staff are not 
trained sufficiently in interviewing skills and he emphasises the need for them to spend 
time gaining experience in this area. If DNA is going to be used well, interviewing 
skills will be required to prove that the person was at the scene and they can give no 
good account as to why their DNA was found there.17 
 
Other reasons given by participants as to why DNA could not be used solely were that it 
needed to be corroborated or used in conjunction with other investigative techniques. 
Participant B: “No. It’s certainly one of the parts of the evidence but it’s not the whole 
case, so just because you’ve got DNA present there’s got to be enquiries too, or there’s 
got to be other evidence submitted to either (...) explain how that’s there or why it 
should be there (...). There's obviously many other parts to the case as well, obviously 
the victim evidence and the potential witnesses and the offenders.” 
Participant C: “You’d have to assess it, probably. (...) in fact I don’t think it would be 
the only thing you’d have because you would use that (DNA) and you would mount 
your case around where it was, how it was obtained, what it was.  (...) the SOCO 
wouldn’t be going to court and saying I found the blood spot on the kitchen floor of 
this house and there was no evidence of why someone should be cut. I think that would 
                                                            
17
 Investigative interviewing is now mandated training in the New Zealand Police. This will be further 
discussed in Chapter 10. 
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be naïve to just front up with something like that. (...) So you’re putting all that 
circumstantial evidence in support of it but you’re not  using the DNA (...) as your sole 
evidence but you’re supporting it by the way you’re presenting your case.” 
Participant Z: “Well, sorry it’s only a tool in the tool box as you know Catherine but 
you can’t hang your hat on it. If you hang your hat on it you come unstuck and a 
classic example of that is from say a sexual offence point of view the fact that the 
person’s DNA is left behind doesn’t disprove or doesn’t prove whichever way you 
look at it, it was conceptual. All you’re proving is that there was that person’s DNA 
there.” 
When a scientist was asked if DNA was all that was needed for a successful 
investigation the response was, "that would be interesting". However, when further 
questioned, he said that DNA was simply another tool to support crime investigations. 
The reply was that the statistics would support that supposition. 
Participant AB: “Well no, I agree with that because when I think of crime stats for 
New Zealand in total and the amount of work that ESR sees it’s only a small fraction 
so obviously you don’t need DNA all the time otherwise it would be the amount of 
work that we would be getting in would be huge so it can’t be necessary for a 
successful investigation because the numbers just don’t stack up.” 
5.4   Do Police Officers Know How to Interview? 
The participants stated that interviewing the suspect was seen as a key element when 
using DNA. As interviewing was often mentioned by the participants, those who did 
raise this issue were asked if they believed that officers were well trained in 
interviewing techniques (see Appendix 15). 
Participant A: “Investigative interviewing, the Peace model we in the district right at 
the moment have started a level one course, we have a number of staff who are level 
three trained and I know from headquarters they’re looking at in terms of level three 
training, because most of the training now relates to witnesses and victims, are looking 
at suspect offender interviews.” 
The response from this participant suggests that interview training was a recent addition 
to training in the New Zealand Police. According to this participant, although there is 
now interview training provided, interviewing suspects has not yet been addressed with 
most of the training aimed at the interviewing of victims and witnesses. 
Participant B: “I think those skills are being lost, not because of DNA but because 
people aren’t being taught well. They aren’t getting quality training. In the good old 
days (...)  there would have been time taken to teach you the investigative process.  (...) 
I think one of the things that I see now with DNA is that people get DNA samples and 
they drag in a suspect and they talk about DNA straight away, we’ve got your DNA, so 
you’re the offender and they go well, no I’m not and (...) the interview process itself 
should be a lot more clever than that.” 
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This participant believes that staff are not being taught how to skilfully interview a 
suspect which is a requirement when trying to establish how DNA was left at a crime 
scene. 
Participant E: “I think interviewing and just getting off the subject, (...) interviewing in 
New Zealand Police is abysmal. It’s the idea level, it’s probably okay there’s certain 
officers who are very good at it but they’re in the minority and I think at uniform level 
it’s again abysmal.” 
This participant is referring to front-line officers when he talks about ‘”uniform level”. 
It is these officers who would most likely be interviewing suspects for DNA alerts 
regarding volume crime. However, as has been highlighted in Chapter 4.4.2, it is these 
staff who are the least qualified to be dealing with such files. This participant has a 
different slant to the question. 
 
Participant K: “I certainly wouldn’t think that of any of my staff I’m not sure whether 
the younger more junior guys would think like that but theoretically the offence is an 
unlawful taking so they should be able to deal with that interview.” 
Whereas some participants believed that staff were not well trained in interviewing 
suspects, participant K was bemused by the thought that, as with volume crime, the 
interviews should be quite straightforward. In her mind an unlawful taking should not 
be a difficult case to interview. If the DNA was found inside the car there would be few 
possibilities of it having got their lawfully. However, not all participants felt that the 
front-line officers were incapable of interviewing. When participant V was asked if 
front-line officers were more than capable of interviewing, his response was an 
emphatic "yes, they are". Participant V was a general duties Constable. 
His reasoning for why the staff might prefer not to interview is because they are too 
busy. 
Participant V: “Yes, well today we’ve only got two cars on and they’re going to be 
very busy tonight. If that ties him up for a whole evening that leaves one car (on the 
street).” 
It is hard to know if participant V is being defensive of his colleagues and wants to 
portray them in a good light. Participant K does not blame the officers for their lack of 
skills but states that it is out of their hands due to the environment that the police now 
find themselves in, with the reporting of everything tied into performance management. 
Participant K suggests that police are constrained by having to meet performance targets 
such as the timely attendance at a priority call. This prevents them from being able to 
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take the time to fully investigate crime or deal with an offender with a DNA alert as 
there is an expectation that the officer should get back out on the street as quickly as 
possible. When participant Y was asked if he thought officers felt a real pressure to be 
back out on the street his response was a succinct "Oh shit, yes". 
When asked if this pressure to get back out on the street prevented the officers from 
dealing with DNA alerts as they should, his response indicated the frustration that was 
felt by those who appeared to be in a juggling act when deciding where their priorities 
lay. 
 
 5.5   Discussion 
This chapter has reviewed the police use of DNA technology to investigate crime as 
perceived by the interview participants. They have given their views and thoughts on 
how DNA might help them (the participants) to investigate crime.   All the participants 
interviewed said that DNA was a good crime-fighting tool and they were enthusiastic 
about its uses and how it has enabled the police to investigate crime. The participants all 
use DNA in a variety of ways but for most of them the ability to identify suspects was 
of the most use. For staff investigating serious crime, DNA allows them to narrow their 
search field and speed up the inquiry process. The investigation of sexual offences, 
especially by unknown assailants, can be enhanced by the discovery of DNA and is 
often a leverage with offenders which precludes the need for a trial and so spares the 
victim the distress of a court appearance. They said DNA was conclusive, irrefutable 
and helped the police investigate crime.  Yet the participants also emphasised that 
although DNA was another part of the puzzle which added to the investigation, it could 
not be relied on solely to solve a case. One participant felt that a case could be taken to 
court with only DNA evidence but others interviewed believed that there should always 
be corroborative evidence. Many believed that more evidence was needed to assist the 
DNA and this support was usually in the form of interviews although the same 
participants felt that the skills to interview were lacking in many police officers. The 
consensus was that DNA found at the scene would reveal a name but the interview 
would establish how and why the DNA was left at the scene. Some participants even 
stated that to rely on DNA without other evidence was dangerous and would do more 
harm than good.  
 
119 
 
While the participants enthused about the value of DNA as an aid to investigations they 
also made it clear that a combination of many things attributed to a successful 
investigation.  No one tool or instrument was seen as the most effective in solving 
crime. All participants acknowledged the positives of DNA in reducing stress on the 
victim or speeding up the identification process but they also accepted that staff and 
training were integral to effective policing. More importantly, the participants 
highlighted areas where they felt their work was affected by processes employed by the 
police organisation. There was acceptance that the police were not making the most of 
DNA due to operational requirements and a feeling that staff were too busy to spend 
time dealing with offenders.  Likewise, it was felt that even if officers did have time to 
commit to dealing with offenders properly they would not know how to interview as 
they were too busy to be trained or to practice their interviewing skills. Therefore the 
general feeling from participants was that DNA is a great tool that they really like but 
they are frustrated by the lack of training for the staff in connected areas such as 
interviewing and a belief that staff are too busy to deal with the workload relating to 
volume crime. The staff who investigate serious crime were not so constrained for time 
or for training. Hence it is difficult to establish if DNA is a useful crime-fighting tool if 
it is unable to be fully realised by staff.   
 
In referring to the reasons as to why police may not be able to make the most use of 
DNA technology to investigate crime the participants are highlighting the culture within 
which they work.  The belief that they are too busy or not given the tools be it training 
or less paperwork to be effective can be attributed to the staff reverting back to what 
they know. If the organisation does not institute robust practices or articulate the policy 
clearly to staff then they do not know what is expected of them. This includes what the 
organisation would expect them to do with a suspect who has a DNA alert as well as 
what the consequences would be if that policy was not adhered to, The interview 
participants all stated in their responses that they liked the technology of DNA and used 
it where they could but they all also identified weaknesses in the system that prevented 
them from making the most of the technology.  Some of the participants were managers 
and/or part of the district leadership team who would be involved in delivering the 
strategies and policies of national office.  However, they too expressed their concerns in 
their responses as to the limitations in making the most of DNA technology to 
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investigate crime.  This is an example of the disconnection between the ‘head office’ 
and the district 
The following chapter reviews the data from the research to establish if DNA 
technology is just another tool, amongst many others, for the police to use to investigate 
crime. This chapter looks at serious crime in relation to DNA use and reviews case 
studies as well as interview results from the participants. It compares the participants’ 
perception of DNA technology to that of the reality of day to day use by them of DNA 
technology to investigate crime. The chapter concludes with a discussion on training. 
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Chapter 6: The Use of DNA to Investigate Serious Crime 
 
6.0   Introduction 
This chapter explores the use of DNA to investigate serious crime. It begins with case 
studies from the files and defines each category of crime to be reviewed. These case 
files are used as a means to illustrate the way in which the subject district uses DNA to 
investigate serious crime. The New Zealand Police is a national police service and has 
centralised policies in place to ensure consistency in the process of crime investigation. 
This implies that the behaviour and practices employed by the subject district are 
indicative of the behaviour and practices employed by other districts in the New 
Zealand Police. However, there will always be slight differences in practices as each 
district is semi-autonomous and is responsible for its own budgets. The chapter then 
examines responses from the participants to the questions asked and should put into 
context, or at least explain to some extent, the outcomes of the case studies. Also 
discussed in the chapter is the issue of the budget in relation to making use of DNA 
technology and the need and implications of being responsible for a budget. The 
discussion on the ”best evidence” rule is required to understand the complexities of 
legislation, the court room and police practice and other influences on the police when a 
decision to prosecute is made. This chapter examines what other influences, both 
external (legislation) and internal (budget), may impact on the police’s ability to 
effectively make use of DNA technology. These influences are important if balanced 
conclusions are to be made regarding DNA use by the police.  
 
This chapter looks at the use of DNA in serious crime and reviews the impact the 
technology has had on identifying offenders and in assisting victims of crime. It also 
explores what knowledge police officers have of DNA and what training, if any, they 
receive on its importance and relevance to their work. Linked into this is the police 
tradition of employing the latest technology without necessarily training staff or fully 
explaining its benefits (Davis, 1989; Colvin & Goh, 2005; Nunn, 2001a). The police 
may employ new technology but implement it using old processes. This chapter 
explores what negative consequences there might be for the police if there is a belief 
amongst younger officers that DNA is all that is needed to bring an offender to court. If 
this is the case, it might be that some officers lose or may never learn other investigative 
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skills, believing that DNA precludes the need for interviewing, search warrants and 
speaking to witnesses. Answers are gathered from the interviews with practitioners and 
it is their opinions that are expressed in the chapter. The aim is to establish whether 
DNA should be viewed with caution and used as a means of narrowing down the 
investigative search area or whether it is deserving of the rhetoric. 
 
6.1   Serious Crime 
Serious crime encompasses violence and sexual offences. In the 2005 statistics, violence 
is the third-highest crime type after dishonesty and drugs and anti-social offences. 
Sexual offences have the least number of recorded crimes (Statistics New Zealand, 
2010) and this is affected by the under-reporting phenomenon which has been discussed 
in Chapter 4 section 4.3. In 2005 48,337 violence crimes were recorded nationally. In 
the subject district 5,031 cases were recorded. Violent crimes come under the 1000 
crime code that is used on the NIA to track crime reporting. That crime code covers any 
crime that involves violence or threats of violence. These figures cover the most serious 
crime of murder right through to criminal harassment. Sexual offending has a 2000 
crime code. In 2005 3,271 sexual crimes were recorded nationally. For the subject 
district the figure is 328 with the total number of crimes recorded for 2005 being 53,615 
as illustrated by Table 5. Sexual offences amount to only 0.6% of all crime.   
 
Table 5. Violent and Sexual crime in NZ v 
Auckland City District, 2005 
 
 
Auckland 
District Nationally 
Total crimes 
reported 2005 53615 407496 
Violence offences 5031 48337 
Sexual offences 328 3271 
 
Serious crime, as its name suggests, involves some very grim offending and it is 
reassuring that it is less prevalent than volume crime, even if the police are not aware of 
all the crimes actually committed. It does, however, mean that the police take this type 
of crime very seriously and invariably assign many officers to investigate such crimes. 
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At times, officers can be removed from other units to assist in the investigation of 
serious crime. Such other units may involve staff who investigate volume crime. In 
looking at the 146 files from the subject district, serious crime covers rape, robbery, 
aggravated robbery, grievous bodily harm, attempted murder and other sexual 
offending. Although homicide is certainly within the serious crime category there were 
no homicide files amongst those available for the research. This is not unusual, given 
the small number of homicides and the length of time it takes for a homicide case to be 
investigated. Of the 146 files only 17 related to serious crime. One reason for this is that 
the more serious crimes can take a long time to be investigated and work their way 
through the court process. It is not unusual for such a file to take several years to be 
completed and filed, therefore making it more likely to be unavailable to be examined 
for the purpose of this research. As stated above, the number of reported serious crimes 
is considerably less than that of volume crime. The limited number of serious crime 
files is part of the study. Therefore the study has to make do with the small sample 
regarding serious crime but taking all this into consideration there is still enough data to 
reflect the true nature of crime in this District, that is, there is enough information to 
provide a valid description as to how serious crime is investigated within the District. 
The information on the files is augmented by the staff interviewed who state that for 
those investigating serious crime, they are resourced appropriately to do the job. 
Moreover the resolution rates are much higher than volume crime and the overall 
figures for recorded crime are much lower for serious crime. The serious crime cases 
explored later in the chapter examine the time and effort the police do put into these 
investigations but also highlight some of the entrenched behaviour that appears to be 
present in some investigations. For example, why have a medical examination of a 
vulnerable witness who would never be able to give evidence in Court. Although it is 
standard practice to have such an examination for a sexual offence why put a victim 
through such an ordeal if there was no endgame.  
 
The serious crime files reviewed were broken down into the following categories: 
Three rape files 
One sexual exploitation file 
Six aggravated robbery files 
One robbery file 
Two wounding/grievous bodily harm files 
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One other sexual violation file 
Two unlawful sexual connection files 
One attempt to murder file 
 
6.1.1   Rape 
Three rape files were reviewed but only two are given as case histories as these are 
sufficient to illustrate the investigation process. In the subject district a dedicated unit 
called the adult sexual assault team investigates allegations of rape involving adults. 
The larger metropolitan districts within the New Zealand Police also have dedicated 
units to deal with such crimes. These specialist teams have the required training to 
interview victims and be forensically aware when investigating the allegation. The legal 
definition details what specific factors are necessary to constitute a rape.  The issue of 
consent is often a key component when trying to prove the offence of rape. 
“Person A rapes person B if person A has sexual connection with person B, effected by 
the penetration of person B’s genitalia by person A’s penis, without person B’s consent 
to the connection; and without believing on reasonable grounds that person B consents 
to the connection “(Section 128, Crimes Act, 1961). 
Of the three rape files examined, two resulted in convictions and one resulted in 
exoneration. In all cases DNA was an integral part of the evidence. One offender 
pleaded guilty to the rape, one offender was found guilty at trial and the third suspect 
was eliminated from the enquiry as the DNA evidence corroborated his story. 
 
Case One 
This case involved a victim with mental health issues. She reported to the police that she 
had been raped by a known offender. As in all rape cases, the victim was required to 
undergo a full medical examination so as to document any injuries and capture any 
possible forensic evidence. A Medical Examination Kit (MEK) is used to collect the 
forensic evidence during the examination and officers often refer to a MEK being 
completed. As with many rape cases, the parties knew each other and therefore the court 
argument becomes one of whether the victim consented to the sexual contact (Select 
Committee on Home Affairs, 2003; Stratton, 2008; Rozenberg, 2007). The offender will 
argue that the victim had consented to the act. This can make any DNA found on the 
victim irrelevant if the suspect admits to having had consensual intercourse. However, 
as a matter of good practice, a medical examination should be conducted in case there is 
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a need to prove that sexual intercourse had taken place. In this case a MEK was 
completed and DNA was found.  This DNA did not belong to the alleged offender but 
to another male with whom the victim was in a consensual relationship.  The alleged 
offender denied ever having a sexual relationship with the victim and the DNA evidence 
added weight to his claim. The male was released without charge. In this instance the 
DNA test exonerated this male. A combination of DNA and interviewing enabled the 
police to investigate this crime to a reasonable conclusion.   
 
Case Two 
In this case the victim was raped and received serious head injuries during the assault. 
She was taken to hospital where it was initially believed she would die from her 
injuries.  She did not. When she was well enough to talk to the police she was very 
reluctant to do so as she could not remember anything and thought that she was to 
blame for her injuries. A medical examination revealed that sexual intercourse had 
occurred. When she learnt of this she was more cooperative with the police. The DNA 
evidence identified a male who had been released from prison on the day the rape had 
occurred. He denied ever being in Auckland. However, with a combination of witnesses 
and the DNA, the evidence was enough to secure a conviction.  The male would have 
had difficulty explaining how his DNA was found in the victim. The offence occurred 
in October 2004 and he was charged with rape and wounding with intent to cause 
grievous bodily harm. The offender was charged on 4th April 2005 and was convicted 
and sentenced on 13th June 2007. As can be seen by the dates, this case took almost 
three years to reach a conclusion at court even though the offender was identified early 
on in the investigation. 
 
In these cases it can be seen that DNA has helped both convict and exonerate. Some of 
the people interviewed in the course of the research work within the specialist area of 
sexual assaults believe that DNA has a positive effect on victims of sexual assault. 
Participant F: "In terms of DNA once you explain at the end of the interview, or during 
the interview, the nature of the evidence you have against them it gives you huge 
leverage (...). At the end of the day DNA for that sort of stranger type rape violation, a 
man and the victim aren’t known to one another, his DNA full profile found within her 
body (...) it’s pretty damning stuff." 
Participant F comments on the strength of the DNA evidence and the perceived power 
this gives to the police when negotiating with the defendant. The implication is that 
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when it is a stranger rape and a suspect’s DNA is found, it becomes harder to defend the 
charge.   Participant G was a Detective in an adult sexual assault team 
Participant G: "It certainly strengthens a case against a particular named suspect, it also 
may rule (them) out (...) whole sorts of aspects around identification around the speed 
in which things like that may in a more sort of public interest role. The strength of the 
evidence and anything that (..) alleviates the stress for a complainant has got to be a 
great thing because, let’s be honest, society should make small efforts towards being 
more victim oriented but actually you know by and large we don't, we’re so focused on 
reporting people, reporting, catching."  
Participant G states that DNA evidence not only provides a good source of 
identification but is regarded as being sufficiently strong evidence for offenders to plead 
guilty rather than risk a trial. For a victim the advantages are two-fold. DNA can 
increase the speed at which an offender is identified and it can also preclude the need 
for a victim to go to court and give evidence in a public trial. Another useful aspect of 
DNA is that it enables the police to narrow down their search area. In rape 
investigations where the attacker is unknown, the search for the offender is labour 
intensive, especially when the police have very little information. DNA can speed up 
this process and release staff to follow up other lines of enquiry. This participant also 
comments that society should be more victim oriented but then comments that it is the 
police who need to change their priorities and be more victim focused. When 
interviewing the participants it becomes quite clear from some of the responses that 
each person has their own agenda, depending on what is expected of them. As shown in 
Appendix 18 which breaks down the roles and responsibilities, a custody supervisor will 
have a different perspective from that of a detective senior sergeant in charge of a 
serious crime unit because different results are expected of them by the organisation. 
They are judged by different standards and so their decision making is driven by 
different needs. 
 
Of those interviewed, several had experience in dealing with major inquiries. When 
asked how DNA could reduce their work load the responses were positive. 
Participant A: "I had an example a couple of years ago. I ran an investigation into a 
home invasion rape, you don’t have any idea who the offender is, there are no 
fingerprints at the scene and it was as a result of I think six to 10 days that we got the 
urgent request back which identified the offender and immediately put us on the right 
track so instead of (...)a list of a hundred suspects and you’d just go through each 
suspect shaking the tree, now you might put up a list and start  putting up suspects but 
within that couple of weeks well in fact they say 21 days now from when you start 
127 
 
you’ll get an urgent request back in relation to DNA which if it is in the databank if 
that person is on the databank, you know who you’re looking for straight away." 
Participant A is unimpressed with staff when dealing with DNA suspect compulsion 
orders.  Concern is expressed that staff are relying purely on DNA evidence rather than 
using all the investigative tools at their disposal. Relying solely on DNA is unwise as it 
could prevent staff from looking at every lead and if the DNA evidence were to be 
discredited there would be no other evidence to corroborate it.  
 
Participant A: "No, no, we still have to do an investigation and that’s one of my issues 
with (..) the suspect compulsion orders sent in through the burglary investigation units. 
They tend to get a DNA hit they go straight to the offender is that your DNA at the 
scene, oh I don’t know what you’re talking about. Not saying anything, you’re under 
arrest and they only arrest on the DNA evidence, they don’t do an investigation some 
of them don’t do search warrants some of them don’t sit down and do a proper 
interview plan." 
Participant C: “Yes, in the big investigations that you have a focus and are able to do 
that (...) so yes look it gives you a starting point and it also gives you a focus but by no 
means should it be relied on as being the be all and end all.”  
Participant D: “Well it depends, how or whether that person's already been identified 
through other means (...) but I would say probably 90% of the cases that’s just a figure 
up here for a bit, 90% of cases the person when we get a DNA hit that will be the first 
time that that person has been linked to that offence so that is very important. Whilst I 
wouldn’t necessarily say that’s where the investigation starts I would say that’s when it 
basically accelerates and gets a suspect focus.” 
 
6.1.2   Sexual Exploitation of a Person with Significant Impairment 
This law specifically protects vulnerable individuals who may not be capable of giving 
informed consent for sexual activity. This is important as consent is a vital element of 
other sections of this Act with the issue of consent often being the defence for such 
charges.  
“Everyone is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years who has 
exploitative sexual connection with a person with a significant impairment” (Section 
138, Crimes Act, 1961). 
There was only one case within this category. It related to a female with a significant 
cognitive impairment. The suspect had similar psychological behaviour and stated that 
the sexual connection was consensual. The female was not able to be interviewed but 
she was medically examined using a MEK. Without a statement from the victim this 
case would never be able to go to court. It is arguable whether a medical examination 
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and samples sent to the ESR were of value. A medical examination for an alleged sexual 
assault is very invasive and the decision to have one should never be made lightly. 
Therefore, if the victim had psychological issues that would prevent her from being a 
good witness at court, the police would need to question what purpose would be served 
by conducting a medical examination. Likewise, is it worth the money to send samples 
to ESR if the case is very unlikely to go to court? The difficulty facing the police is that 
they always need to be seen to be conducting a thorough investigation but sometimes a 
pragmatic stance may be of more benefit to the victim and might save time and money 
for the police.  
 
6.1.3   Aggravated Robbery 
Within the category of robbery there is a clear distinction between a theft that includes 
an assault and an assault committed in order to rob someone. Aggravated robbery is 
when the assault is serious and this assault amounts to grievous bodily harm.  
“Everyone is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years who robs any 
person and, at the time, or immediately before or immediately after, the robbery cause 
grievous bodily harm to any person; or being together with any other person or persons 
robs any person; or being armed with an offensive weapon or instrument, or any thing 
appearing to be such a weapon or instrument, robs any other person” (Section 235, 
Crimes Act, 1961). 
Six cases relating to aggravated robbery were examined. Of these, four resulted in a 
prosecution. It is unclear what happened with the remaining two cases as the files did 
not contain any reports explaining the outcomes. Only two cases are used here to give 
the reader an idea of the processes but also to highlight the weaknesses in the processes 
behind the use of DNA technology. 
 
Case One 
This file has an apprehension code of Forensic. The offence occurred on 24th November 
2004 with the result from the ESR received on 18th January 2005. The offender was 
charged on 28th February 2005 and convicted on 16th June 2005. The DNA alert was 
entered on to the NIA on 18th January 2005 and should have been removed from the 
NIA when the offender was charged.  For some reason it was not removed until 2008. 
This would suggest that someone noticed that the offender had been charged for the 
offence and decided that the alert could be removed, which would explain the delay.  
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Case Two 
There was no apprehension code for this case. However, as the offender was caught 
when leaving the scene, it would seem appropriate that Patrol was the apprehension 
code. The offender admitted the offences. The offence occurred on 25th November 2004 
with the ESR result received on 24th December 2004. This raises the question why the 
police would send DNA samples to the ESR if the offender had been caught at the scene 
and admitted to the offence. Every time police send a sample to the ESR it costs them 
money and adds to the ESR’s work load. For this reason, all samples are screened by 
detective senior sergeants to ensure fiscal responsibility. Moreover, if the ESR is sent 
too much work their ability to achieve a five-day turnaround is reduced. For these 
reasons the police need to be very clear why samples are sent to the ESR. If the 
arguments for not making full use of DNA are both budget and time it makes sense to 
use both wisely.  
 
6.1.4   Robbery 
Robbery is less serious than aggravated robbery in that it refers to an assault or threat of 
an assault in order to facilitate a theft. The level of the assault is not specified. 
“Robbery is theft accompanied by violence or threats of violence, to any person or 
property, used to extort the property stolen or to prevent or overcome resistance to its 
being stolen. Everyone who commits robbery is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 10 years” (Section 234, Crimes Act 1961). 
There was only one robbery file available to view. This related to a male who stated he 
had been robbed by persons unknown. The offence occurred on 18th February 2005 and 
the police received the DNA result from the ESR on 26th July 2005.  The suspect was 
not interviewed by the police until 13th June 2007. There was an alert on the suspect and 
he had been in police custody several times without being interviewed in relation to this 
offence. When the suspect was eventually interviewed regarding the offence it became 
apparent that he and the victim were known to each other. The allegation of robbery was 
not as it initially seemed and police were unable to follow up and charge the suspect. 
This crime was left open for over two years, resulting in the police having an unresolved 
robbery on their statistics. If the suspect had been dealt with as soon as the result was 
received from the ESR, this file could have been resolved within a short time. The 
suggestion made by the interviewee (participant G) that DNA evidence can speed up an 
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investigation is true only if the police actually make use of this information 
expeditiously. 
 
6.1.5   Wounding with Intent 
This section of the Act is divided into two to distinguish between the more serious 
assault of grievous bodily harm and an assault. The levels of seriousness are reflected in 
the length of prison sentence available to a judge. 
“Everyone is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years who, with intent 
to cause grievous bodily harm to anyone, wounds, maims, disfigures, or causes 
grievous bodily harm to any person.”  
“Everyone is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years who with intent 
to injure anyone, or with reckless disregard for the safety of others, wounds, maims, 
disfigures, or causes grievous bodily harm to any person”(Section 188, Crimes Act, 
1961).  
Although there are two cases of wounding, one has already been dealt with as part of a 
rape case. The remaining wounding case refers to a male who was severely beaten by a 
man he knew. He was able to identify him to the police, as were several witnesses to the 
incident. The offence occurred on 27th July 2004 with the result from the ESR being 
received on 7th November 2005.  The offender had already pleaded guilty at court on 
16th August 2005. The slow return from the ESR was probably due to the fact that the 
suspect’s DNA was not on the national DNA database. The suspect surrendered himself 
to the police the day after the assault. He pleaded guilty to the crime and, once 
convicted, his DNA would have been taken as a matter of course. When the sample was 
received at the ESR there would have been a match with the crime-scene samples. This 
would explain the lateness of the result. However, in these circumstances it would have 
been preferable if the police had withdrawn the scene samples from the ESR as there 
was no argument regarding either the circumstances or the identity of the suspect.  
 
6.1.6   Other Sexual Violation 
Sexual violation is the general term used when referring either to rape or unlawful 
sexual connection. The charge itself would specify whether it was sexual violation by 
rape or sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection. Unlawful sexual connection is 
defined in the next paragraph.   
“Sexual violation is the act of a person who rapes another person; or has unlawful 
sexual connection with another person” (Section 128, Crimes Act, 1961). 
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According to the file, this case resulted in a male being convicted of sexual violation. 
However, information in the file made it clear that the offender was convicted of sexual 
violation by rape. This highlights the difficulties when viewing police files and the 
ambiguity of the nature of police reporting and coding of offences. The offence 
occurred on 23rd October 2004 and the victim took the police to the offender. As in all 
sexual cases, a MEK was completed. The suspect was charged on 25th October 2004 
with the DNA result being received from the ESR on 22nd February 2005.  The suspect 
was convicted in 2006. The DNA evidence would have supported the victim’s 
allegation but if the issue at hand was one of consent then DNA does not assist the 
prosecution in any way. DNA evidence in cases of rape where the suspect is unknown 
to the victim is very useful in identifying the suspect. When the parties are known to 
each other the DNA evidence can confirm that sexual intercourse took place but it does 
not assist with the issue of consent. This issue is often problematic in rape cases. 
 
6.1.7   Unlawful Sexual Connection 
This section of the Act covers any other form of sexual assault that does not include 
rape but is more serious than an indecent assault as it involves penetration.  
“Sexual connection means 
a) Connection effected by the introduction into the genitalia or anus of one person, 
otherwise than for genuine medical purposes, of 
i) A part of the body of another person; 
ii) An object held or manipulated by another person; or 
b) Connection between the mouth or tongue of one person and a part of another 
person’s genitalia or anus; or 
c) The continuation of connection of a kind described in paragraph (a) or (b)” Section 2 
(Crimes Act, 1961). 
There were two cases of this crime type. One resulted in a prosecution with the other 
inactivated by the police. When a file is inactivated it means that it is not closed and 
may well be investigated at a later date should more evidence come to light. However, 
in these circumstances there is very little to be gained by inactivating this file as 
explained further 
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Case One 
This offence occurred on 4th June 2005. The DNA result from the ESR was not received 
until 13th December 2005. The length of time taken to receive a match is more than 
likely due to the fact that the suspect did not have a DNA sample on the database until 
later. He may have been arrested or convicted of a crime and his DNA added to the 
database. Once this happened there was a match to the unlawful sexual connection and 
this information was sent to the police. An alert was put on the police computer on 13th 
December 2005 and the suspect was charged with the crime on 17th January 2006. He 
was convicted on 17th November 2006. 
 
Case Two 
This offence occurred on 20th December 2003. On 26th December 2004 the suspect gave 
a voluntary DNA sample to the police regarding an unconnected matter. On 15th 
February 2005 the ESR returned a match to the unlawful sexual connection case. The 
DNA alert was entered on to the police computer.  The suspect had been in police 
custody several times prior to this date but on 30th November 2007 he was arrested 
again and the arresting police officer advised the officer in charge of the unlawful 
sexual connection case that he was now in custody. The officer was unable to locate the 
victim from the original case and so decided not to interview the suspect but let him go 
and the case was inactivated. It is very doubtful that the courts would allow this case to 
progress should the victim finally be located. The court (or defence) will reason/argue 
that the police had plenty of opportunity to deal with the suspect but did not do so.   
 
6.1.8   Attempted Murder 
Attempted murder carries the same punishment as murder. However, in the definition it 
clearly stipulates that the person must have intended to commit murder. This is the 
difficult part to prove and explains why this charge is usually laid only when the 
evidence is compelling. Often this is reduced to a lesser charge at court for a variety of 
reasons.  
“Everyone who attempts to commit murder is liable for imprisonment for life” (Section 
173, Crimes Act, 1961). 
“If the offender means to cause the death of the person killed” (Section 167, Crimes 
Act, 1961). 
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The attempted murder file was part of the rape/wounding file and the attempted murder 
was dropped to the lesser charge of wounding with intent. The offender beat the victim 
severely over the head and then raped her. He left her seriously injured and at first it 
was believed that she would die from her injuries. No doubt this was why the offender 
was initially charged with attempted murder. However, it is very difficult to prove that 
charge as it requires establishing the intent or mens rea of the offender. Due to the 
serious nature of the crimes of which he was convicted he received a heavy prison term. 
This could have included preventative detention which is a means of keeping dangerous 
offenders in prison for an indefinite period of time. 
 
The above-mentioned cases have been used to illustrate the way in which police 
investigate serious crime and to highlight some common themes and issues for the 
police when investigating these crimes. These issues relate to the timely apprehension 
of the offenders, the correct information being entered in the National Intelligence 
Application and the superfluous taking of DNA samples. All of these issues create extra 
work for the police, impact on the budget and lessen the service provided to the victims 
of crime.  The behaviour by the police with these cases could be attributed to the 
environment in which the police work or how easy it is to fall into a routine rather than 
treating each case on its own merits. The police do use DNA to investigate serious 
crimes but as these cases illustrate, DNA alone will not solve the crime and it is the 
application of the science that is important. Although these cases relate to offences 
investigated by the subject district, the method of investigation and the policies used are 
those used nationally for the New Zealand Police so there would not be too much 
difference in crime investigation from district to district. Any difference would lie in the 
talent and experience of the officers involved, including the quality of supervision and 
leadership in the district.  
 
These cases highlight the willingness of the police to use DNA technology to 
investigate crime. However, the results do question whether it is worth putting effort 
into all serious crime at the expense of volume crime if this effort is not going to 
produce the requisite results. Are decisions made to send samples to the ESR, for 
example, based on need and worth or are they based solely on the crime type? It is 
worth considering whether the police slip into automatic pilot rather than thinking 
through the need to send samples to the ESR when they are either superfluous to the 
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case or the case will never reach court (this subject is expanded further in the next 
paragraph). Even though the cases mentioned above are deemed to be serious crimes, 
some of the offences have not been dealt with quite as expeditiously as could be 
expected with one case taking three years to get to court in spite of the offender being 
identified very early on in the investigation.  It can be seen that there is still a reticence 
to deal with DNA alerts in a timely manner. While these crimes appear to receive 
immediate attention, if the offender is not caught early on in the investigation the 
enthusiasm seems to wane. If the offender is entered on to the police computer as being 
wanted in connection with a crime there does not appear to be any follow up.  
 
6.2   Best Evidence or Fiscally Responsible: Which is Best? 
When the police are preparing a case for court they are required to put forward the best 
possible evidence. This increases the chance of a conviction. Likewise the presence or 
absence of forensic evidence can have a powerful affect on the jury. The CSI effect has 
been discussed at length in Chapter 1 section 1.10 but it is something of which 
participant E was mindful.  
Participant E: "With some of the research that’s come to us mainly through child type 
court work but I think it also comes across to adult work I think juries do know about 
DNA and they do expect it to be there or want it to be there. I mean there’s obviously 
the few major factors that a jury looks for when they are looking at convicting 
somebody from such a serious offence like rape etc and DNA is invariably in the eye 
of belief, obviously we don’t always have it." 
The Evidence Act, 2006, states that: “Evidence is relevant in a proceeding if it has a 
tendency to prove or disprove anything that is of consequence to the determination of 
the proceeding” (Section 7,3). To acknowledge that forensic evidence has been found at 
the scene but (for financial reasons) decide not to have it tested could leave police open 
to criticism with the defence suggesting that the sample could exonerate the offender. 
An admission of guilt at the police station is no guarantee that the offender will plead 
guilty in court. The police are caught between the need to offer the best-possible 
evidence in court whilst dealing with budget constraints.   
 
When interviewed about the importance of budgets, staff clearly understood the need 
for them. 
Participant B: “Well we’re constantly monitoring that and I have to go back through 
and look if there are any cases that are still in progress so as a detective senior  sergeant 
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I’m one of the people that is authorised to sign off forensic samples being sent away 
and so that’s one of the things I look at straight away, how much is it going to cost and 
whether it’s going to get bang for buck.” 
Participant T: “There needs to be some control I think, I don’t think you can, if there’s 
unlimited I mean all those processes you have in place to check those, they’ve just like 
everything would go through and as I say for sometimes for the cigarette butt outside. I 
mean an investigator will end up getting that and look at it and say well hang on it’s 
like a fingerprint on the outside of a car.” 
Participants B and T appreciate the need to be smart about sending samples to the ESR. 
There is little point in sending samples to be examined if they will provide little 
evidential value. An example of this is picking up many cigarette butts next to a river. 
This is a very public place and proving that someone was standing smoking in a public 
place does not implicate a person in a crime. Participant T gives the example of a 
fingerprint found on the outside of a vehicle. Evidentially this is of no real use as 
anyone can account for having their print on the outside of car as they are often parked 
in public areas. Not only does it lack evidential value but it also creates a lot of work for 
an investigator having to eliminate many suspects from the enquiry. There is nothing to 
be gained in spending money to have something analysed if it does not assist the case. 
Participant O: “Well I realistically know that things will run out of control if there was 
no limit it’s frustrating that the whole thing is so damn expensive when other methods 
aren’t nearly so expensive, fingerprints for example are not nearly so expensive. I 
mean there’s obviously techniques that are quite expensive but by and large the 
average dust print and lift is super cheap in comparison to DNA so it’s just frustrating.” 
Participant O was frustrated by the expense of DNA testing.  This participant compares 
the cost of the different forensic techniques, noting that fingerprinting is a much cheaper 
process. The forensic manager for the New Zealand Police told the researcher that some 
officers believe that fingerprinting comes at no cost to the police as it is an internal 
resource but they do not consider the cost of staffing and of purchasing a complicated 
computer database such as the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). 
However, the belief is that samples sent to the ESR for analysis are a huge expense for 
the police. The researcher was shown the individual costings for forensic services but as 
the financial details agreed upon between the police and the ESR are deemed sensitive it 
was requested that these figures not be published as part of this research. The forensic 
programme manager at the ESR did explain the financial pressure of maintaining the 
database and providing forensic services. A forensic laboratory is required to use 
sampling kits that are acceptable to courts and have been extensively reviewed by their 
peers (scientists). Only two multinational companies in the world have this recognition. 
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This means that the ESR is not in a position to negotiate the cost of these consumables. 
In the UK the government funds its databank. This can keep down the cost of forensic 
analysis. In New Zealand the ESR has to factor in the expense of the day-to-day running 
of the databank, along with the expense of consumables, into the price of the analysis 
(Vintiner, 2011). 
 
Ultimately the participants acknowledged that a budget is required to maintain control. 
Although a budget was widely seen as a requirement for any government department, 
some participants were unhappy about the impact this had on their ability to do their job 
well.  
Participant K: “I do know that they are very reluctant (...) for unlawful takings. If they 
(the suspect) refuse to give a sample and require a compulsion order they (people in 
charge of the budget) will immediately look and see what’s it for or how much has 
been taken. What I’m saying is it’s ludicrous we’re going to get someone to go and 
take a sample and go to do the work in the beginning and knowing that it’s only for an 
unlawful taking at the time, why are they doing it? I mean I guess everyone needs 
budgets to be realistic, but it’s not probably the police’s fault to be fair it’s the Crown 
that’s going to end up doing the compulsion order and obviously they charge. It’s just 
the system in place but I can see why it’s frustrating that it’s got to come down to 
money when we’re trying to get these people's convictions because they’re clearly 
active out there and okay it might be a lesser crime but as I said it moves on to others. I 
mean there’s no hard and fast answer to it.” 
Participant K is perplexed by the attitude of attending the scene of a crime, obtaining a 
crime-scene sample and sending it to the ESR but when the intelligence link comes back 
deciding not to obtain a suspect compulsion order. A suspect compulsion order is 
required if the offender refuses to provide a sample to compare with the crime-scene 
sample. This participant thinks that the police will not pay for the analysis of the suspect 
compelled sample as the crime is not serious enough. If that is the case, the participant 
questions the logic in attending the scene.  
Participant E: “I think I’m pretty careful with the budget but I don’t really have an 
issue with budget because effectively I’m pretty much given open slather. But, they 
realise that the type of work that I do requires quite a lot of ESR work to be done so it’s 
pretty rare that I would have anything turned down. But I still look at each individual 
case and ascertain as to whether we should be going down that track.” 
Participant F: “I think when it comes to our nature of work it’s not such a big thing 
because it’s a pretty serious crime generally but I do more and more. I mean we’ve got 
budgets and especially at certain times in the year you’re aware of it.”  
Participant I: “I think we’re spending the public dollar and we need to be fiscally 
responsible. Look it would be great if I could throw untold resources at every single 
scene. I think that our identification rate,  prosecution rate would look a lot better as a 
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result but you’ve got to be pragmatic and you’ve got to look at the seriousness of the 
offence, the dollar value of the crime. It’s no good throwing five thousand dollars at a 
hundred dollar burglary –you choose your targets.” 
Participant J: “What price is law and order I guess and you’d have to link not doing a 
sample to say a reduction or an increase in crime. There’s a certain rule saying oh I 
wasn’t allowed to have certain samples analysed you’d have to link that to some risk of 
an impact on crime going up for it to be worthwhile. What I’m saying is there must be 
a process, there must be an accountability unless you can reduce crime by doing 
something that you’re not doing at the moment. And, if that is the case then you make 
a payment for appropriate people and I’m sure you’d get whatever law changed to 
ensure that it was done. So I think ensuring you’re working on a budget is important.” 
Participant L: “I know about the budget and about the cost because I’ve been relieving 
for the detective inspector and I’ve been doing the monthly review. But when I’m an 
investigator I’m not trying to avoid costs or to cut corners and there are numerous 
examples where advice from an ESR scene examiner can show you how they can do 
things most efficiently.” 
Although the participants understood and acknowledged the need for a budget, the most 
important consideration seems to be that for a sample to be sent to the ESR the DNA 
evidence must add value to the investigation. 
Participant I: “Absolutely and that’s one of my roles here in the district. All of the 
detective seniors are the ESR gatekeepers and anything that goes to ESR has to cross 
our desk and be approved by us for analysis. I’m seeing it on a daily basis where 
people are coming with stuff wanting to have things analysed and sometimes staff 
don’t actually know why they want stuff analysed. Have you actually sat down and 
figured out how it’s going to benefit your prosecution and your investigation and 
sometimes there are other ways of doing things without incurring ESR costs.” 
The participants do not believe that all crimes are treated equally. Serious crimes appear 
to have more resources assigned to them and officers are not constrained by budget 
when sending samples to the ESR. This allocation of resources could be at the expense 
of other crime types such as volume crime. This seems to be at odds with the police and 
government’s policy on giving priority to addressing the problem of burglaries as 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
6.3   What Is The Most Useful Crime-Fighting Tool?  
There is a lot of rhetoric regarding the use of DNA as a crime-fighting tool, therefore 
the participants were asked the question: “What do you consider to be your most useful 
crime- fighting tool?” (See Appendix 16)Twenty-seven people were asked this question. 
The most common response was that people were the most useful, with 15 participants 
stating that staff or themselves were of the most use when investigating crimes. 
Fingerprints and DNA were considered the most useful by five participants with three 
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believing that it was a combination of things. The remaining four participants named 
other tools as being more useful. 
 
The majority of those interviewed stated that staff were their most important crime-
fighting tool.   
Participant C: "My staff, because they are the people who have to go and put the 
information together so therefore they have to use their brains to gather all available 
information and evidence (....) young detectives as such are utilising or have been 
utilising DNA fingerprints as the be all and end all of crime investigation, which it 
isn’t. It is a corroborative assistance to aid normal investigative policing". 
Participant D: "Skill, basically the skill of your staff, your training of your staff and 
ability to analyse files, digest information and go out, follow up enquiries to come to a 
good conclusion. If you ask for one most important it would be the skill sets and 
abilities of your staff."  
In summing up their reasons, participants C and D stated that the staff were able to 
gather information through talking to people and being able to absorb and analyse all 
the data that was given to them. Both acknowledge the usefulness of DNA but believe 
that it is of corroborative assistance and just another instrument for the police. It is seen 
as part of a combination of methods the police can use to solve crime. It is a thorough 
investigation that will catch an offender. DNA can enhance but not replace the skills of 
the detective (Roach & Pease, 2006). The response that garnered the second-largest 
number of responses was that a combination of things contributed to a successful 
investigation. 
Participant N: "I the burglary squad, I’d say DNA would be one of them along with 
fingerprints obviously, positively identifying offenders that way and also CCTV 
footage. So, DNA, fingerprints, CCTV I would say are the three most important 
things." 
Participant N believes that a variety of tools are required by the police including DNA, 
CCTV and fingerprints. There was a dominant view that there were no quick fixes when 
it came to crime investigation. No one technology was considered to be the best but 
rather a combination of the many tools available to the police provided the best 
opportunity to investigate crime successfully. 
 
For a scientist rather than a police employee this question was worded slightly 
differently: “What do you think of DNA as a crime-fighting tool?” 
139 
 
Participant AB: "I think it’s extremely important it is not the only crime-fighting tool, 
so it is one of a choice so it’s not just about DNA but if you are looking to use DNA 
then it is very useful. I think it has evolved over the last 10 years, significantly, so 
that’s the science and technology behind it so that means that we can now get results 
from samples which 10 years ago wouldn’t even have tried to do and so that means, 
well adds to the fact that DNA has a place because it might be the only thing that 
you’ve got from a crime scene. And, therefore, we’re now in a situation where there’s a 
greater chance of getting a result from it than we were five years ago, (.....) it doesn’t 
replace fingerprints or the other forensic evidence, it’s a matter of well here’s what 
we’ve got to work with, what can we best progress in the quickest timeframe. And, in 
amongst those options there is DNA. I think the other thing about DNA from a 
criminal perspective is that it’s increasingly difficult not to leave DNA behind at a 
crime scene so with fingerprints you can kind of mitigate that by wearing gloves and so 
forth but with DNA blood, cigarette butts, take a drink from a container, have 
something to eat, leave a bit of food behind, touch stuff, it’s actually getting harder and 
harder not to leave something behind." 
The response from this scientist was that DNA is a good tool but is one of several that is 
and should be used by the police. She also explains that the technology used in DNA 
has improved over the past 10 years, making it more discerning and reliable. She stated 
that with each iteration this technology has become faster. The scientist also remarked 
that fingerprints can be avoided by wearing gloves but DNA is harder to evade. Of those 
interviewed, only three participants identified DNA as their most useful investigative 
tool. 
Participant F: "I’d have to say DNA would probably be one of the top ones, because 
generally it’s so black and white and in our field of work, the investigation of sexual 
violations, everything is such a shade of grey in terms of especially consent issue type 
situations that  it affords at least in terms of identification a black and white indicator 
as to who has possibly perpetuated a crime or committed a crime." 
Participant L: "DNA. It not only helps us to identify suspects but the degree of 
sensitivity and discrimination now allows us to identify what those particular suspects 
have done and in some cases what they haven’t done which makes the court process a 
lot more precise, a lot more focused." 
For these participants, DNA was a definitive result for their investigation. Both work in 
serious crime areas, more specifically in sexual crimes, and they see DNA as being of 
great significance in aiding them to identify offenders. However, although DNA is 
acknowledged as being an important tool there are also cautions. 
Participant A: "DNA is definitely in terms of the technology these days a great 
assistance for investigations as long as it doesn’t usurp the actual investigators doing 
proper investigations and just relying solely on DNA. It’s not our bread and butter but 
it’s the next best thing, we need DNA and the technology that goes with it." 
Participant A is mindful that nothing can replace the ideal of a proper investigation. He 
believes that DNA is a good technology but that it should be seen in the context of 
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being one more resource to be used by the police. It cannot replace the role of the 
investigator or the requirement to complete a thorough investigation. Of those 
interviewed, six participants stated that their most important tools were interviewing, 
talking to people, witnesses, experience, telephones and communication. Although they 
used different words, it was clear that they all believed it was communication that was 
their most important tool. The participants voiced concerns that many staff were not 
able to do basic police work which is to talk to people and ask questions.  
Participant A: “It is another tool, albeit a very powerful one, but staff still have to do 
some of our basics (...), interviewing offenders is still very important to an 
investigation.”  
Participant B: “There are obviously other factors that affect that. There’s forensic 
evidence which is significant for us but the best part, the most important part of that 
investigation process is the ability of qualified or skilled interviewers really to solicit 
information.”  
Participant C: “I think a lot more reliance is placed on forensics (...) then it was in the 
old days because you didn’t have it but yes looking for the easy short cut and some 
investigation managers are too, (...) it is of assistance, well it’s a walk up (good) start 
but then you have to do the work it’s not the be all and end all.” 
Participant M: “You’re gathering information but a lot of people talk and don’t actually 
listen to the answers they’re given you know they don’t listen to the question that 
they’ve asked.”   
A key theme from these participants was that any investigation relies on more than just 
one element. A good police officer will make use of a variety of skills and some voiced 
their concern that these skills may be lost or are no longer being taught. These concerns 
may be something that the police executive needs to consider when they are introducing 
technology and change. New technologies can alter the field of policing and, as 
highlighted by the participants, staff need to be supported and guided through these 
changes if they are to remain competent at what they do. They all agreed that there were 
no short-cuts to investigating crime.  
 
6.4   Is There Enough Training? 
When a new system or technology is introduced to the police, research has shown that 
they are not good at informing and training their staff in this new technology (Chan, 
2001; Radcliffe, 2005; Marks, 2004; Small, 2000). The police will change the field but 
will not assist the staff to modify their habitus by giving them the tools to do so. This 
results in processes not changing to meet the needs of the new technology. The police 
will continue to do what they have always done because that is all they know. The 
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participants were asked what training they had received in DNA (see Appendix 14). The 
responses were grouped into eight main answers. Of the 27 people interviewed, 13 
stated that they had received training. Five stated that they had received most of their 
training through their Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) induction courses. A 
minimal amount of training was received by three of the participants with two stating 
that they were self taught. No training at all was the response from three of the 
participants with the remaining participant stating that he had received some training at 
the police college during his recruitment course but none in the district. This lack of 
training could expose the police to criticism if a case were to be lost at court due to 
incorrect paperwork or a breach in legislation. The implications for victims would be 
great if an offender were to be released from court as a result of police incompetence. 
While most participants felt that the training they received was adequate there was some 
disquiet expressed regarding the complicated paperwork required for DNA samples. 
There was also some discussion by most participants as to what specifically about DNA 
was being referred to in relation to training. They saw DNA as being in two parts: the 
samples taken from people and the legislation and paperwork covering that, and the 
examining of crime scenes and the dangers of contamination.   
 
Participant M below refers to the forms that are in the DNA sampling kit. Some of these 
need to be sent with the sample to the ESR and the remaining forms must be attached to 
the DNA paperwork file. It is not uncommon for officers to find this aspect of the 
paperwork confusing. The TCR form to which the participant refers is a report for a 
traffic crash. These forms are self-carbonating and on the bottom of each states where 
that particular form should be sent. Participant M is suggesting that something similar 
could be done with the DNA forms.  
Participant M: " Because the taking of the sample’s easy you don’t touch the thing. 
You put the gloves on, rip it open. I mean I can remember that and I probably haven’t 
done one in about a year but yes it’s that paperwork, (...) I don’t know which bit to give 
them it should have it at the bottom like a TCR (..).” 
Participant Q:" Oh definitely, there’s too many selections if you open up the police 
forms and go to DNA there’s people always tick the wrong boxes. Yes and the wording 
is just slightly different and you don’t even notice (...).” 
Participant Q comments on there being too many choices and as the wording is slightly 
different on each form it is very easy to pick the wrong form for the sample, thus 
nullifying the permission given by the subject. When a voluntary sample is taken it is 
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very important that the person is fully aware of the implications for giving a sample for 
inclusion on the DNA database. For this reason he or she must be given all the 
appropriate forms to read, sign and date. This ensures that the subject has made an 
informed decision and that she/he agrees willingly to provide a sample. If the wrong 
form is completed the sample has to be destroyed.   
 
Although there were some concerns raised regarding training, the participants were also 
mindful of the time and financial constraints on the staff. DNA training has to compete 
with many other subjects that require frequent instruction and training and often came a 
poor second to operational demands. 
Participant L: "Yes well I think we have to do the best we can really and there are a lot 
of competing interests for the education and training and timings available for front-
line police officers."  
Participant N: "I think everybody should do it at some stage if you’re CIB or not but I 
don’t know what the cost of it would be over time." 
Generally L and N were satisfied with the amount of training they received regarding 
these areas. However, several participants raised concerns about a general lack of 
understanding of the use of DNA within the greater context of policing. This was a 
concern also expressed in several reports in the UK (see Chapter 3 section 3.2.3). 
Participant B: "Yes, I think the process part of it is explained but the bigger picture, the 
system itself, is not fully explained. It’s also interesting too that when you send 
exhibits off and there’s no DNA, we don’t actually think why there’s no DNA but we 
should be thinking about the reasons why DNA’s not present and that can be evidence 
as well." 
Participant C: "I don’t think that there’s a very wide understanding of what the 
database is. I think police officers have a reasonable understanding of what DNA 
means to criminal investigations but it doesn’t mean that they’re forensically aware. I 
think that the establishment of the law-enforcement database could be a good thing." 
As with the previous participant, this person considers the knowledge of some officers 
to be limited. In particular, participant C thinks that people should have a good working 
knowledge of the database rather than just an idea based on assumptions. This 
participant also comments that officers might have some understanding of DNA but that 
does not make them forensically aware, hinting at the dangers they pose to scene 
contamination. For this reason this participant remarks that a law-enforcement database 
would be a good idea. This is a database of DNA profiles volunteered by police 
employees who are likely to attend crime scenes. The idea of having such a database is 
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to eliminate any DNA that may have been left at the scene inadvertently by a police 
employee. 
Participant F: "If someone with some knowledge actually sat the people down and said 
right in black and white this is it. There’s enough grey in this job, it’s nice to have 
some real black and white and just some real direction and some real insight within a 
specific sort of black and white framework that you can actually go okay that’s in there 
and that’s why that’s done. I would’ve thought not just DNA-type situations or 
scenarios but other things in the police which would be nice just to be in black and 
white." 
Participant F bemoans the lack of clear direction often missing from police training. 
This subject states that in the police people continue to do things the way they think 
they ought to be done until someone tells them that what they are doing is wrong. It is 
interesting to note that this participant wishes that things could be more black and white 
rather than the usual grey. He attributes this to ambiguity over guidelines and processes, 
not just with DNA but with many other things in the police. There is a pattern to this 
behaviour and it is obviously frustrating for him. 
Participant J: "Oh no, I think, well I guess, there’s an understanding of the staff that 
processing these DNA hits getting people arrested and people with DNA hits is linked 
to crime reduction but I, my question is can we link the increase in forensic hits to 
crime reduction? Have we made that link and I’m not sure we have." 
This participant believes there should be a link between the use of DNA and crime 
reduction. This is what the government and the police want the public to believe but it is 
interesting that this participant does not think that the staff have made the link. 
Moreover, the participant does not believe that the police as an organisation has either. 
However, if an offender can be identified through DNA technology and the suspect is 
held to account for their offending quickly, there is the possibility that this may prevent 
future offending, thereby preventing and reducing crime.  
 
6.5   Discussion 
The New Zealand Police say they are using DNA to help them solve crime (Allsop-
Smith, 2005; Broad, 2009). They have told the government and reassure the public that 
they are. The ESR state on their website that they use DNA to help solve crime and this 
is evidenced by their hit rate (ESR, 2011a). The files reviewed for the research show 
that DNA is being used to investigate serious crimes such as rape, serious assault, 
robbery and attempted murder. However, of the 328 serious crimes reported for the 
2005 year only 32 included DNA as part of the investigation. Of these 32 crimes, only 
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17 files were available for examination, with rape files appearing to be the most 
successful in terms of DNA use. The three rape files resulted in two convictions and an 
exoneration of a male falsely implicated by a mentally ill victim. The elimination from 
the enquiry of this male suspect was an example of the many benefits of DNA use. 
Moreover, several interview participants believe that another bonus of DNA is that it 
can protect the victim from the difficult experience of giving evidence in court. 
Presented with the DNA evidence an offender will sometimes plead guilty, believing 
that the DNA evidence is too strong to fight.  
 
The belief amongst some of those interviewed was that they had more access to funds 
for their investigations due to the serious nature of the crimes. However, with only 32 
out of 328 crime scenes yielding DNA evidence, it is a reminder that DNA is found at 
very few crime scenes, therefore the police cannot always rely on it to help them solve 
crimes.  Perhaps it was unsurprising that the majority of those interviewed did not 
consider DNA to be their most useful crime-fighting tool. In fact, of those interviewed 
only three regarded DNA as their best method to identify offenders. Although they 
acknowledged the benefits of DNA, most of those interviewed believed that their staff 
made the most contribution to the successful conclusion to an inquiry.   
 
If the police are to routinely look for DNA evidence at all scenes of crimes they do 
require the necessary training. Generally speaking it was believed by those interviewed 
that the training was adequate although some would prefer more training. It was also 
noted that staff might not be aware of the full implications of DNA and its use in crime 
reduction. The use of DNA to solve crime is understood to mean that it can identify an 
offender and thereby resolve a particular crime. However, whether DNA can be used to 
prevent crime is another matter. If the police were to deal with intelligence links as soon 
as they were received, there is a possibility that arresting and putting an offender in 
prison would prevent further offending and therefore reduce crime. Participant J also 
noted that the organisation itself probably did not know the full implications either, 
none of which is reassuring for the public who have been assured that the police will be 
able to reduce crime if they have greater access to DNA technology. However, this was 
the view of only a small number of police officers and cannot be said to be indicative of 
the entire organisation. It has been acknowledged that DNA could also be used as 
intelligence to link a person to other crimes and certainly the ESR states this on their 
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website (ESR, 2011b). One participant was frustrated that there were no clear directions 
on the use of DNA and referred to a desire for rules to be stated in black and white 
(something that is rarely done in the police). This lack of process has already been 
identified in the previous chapter and is a recurring theme that has been identified by 
both the participants and the data. 
 
All participants recognised the value of DNA in helping them to investigate crime. They 
commented on the financial constraints experienced as well as the limited time but were 
still optimistic about its efficacy. Their biggest concern regarding its use was the 
complicated paperwork which they considered to be unnecessary. If this paperwork was 
completed incorrectly the sample had to be destroyed and the opportunity to add that 
person’s DNA to the database was lost. A greater worry would be if an offender had to 
be released due to a breach in legislation as a result of incorrect paperwork.  Another 
concern identified by some participants was the loss of experienced staff which may 
have contributed to an inability by newer staff to interview suspects. It was considered 
that the ability to talk to people coupled with old-fashioned police work such as 
searches, door-knocking and solid investigation were still the most important skills 
required to investigate crime. It would seem that while DNA is impressive, it is just 
another resource that the police can use when investigating crime. Moreover those 
interviewed do not believe that DNA has been fully integrated into police culture as the 
organisation has not supported its implementation despite the public pronouncements of 
its benefits. This has been identified by the lack of training for staff, difficult paperwork 
surrounding its use and a clear lack of framework for its operational use, resulting in a 
poor understanding by the staff as to what work should be prioritised. The police might 
need to look at whether it is more fiscally responsible to use DNA only for serious 
crime and to resource and train staff accordingly. 
 
DNA may well be an exciting investigative tool and may in itself deserve the hyperbole 
that it receives. In terms of the police use of DNA evidence this praise may not be well 
deserved. In the subject district, DNA was found at only 302 scenes even though there 
were 54,000 crimes reported in that year. This does not necessarily equate to 54,000 
crime scenes but is certainly fairly close to it. This would indicate that the impact of 
DNA on the overall level of crime will be minimal. However, when it is available it can 
provide some excellent advantages for the police. These have been highlighted by 
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participants. DNA can categorically identify an unknown suspect for rape, it can enable 
the police to narrow their search field and it can spare a victim from giving evidence at 
court. However, the numbers involved are not significant and it needs to be seen 
whether the police can make better use of DNA technology. 
 
This chapter has highlighted the strengths of DNA in relation to investigating serious 
crime. However, the case studies have shown that there are several weaknesses in the 
police use of DNA technology to investigate such crimes. There is no indication that 
they have changed any of their processes to respond to DNA intelligence links as a 
matter of urgency. It appears to be sufficient to enter the information that a DNA 
intelligence link has been received on to the NIA in the hope that this person may come 
to police attention sometime in the future. However, in one of the case studies the 
person came into police custody and was still not interviewed regarding the offence. 
Likewise, it is important that police officers take DNA samples from the right people as 
was evidenced by one case study whereby a DNA sample was taken from the scene of a 
serious sexual assault and did not have a match for some time, suggesting that the 
suspect was not on the database. Another question raised by these case studies is 
whether it would be more effective for the police to invest time and money in the 
investigation of volume crime to aid crime reduction rather than focusing most of their 
energies on serious crime. 
 
The following chapter reviews the reasons that may prevent the police from making 
effective use of DNA. The chapter discusses how often the participants believe that 
DNA should be used and what outside constraints may prevent this use. The topic of 
legislation is reviewed at length which leads into the use of the Guthrie test and how the 
police might make use of this database. The chapter concludes with the participants’ 
views on the ethical application and use of the DNA database. 
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Chapter 7: The Perceived Constraints of Using DNA 
7.0   Introduction 
This chapter provides a closer look at operational issues. It begins with the participants 
explaining how often they believe DNA should be used. The chapter then explores the 
participants' views on the current legislation governing DNA use. As a result of their 
expressed opinions there is a discussion on the Guthrie test. The chapter ends with a 
discussion on the reality of applying DNA evidence within the confines of legislation, 
budget and processes. 
 
By reviewing the interviews of the participants from the subject district, this chapter 
examines the use of DNA technology in investigations and what external pressures 
might be exerted on the police when investigating crimes.  The statistics for DNA use 
over the years since its introduction are examined to try to establish a correlation 
between the growth of the database and the reduction of crime. This may prove to be 
difficult due to the manner in which statistics are captured on the police computer or it 
might be that the police do not use the evidence they are given. These are compared 
with the available statistics from the UK database. Several participants referred to the 
complicated paperwork as well as difficult laws in New Zealand so this chapter also 
reviews the laws and the recent changes made to them. These law changes will have an 
impact on officers’ ability to do their work and it will be worth noting whether the 
changes will assist the police in reducing crime at a date later than the period covered in 
this thesis.   
 
In 1995 when DNA was first introduced in the UK, police took DNA samples only from 
people arrested for violent or serious crimes. However, by 1999 Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) along with the Forensic Science Service (FSS) 
recommended that police should extend its use to clear up volume crime (McCartney, 
2006). This resulted in the UK embarking on the DNA Expansion Programme. The 
New Zealand Police did not have the same powers as their UK counterparts to obtain 
DNA samples but from 1996 until 2010 there have been three major changes to the 
DNA legislation, largely at the behest of the police. This chapter examines the views of 
the participants regarding the legislation and why they believed it needed to be changed.  
This is linked to their views about how often DNA should be used. The participant’s 
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comments are a reminder that the police view their main role in life as being to identify 
and prosecute offenders. For them, DNA is an irrefutable, infallible way of doing this 
while appearing to be using the latest scientific discovery which can be legitimately 
deployed (Ericson & Shearing, 1986; Johnson, Martin & Williams, 2003; McCartney, 
2006) (see Chapter 5 sections 5.1 and 5.2).  Although the participants may not couch it 
in those terms or even be aware that they are attempting to be legitimate, they do 
believe that DNA, along with their other skills, can help them to identify and prosecute 
offenders. 
 
7.1   How Often do You Think DNA Should be Used? 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, participants were impressed with DNA and 
find it to be a good tool for investigating crime. They like the fact that it clearly places a 
person at a crime scene. After establishing why the use of DNA was good for the police 
they were then asked how often they believed DNA should be used to investigate crime 
(see Appendix 8). This question was posed to establish if the alleged accepted police 
use of DNA was supported by the staff, in that the reason the police chose to use DNA 
was fully understood and evidenced by the actions of the participants. Many of the 
participants commented on the need to put the best possible evidence before the court. 
Although the topic was raised in the previous chapter it is very relevant to the responses 
of how often DNA should be used. This matter was discussed by some participants 
when questioned regarding the idea that DNA might be superfluous to an investigation. 
Of the 146 files that were examined, 33 showed that the police officers clearly had a lot 
of evidence in the form of fingerprints, CCTV and eyewitness evidence but DNA was 
still sent to the ESR for testing (see Appendix 19). In looking at the cost involved, the 
question was raised as to why this might have been done. Best evidence rule was 
postulated as a possible reason, likewise the concern that the jury might be aware of 
forensics and expect to see it at a trial. All are reasonable responses. The concern is 
when samples are sent to the ESR and the person is charged and convicted before the 
results are received back. This may be an example of when DNA could have been 
discarded if the officers were going to take the case to court irrespective of the outcome. 
Participants talk about the difficulty of knowing what to choose regarding the best 
possible evidence. In response to this question participants often discussed exactly what 
was meant by using DNA. Some thought the question related specifically to the taking 
of DNA samples from arrested people and others assumed that it related to the searching 
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for DNA samples at a crime scene. In essence both are correct. If the DNA profiles of 
appropriate people are being put on to the DNA database and all crime scenes are 
thoroughly forensically examined, the optimum use of DNA and the database should be 
achieved.  However, as has been highlighted in previous chapters, if the police are not 
taking action on all the information received from the ESR the attendance at crime 
scenes and the obtaining of samples from suspects will not garner the full benefits 
promised by the police and lawmakers (see Allsop-Smith, 2005: Goff, 2009; Key, 
2009). The participants give their responses from both perspectives and qualify their 
reasoning. 
 
When asked how often DNA should be used, just under half of the participants believed 
that DNA should be used all the time, every time, at all scenes and for all offenders.   
Participant E: "All the time. In my case it should be one of the first things looked for in 
any particular case." 
Participant E investigates serious crime and  for this reason it makes perfect sense that 
all crime scenes he attends would be rigorously searched for DNA and any results 
received would be acted upon immediately. 
Participant G: "I think minimally I would want DNA to be automatically taken off 
anyone charged with an offence.” 
This participant works in a squad that investigates serious crime therefore having more 
profiles on the database could make it easier to identify an offender and this squad 
would have the time and the resources to interview all intelligence links they receive 
from the ESR.  
Participant H's response to the question of DNA use was: "If the sample’s located and 
identified to a person, every time," but when asked if DNA could ever be superfluous 
the response was: 
Participant H: "I think it’s just covering more bases. Quite often we’ll do photo boards 
when really there’s no dispute that that person was there but it’s just another box to tick 
to have a watertight case around more better strength." 
Participant L believed that DNA should be used for all crime types because it was more 
reliable than the quality of the interview evidence produced during the 1970s and 1980s. 
When asked if this included unlawful takings, theft ex cars and volume crime the 
response was: 
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Participant L: "Absolutely, because it focuses enquiries if identifiable DNA is found at 
the crime scene. Then it’s a matter for the investigator to ask the question what does 
this mean in terms of reconstructing the suspect's activity and it may very shortly and 
very quickly focus the investigation and that’s applicable in any circumstance, 
secondly it reduces opportunities for injustice. I was in the police in the 1970s and the 
1980s when the principal investigative method was protracted interviews leading to 
confessions. There were always issues of duress, there were always questions of 
fairness in those interviews  and over the years it’s been shown that a number of false 
confessions were obtained or unwarranted confessions were obtained whereas with 
DNA you’re focusing on someone about whom there is circumstantial evidence that 
they were involved in the crime provided you interpret the DNA that you find correctly 
so that casting a wide net and rounding up all the usual suspects and perhaps getting an 
admission of sorts that’s not justified or that’s due to the dynamics of an interview 
situation or the vulnerabilities of the suspect that’s not good for justice and that’s not 
good for the police." 
This is the only response where the topic of fairness for the suspect has been 
specifically raised.. This comment about interviews being conducted under duress in the 
1970s and 1980s and that DNA benefits justice are very interesting reasons for using 
DNA as often as possible. Yet it is naïve of the officer to believe that DNA is tamper-
proof, with examples in the US proving otherwise (Duster, 2006; Noble, 2006). 
However, the following participant believes that DNA evidence does not lie. 
Participant M: If it’s applicable I think every time it can be because a person’s DNA is 
such a unique thing, even between brothers and sisters it can be proved so it’s better 
than somebody’s word, you can trust DNA because it doesn’t lie really." 
While DNA may not lie there have been examples when the application of DNA has 
been called into question (see Geursen, 2001; Gibson, 2001; Hibbert, 1999; 
Imwinkelreid, 1991; Lander, 1989; Williams, 2001). Likewise, if DNA technology is 
seen as the ultimate truth machine there do need to be robust systems in place to deal 
with the obtaining and storing of samples and the analysis and court application of DNA 
evidence (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010; Krimsky & Simoncelli, 2011; Lynch et al, 
2008). In New Zealand the database is populated by people who have either voluntarily 
given a sample or those who have been compelled to as a result of a court order, having 
been convicted of a crime. However, the belief amongst those interviewed supports the 
use of DNA for all investigations and that DNA is evidentially useful. These 
participants agree that DNA should always be used. 
Participant A: "Oh look, we should be using it for all, it’s just another one of those 
investigative tools, it’s like the media are an investigative tool, how often do we use it, 
do we use it to a less advantage because DNA actually either identifies the offender or 
eliminates someone from the investigation that is very important." 
Participant Q: "No, definitely always be looking for it as part of your evidence base." 
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Participant R: "I think that DNA should be collected always and used when necessary." 
Some participants believe that DNA should be collected at all scenes and taken from all 
people arrested as this will enlarge the database and with the refining of DNA 
technology through the years more people will be caught. 18 One participant had very 
strong views on obtaining DNA and went so far as to describe what might happen in the 
future. 
Participant W: "All scenes, all offenders who go through that watch house. Just getting 
the databank wider and the LCN technology and as that develops more I'm sure in 50 
years we'll turn up at a homicide scene, put the robot in, it’ll suck out the DNA and 
we’ll show up at someone’s house later that night and say why were you there but I 
don’t think that’s being stupid about things at all."  
Several participants were certain that DNA needed to be used for all crimes as there was 
an expectation that the court should be presented with the best possible evidence. It was 
suggested by participant Z that the police needed to make the most of all the 
information available to them as it was something that they could not go back and 
examine later.  
Participant Z: "Well I think it should be used in all cases like fingerprints. You 
shouldn’t exclude it you should include it, whether you use it ultimately in court is 
another thing. It’s like a photo ID board which you can now more readily use. It’s like 
a lot of things, you’ve got to include them where applicable but don’t exclude them 
because if you exclude them you can’t go back to it once it’s gone. It’s the same with 
fingerprints, if you don’t check you don’t find."  
 
Participant AA: “I just think we’re losing a lot of opportunities. At one stage there was 
a directive that we should only be targeting you know forget your disorderly behaviour 
stuff but your disorderly behaviour is your 18, 19-year-olds who could go on to offend 
further and it’s the broken window policies. I ignored it back then as well if you were 
inside as in the watch-house you were there for a reason, you had a disregard for law 
and social norms.  I’d be surprised if we weren’t nowadays and you know ignore the 
CSI factor I think members of the public would be surprised yeah you know I think I 
was around when the car swabbing came in for DNA and that was a biggie and you 
know people talking about the expense of that for a car theft. Well a car theft is a car 
theft and what else are they doing. But that’s not a good excuse for not doing anything 
that’s about resources." 
Participant AA sees DNA as an important resource for the police. For this reason she 
did not agree with the initial policy that DNA was to be taken only from certain 
criminals. More importantly she states that she chose to ignore this directive which 
                                                            
18 The law change in December 2011 enabled the police to take DNA samples from all people where there is an intention to charge 
for imprisonable offences. 
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would have been a national policy decided by the executive team at Police National 
Headquarters. This is an example of the disconnection between the street police officer 
and the manager police officer (Grant & Rowe, 2011; Reuss-Ianni, 1983). This 
participant did not agree with the directive on when to take DNA samples and her 
reaction was to ignore it. This was only one person’s view from a small group of people 
interviewed but it does raise the question as to how many officers would disregard this 
or other directives that they did not agree with. Participant AA's belief was that anyone 
who came into the watch-house had already shown a disregard for the law and the 
opportunity should be taken to get a DNA sample from them. The participant fails to 
acknowledge that a police officer is able to arrest a person on suspicion so just because 
a person is in the watch-house does not mean they have shown disregard for the law. It 
is for precisely this reason that there need to be tough laws around the obtaining and 
storing of DNA samples. The subject of the CSI effect is also touched on again as the 
public do expect there to be some mention of DNA in a criminal investigation. 
However, that topic has been covered sufficiently in previous chapters. There is 
frustration that a lack of resources limits the use of DNA but the participant does not 
accept that a lack of resources is reason enough not to make full use of DNA. 
Participant C: "Well, I was just going to say the best evidence rule, look I think it’s 
incumbent on us to provide the best evidence we can on every case and if you have 
DNA evidence, which part of the evidence do you not give, the CCTV, the DNA. You 
know certainly on burglary and things like that, yes it does seem to be an overkill but 
in saying that the day that you lose something because something falls by the wayside 
and you haven’t done something there’s going to be a degree of criticism." 
Similarly participant C agrees that it is difficult for the police to choose which evidence 
should be presented to the court. There is a belief that there could be criticism levelled 
at the police if steps are not taken to provide all the facts. The participants who did not 
state that DNA should be used all the time believed that it should be used as often as 
possible or at least on a case-by-case basis. It was stated that criminals were becoming 
more forensically aware so it was important that the police keep ahead of them.  
Participant D: "If you identify a suspect through a DNA hit at the scene of a crime for a 
serious offence and by serious offence I mean aggravated robbery, sexual violation, 
murder, wounding, I would say 100% of the time use the DNA either as the only 
evidence available or in conjunction with other evidence but still use that even if 
you’ve got other evidence, still use the DNA. For less serious offences where you have 
other good evidence and a person declines voluntary suspect blood I would say you 
probably wouldn’t use the DNA. For less serious offences where the only evidence 
you’ve got and you can only prove a prima facie case through the DNA and they 
decline to give you a suspect sample I would say you’d probably have to do that on a 
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case-by-case basis. If they were a dangerous person you wanted to keep off the streets 
definitely, mainly to oppose bail but it would be probably by a case-by-case basis." 
The key message of this response is that DNA should be used for all serious crimes but 
when it comes to lesser crimes such as burglary each case needs to be viewed on its own 
merits. From this it can be surmised that the work required to obtain a suspect sample 
from an unwilling suspect needs to be weighed up with other factors such as the other 
evidence that is available and whether it is important for this suspect to be convicted. 
This is a very realistic view of DNA use and the work that is involved in obtaining 
samples from reluctant suspects. 
Participant F: "I would think especially with the advent of technology, low copy 
number etc I think I mean it should become more part and parcel of what we do, it 
already is to a large extent but even more so." 
Participant K: "Whenever it can. I think if we can get convictions for crime, okay some 
of these volume crimes are considered the lesser of the scale however they start, half 
these guys start with theft ex cars or burglaries, not that we’re involved directly with 
burglaries and I think look if we’re going to go to the trouble of taking swabs and 
things for these sorts of things it should be followed through to use not just an oh 
perhaps it’s not serious enough." 
Participant P: "Oh, I think so. I think these days everyone should be looking at that 
opportunity because criminals are getting smarter. I mean CCTV’s brilliant as long as 
they’re not disguised or you know they’re not aware of it but you can’t skive DNA." 
The above participants acknowledge the importance of police using technology to 
investigate crime. Participant P suggests that criminals are becoming smarter so the 
police need to be more sophisticated with how they investigate crime. The technology 
of DNA evidence is becoming more advanced and the police will be relying on it more 
so it should be considered a normal investigative tool. It was also considered that DNA 
should be used for all crime types because criminals often began their offending with 
lesser crimes and build up to more serious ones. Likewise, because criminals are 
becoming more forensically aware, DNA is an excellent method of identifying 
offenders as it is very difficult to avoid leaving DNA behind whereas it is easier to wear 
gloves or fool CCTV. Financial constraints were also given as reasons for not using 
DNA all the time. Also, in terms of sophisticated crime such as cyber crime or fraud, 
DNA was of limited use.  
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7.2   Are Current Laws Adequate for Obtaining DNA Samples? What Changes 
Would You Like to See? 
This question received quite strong responses with some participants talking about the 
laws before the question was asked (see Appendix 9). Only four participants felt that it 
was adequate yet they still raised some concerns about certain aspects of the law. 
Participant P: "Yeah, I do actually. Hard one because it’s a really personal thing DNA 
and if we’re going to get it from everybody there’s going to be some people that do 
need that second chance that aren’t going to re-offend but I think it may be a little, I 
don’t know I have to think about that question. It’s also got the ability and this was 
only brought to my attention by Greg O’Connor (President of the New Zealand Police 
Association)19 about being set up, very easy to set someone up using DNA so I don’t 
know, serious offenders yes we need it, voluntaries yes we need it but I also think there 
needs to be a limit or the ability to say no for your own reasons."  
This participant is concerned that DNA could be maliciously placed at the scene of a 
crime in order to put suspicion on an innocent person. The participant’s reasoning for 
this was not explored in the interview so it is not known on what this fear is based. 
Likewise it is not known in what context Greg O’Connor was talking about DNA.   
Participant AB: "Obtaining DNA as a first legislation because we were early on in the 
piece 1995 straight after the UK I think we did it really well but crime has changed 
since then and the science has changed since then so the amendment that came along in 
2004 that allowed  buccal scrapes, excellent because that meant that it was cheaper and 
less invasive and I think we’re moving away from the law, we are reliant on people 
giving voluntary samples up front and people have it’s been excellent, the links we’ve 
seen from that have been amazing. I don’t know how much longer from here on for the 
next 10 years we can rely on people volunteering samples before they’ve been 
convicted and I think it takes a while for this to sink down into a criminal's mind. It has 
been adequate but where it’s now possibly time for a review. The second area where I 
think it has shown not to be adequate is the under-17-year-olds. As soon as you take a 
sample from a 17-year-old and you load it to the databank they are hitting crimes from 
when they were 14, that occurred from when they were very young and the percentage 
of samples from under 17-year-olds or who have just turned 17 on the databank is tiny 
because you just can’t take those samples until there’s been a conviction but the link 
rate to that particular group is huge and sure we just send the kind of top end of it those 
that are offending and to the point  where they’re ending up on the databank but I think 
there is scope there to widen that sampling." 
Participant AB believed that the law was adequate when first enacted in 1995 but it 
needed to change as the technology and the criminals evolved. This was done with two 
amendments. This interview was conducted before the recent 2009 law change but it 
would seem the two changes that AB suggested would be of use have been made. 
                                                            
19
 New Zealand Police union 
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Participant Z: "There are weaknesses and they’re being addressed. Well the new bill is 
to be had next Monday on that but if you follow the spirit of the intention yes it is 
adequate but the biggest flaw is we historically have gone down the consensual road 
based on part two of the act and it’s a flaw with the databank because if someone elects 
to remove it we can suddenly lose a massive amount out of the databank because a lot 
of those people have not been convicted and that’s the flaw." 
The question of voluntary samples is also an issue for participant Z who does believe 
that the spirit of the law is adequate. He believes that relying too heavily on voluntary 
samples and the ease with which that permission can be rescinded may cause the police 
some problems in the future. However, the new law does not change this because if a 
person is not convicted their profile must be destroyed. Eighteen of the participants 
interviewed did not believe that the current laws, at time of interview, were adequate. 
Of those 18, 10 favoured DNA being taken on arrest but agreed that the sample should 
be destroyed if the person was acquitted at court.  
Participant A: "I don’t think it is wide-ranging enough. I think anybody arrested should 
have to provide DNA. And if they are acquitted and then they’ll have the opportunity 
just like fingerprints of having it removed and I just know an example from speaking to 
some of the UK converts who talk about how at traffic stops there’s road blocks with 
breath testing and they do a check and bingo some serial rapes have been solved 
because somebody who had been arrested for a driving offence and their DNA’s taken 
is actually the offender because we know most offenders are mobile and so if they’re 
driving, committing driving offences and being arrested for it let’s get their DNA 
because they’ll be doing other things." 
The UK converts are police officers from the UK who have moved to New Zealand and 
joined the New Zealand Police. Participant A is suggesting that DNA should be taken 
from people who commit traffic offences as offenders tend to travel and a simple traffic 
stop could yield more serious offences. However, if the subject is acquitted at court the 
DNA profile should be destroyed. 
Participant J: " I think in terms of arrest, DNA should be taken from every person that 
we arrest, it seems sensible to do it. To fingerprint people and not take their DNA it’s 
the new millennium fingerprints I think the legislation was drafted with this fairness 
thing in mind which means that the police have to go through hoops to get a suspect 
compulsion order or there’s this overarching issue of fairness and I don’t for one 
minute think that members of the police don’t want to be fair to people but I think 
there’s an idea that we could be a little more efficient with how we deal with it, having 
to draft a compulsion order and inspectors having to swear in front of judges where I 
mean it might be nice for their OC of the case to do those types of things could be 
improved so that it just becomes a little more efficient and then the merits of the case 
can be argued at the appropriate time. Absolutely, why couldn’t we do that and I’m 
sure that there are all sorts of things you could put in place to ensure that you know 
mystery samples aren’t kept and all sorts of things." 
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This participant acknowledges the need for fairness but believes that the system could 
be more efficient without impinging on people's rights.  
Participant L: "No, I think they are nonsense. It should go back in principal to and 
that’s where the incoming government is going of course we should go back to the 
principle where everyone coming into police custody was fingerprinted because that 
was a way of identifying them. DNA identification is equally important nowadays and 
everyone should be identified by DNA. And of course we deal with a lot of young 
people now and there are provisions in children and young persons and Family’s Act 
that prevents us from arresting most of the young people we deal with for criminal 
offences but the fact that we’re going to report them for a Family Group Conference 
(FGC) should be sufficient grounds to take a DNA sample from them too. That’s the 
provision for fingerprints and photographs, so the same for DNA." 
These participants do not consider the current laws are sufficiently far-reaching to 
maximise the benefits of DNA technology, which for them means being able to identify 
and arrest offenders. However, they all believe that the DNA profile should be 
destroyed if the person is acquitted. These views are different to those of previous 
participants who believe everyone should be on the database. For one participant, 
fairness should be the overarching philosophy whereas for another DNA should be 
treated like fingerprints and the police should use the same provisions already in place 
for photographs and fingerprints (see The Policing Act, 2008). The police have 
historically used fingerprints as a means of identification when suspects were brought to 
the watch-house. This is because fingerprint identification is instant but DNA requires 
time for it to be analysed, so the capabilities are different. The Police Act 1958 made 
provision for the taking of fingerprints and photographs on charge and if the person was 
acquitted the police were required to destroy their fingerprints and photograph. The 
1958 Police Act was replaced in 2008 by the Policing Act whereby, as well as a 
photograph and fingerprints, police officers may now also take palm prints and foot 
prints. These participants could see no difference with the use of DNA as a means of 
identification. However, the power to take a persons’ DNA is set within the Criminal 
Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995 and so the legislation governing the obtaining 
and retention of DNA is quite different from the powers given to the police through the 
Policing Act.   
 
Other participants did not think that the destruction of the DNA profile was important.  
Participant C: "Everyone that gets arrested should have their DNA taken. I’m not 
talking about charged. Just arrested, everyone that goes through the watch-house 
should have their DNA taken if they haven’t had it taken previously. As part of the 
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processing, with certain riders, like the 90-year-old shoplifter, if they get arrested is 
probably not a necessity, in South Australia anyone that gets reported can have their 
DNA taken. I suppose the starting point you’ve got to say everyone that gets arrested 
maybe we should say should have theirs taken and then before it gets determined as to 
whether it gets processed it maybe should go through a check process, I don’t know 
how, what the criteria should be because you have the 12-year-old who comes through 
as a burglar who’s now the bloody rapist and robber at 19. I suppose you could draw 
the line and say if you’re 60, if you’re 65 and it’s the first time you’ve been brought in 
you got to ask the question of why they’re being arrested for a start so I’d like to think 
that everyone that’s being arrested should have their DNA taken because they are 
being arrested for a reason as opposed to not being and I think with the Policing Act 
the move towards less arrest or more process of sight." 
Participant C does not believe there should be any exceptions to the taking of DNA, 
unless subjects are very old or clearly not a threat to society although it is not stated 
how the latter distinction could be made.  
Participant E: “Absolutely not, DNA should be taken off every person that goes 
through the watch-house just like fingerprints are. None of this cut-off point at a 
certain level of crime, it’s just ludicrous I think the ability of us to be able to obtain 
compulsion orders is way too heavily weighted in favour of suspects, it’s far too 
difficult, it’s far too paperwork intensive and that’s right across the board. We were 
talking about voluntary samples, suspect samples, the paperwork that’s got to be 
completed, the level of information that has to be imparted between the police officer 
and the suspect if you want a better word is too encompassing.” 
Complicated paperwork is a recurring theme through many of the interviews. This 
participant believes that the police have to work too hard to get a compulsion order and 
that it would be and should be much simpler if everyone had their DNA taken on 
arrest.20  The suspects appear to have more rights which creates an unfair balance, 
according to this participant. 
Participant I: “I would like to see just with as with fingerprints you know everybody 
who goes through a watch-house now is DNAd because it is a method of identification 
just confirming who it is that you have there and it’s not as invasive as it used to be 
you know just do the buccal swab is not like you’re sticking holes in them, drawing 
blood so certainly that aspect of it I think also the fact that it’s not as invasive as it once 
was could also lead to a relaxing of a situation, compulsion orders they are very time 
consuming and convoluted.” 
The view of these participants is that DNA is another method of identifying offenders 
when they are brought into the watch-house. For this reason it makes sense that DNA 
should be taken on arrest. They are dismissive of compulsion orders as they state that 
the paperwork for the application for the orders is clumsy and time consuming and in 
some cases benefits the suspects. There are also concerns that, as discussed in Chapter 
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4.3, some suspects start with minor crimes and build up to more serious offending 
(Zedlewski & Murphy, 2006) and taking samples from them on arrest would be one 
way of ensuring that their DNA was captured. For this reason participant C could see 
the value in taking DNA samples from all those who have been arrested. That way all 
potential serious criminals would be on the database. However, these participants do not 
mention the potential for misuse of these powers or the impact this may have on 
suspects who have not actually done anything wrong. There is almost an implied 
acceptance by the participants that the police would administer this technology fairly. 
 
Two of those interviewed had no knowledge of DNA legislation. These participants 
were not police officers but attended crime scenes to forensically examine the area and 
take detailed crime reports. Although not an integral part of their job, it was surprising 
that they had no idea of the law covering DNA considering that understanding the 
legislation might put their work into context. 
Participant R: “No, I have read the law but that would have been three or four years 
ago so I couldn’t even, couldn’t even well I could probably dredge up some of it in the 
back of my mind but no, it doesn’t affect me as a gatherer as opposed to a hunter.” 
Although participant R had read the legislation he did not believe he needed to have a 
firm grasp of it as it was not relevant to his role.  
Participant S: “I don’t know anything about the swabs as far as the offenders and what 
not, no I don’t really know a lot about it.” 
Likewise, participant S did not have any knowledge of the legislation and did not appear 
to be concerned by this. They both knew what was required to complete their roles and 
that was what was important to them. The legislation did not immediately impact on 
their work. However three participants deemed the laws inadequate and wanted DNA 
taken from babies at birth. 
Participant K: “Well, the reason a lot of it isn’t being used as I said with an example is 
because of the costing I just feel surely once it’s taken and it’s clearly identified as 
being from that person this theory of having to continue every time they are arrested to 
get another sample to compare to, with the technology in this day and age a little bit 
out of date. Absolutely, I think it would be ideal, I’d love to see something come in like 
everyone that you know at birth as a matter of course it’s taken. I mean I think it would 
solve a heck of a lot of crime a lot earlier and I just, I know it’s human rights and all 
that but I just can’t see the big deal if everyone’s on there from the very beginning as a 
baby when they do a blood test.” 
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Every time a person is identified by DNA a suspect sample must be taken for 
comparison. Participant K feels this is an unjustified expense and suggests that taking 
everyone’s blood at birth would be a great way to solve crime more quickly. 
Interestingly enough there is pause for thought regarding human rights but then he 
decides that it is not really an issue. As one participant pointed out, if you have not done 
anything wrong you have nothing to fear from giving a DNA sample. 
Participant F: “To be honest, no not really, no. Well, I mean I think with the influx of 
UK cops we’ve had discussions about the DNA the differences between systems both 
the administrative form side of things as well as the powers and the situations where 
you can take a DNA and I think the DNA upon arrest is fantastic. You know I think it 
should be part and parcel of an arrest, it should just be part of a procedure. To be 
honest, I’m a great believer if you haven’t done anything and you’re a good person 
then you haven’t got anything to worry about.” 
This attitude is not uncommon but there are pockets of the population who may not 
agree with this participant. One person interviewed even raised her concerns about the 
apparent ease by which DNA can be placed maliciously at a crime scene. For those 
members of society who have traditionally felt vulnerable to unscrupulous policing 
methods, the idea of their DNA being taken at birth may well fill them with dread 
(Duster, 2006; Noble, 2006; Washington, 2011). The concept of having nothing to fear 
if you have done nothing wrong, will not reassure them. The comment regarding the UK 
police relates to the different legislation that is in force in the UK relating to the 
obtaining and retaining of DNA samples. This legislation has been discussed at length 
in previous chapters (see Chapters 1 section 1.5 and 8 section 8.4.2) but it is worth 
reiterating that the UK legislation has been amended to reduce police powers as a result 
of public opinion. However, it still remains much wider than the sampling regime 
available to the New Zealand Police. The following paragraph discusses the Guthrie test 
as it was a subject raised by two participants and relates to a database containing 
sensitive information that needs to be protected by tight legislation. For this reason, it is 
likely to be an emotive subject should police (or anyone else) ever have unfettered 
access to it. 
 
7.3   The Guthrie Test 
The Guthrie Test is a colloquial name for metabolic screening of newborns. It was 
named after Dr Robert Guthrie who developed an inexpensive method for screening 
newborns for the genetic disorder of phenylketonuria, or PKU. Early detection and 
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treatment of PKU can prevent brain damage that would occur within the first three years 
of the child’s life. This screening commenced in New Zealand in 1964-1965, initially 
only in several hospitals in large centres. The testing programme is now operated 
nationally, is administered without charge and is voluntary. However, it is thought that 
almost 100% of babies born in New Zealand are tested (Privacy Commissioner, 2003). 
The programme tests for seven metabolic disorders. The blood is collected on a blood 
spot card and once the samples have been tested the cards are stored indefinitely by the 
National Testing Centre. There has been some concern raised by the public as to who 
has access to this databank (The Privacy Commissioner, 2003). In 2006 the Ministry of 
Health and the New Zealand Police signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
about when the police might have access to the information held by the national testing 
centre.  The MOU sets out that the blood spot test is first and foremost a tool for health 
purposes only. The police may access this information only in rare circumstances. 
Primarily the information on a blood spot card would be shared with the police only if it 
related to an unidentified body and all other avenues of identification had been 
exhausted (Ministry of Health, 2006).   
 
The Ministry of Health has released information to the police 13 times in the past 20 
years (Barton, 2009). However, in spite of this there are still concerns that the Guthrie 
Test has provided an unregulated biometric database of over two million people in New 
Zealand (Barton, 2009). In 2003 the Privacy Commissioner completed a report that 
recommended the Ministry of Health develop clear rules for retention of the samples 
and described in exact terms what third parties, if any, would have access to this data. 
All this needed to be incorporated in legislation to ensure that rules were enforceable 
(Privacy Commissioner, 2003). The MOU with the police was one of the outcomes. 
That the police should have full access to the Guthrie cards was strongly opposed. With 
New Zealand having almost 100% compliance rate, the Guthrie Test is a successful way 
of managing treatable metabolic disorders. If parents were to have any doubts about 
who had access to the data from the blood samples of their children they might choose 
not to allow their children to have the Guthrie Test. This would be catastrophic for 
children's health and not worth any gains that might result from identifying an offender.   
Participant V: “No. Well, people coming into the country, immigrants should give a 
DNA sample and newborns if they give them vitamin K injections when they’re born 
all they need is a spot of blood for a DNA sample. Well, that should be put onto the 
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national database because it can help a lot with disaster victim identification, people 
who turn up dead particularly if we don’t know who they are. I think the Guthrie Test 
should be put onto the national database. Because that gives you a comprehensive 
library then because there’ll be a lot of people out there who’ve committed some pretty 
heinous crimes, never been in trouble before, never given a DNA test, a one-off murder 
or a one-off robbery and never come to the attention of the police again where their 
DNA’s sitting there but they haven’t matched it up to anything but if the Guthrie Test 
was they could say oh yeah it was this one just like that.” 
Participant AA: “I want access to the database that the hospitals have, you know the 
pin prick stuff.  Oh, that would be Utopia for the police but it’s not going to happen 
because of privacy and I know we have special access to it in extreme cases.” 
 
Participants V and AA both believe that if the police had access to the Guthrie database 
it would help immeasurably in identifying offenders. One reason to have this 
information as suggested by participant V was that it would assist with disaster victim 
identification. As stated, in extreme cases the Guthrie cards could be used to identify a 
body that could not be identified any other way. However, participant V feels that there 
are offenders at large who have never given a DNA sample and who have probably 
committed one serious crime in their life. Putting the entire metabolic disorder database 
on the national DNA database would identify these people. Participant AA uses the 
word Utopia to describe a place where the police have unregulated access to this 
database but also realises that this will not happen as there would be privacy issues. 
Other people might regard this same place as a police state whereby the police have 
access to any private information on any individual (see Billings, 1992; Jost; 1999; 
Rosen, 2003; Simoncelli, 2006; Steinhardt, 1999; Webster, 2000. Although the majority 
of those interviewed (23 out of 28) felt that the law was inadequate and wanted to see 
changes, there was still a strong belief that privacy and fairness were of concern to the 
public. The minority (5 out of the 28 interviewed) believed that those who had done no 
wrong need not fear their DNA being on a database.  
 
The size of the database was also raised by several participants. There is a belief 
amongst them that the more samples on the database the more effective it will be, 
therefore taking samples from everyone arrested would aid the police in identifying 
offenders. However, research conducted by Goulka et al (2010) revealed that an 
important factor is the number of crime-scene samples entered onto the database as 
opposed to the number of individual profiles there. A crime scene may well yield DNA 
evidence whereas obtaining a sample from a person who may have offended or might 
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offend in the future was less cost effective. The Home Office also notes that the number 
of matches obtained from the database is driven by the number of crime-scene profiles 
loaded into the database (The Home Office, 2005). In the UK the number of stored 
personal profiles rose from 3.1 million in 2005/2006 to over 5.5 million in 2008/2009 
and the number of recorded crime declined.21 The percentage of recorded crimes 
detected involving DNA remained stable, fluctuating between 0.63 and 0.76%. The 
presence of more profiles on the database has not increased the percentage of crimes 
cleared up even though the number of recorded crimes has been decreasing (House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2010). For the 2007/2008 year, there was an 8.6% 
decrease in the total number of crime scenes for which one or more suspects had been 
nominated in the previous year (The National Policing Improvement Agency, 2009). 
This was said to be as a result of fewer new crime scenes being loaded to the database. 
However, during 2008/2009 there was an increase of 0.7% in the total number of crime 
scenes for which one or more suspects had been nominated in the previous year.  In 
2008-09 there was a crime-scene investigation in respect of 796,780 crimes and 42,572 
crime-scene profiles were added to the database. If one profile per crime was added, 
then DNA profiles were obtained for less than 1% of recorded crimes. From this it can 
be seen that DNA is involved in solving only a small proportion of overall crimes. The 
above figures relate to all crime types and many crimes do not have a ”scene”. They are 
minor and are often solved because the victim and the offender are known to each other. 
Other crimes can be solved by other police methods or because the police came upon 
the crime in progress. If DNA is found at a scene there is no guarantee that it is always 
usable (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2010).  
 
New Zealand has a population of 4.2 million and the national DNA database contains 
108,000 profiles (ESR, 2010). Therefore, 2.57% of the population is on the database. 
This is compared with 5.5 million or 9.1% of the UK population (GeneWatch UK, 
2009).  In New Zealand, of all unsolved crimes loaded on to the crime-sample 
databases, 63% are linked to individuals and more than 30% linked to another crime 
(ESR, 2010). The UK database produces its data in a different manner. It states that 
from 2001-2010 the total number of crime scenes matching one or more subjects in all 
offence types was 361,381. The number of subject profiles on the database is higher 
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than the number of individuals, due to duplicate profiles. This occurs when a sample is 
taken from an individual on more than one occasion, either because they give a different 
name or different versions of their name (National Policing Improvement Agency, 
2009). In spite of New Zealand’s database being relatively small it is considered more 
successful than the world’s largest database housed in the UK (Buckleton, 2008). No 
doubt Buckleton bases this on the fact that the New Zealand database has the highest hit 
rate in the world. It would suggest that the size of the database is not as important as the 
quality of the profiles and the number of crime-scene samples entered on the database. 
If the right individuals are on the database and crime scenes are attended assiduously 
there should be a happy marriage between the two databases. Moreover, as has been 
evidenced, the New Zealand Police struggle to cope with the results they receive from 
the ESR. If the database were to be increased, how would the police cope with the 
potential new work load? 
 
7.4   Discussion 
This chapter has examined how the participants perceive the use of DNA in their day-
to-day policing. They were asked to explain their views on DNA use and to clarify their 
beliefs. The participants all value DNA as a useful tool for investigating crime and this 
has been well established in the previous two chapters. Some of those interviewed stated 
that DNA should be used for all crimes and as often as possible. This view was justified 
by some participants to mean that DNA samples should be taken from all people 
arrested as well as searching for DNA at all crime scenes. While there was an 
acknowledgement of budgets and resourcing issues there was a feeling that this is not 
reason enough to prioritise cases where DNA will be used. Some participants were 
frustrated by the fact that although all burglaries are attended this does not mean that all 
samples will be sent off for analysis. This tended to be true of vehicle crime where the 
cost of the investigation may well outweigh the cost of the items stolen. They raised 
concerns about the need for DNA to be presented at court as the public may well be 
expecting DNA evidence which, according to some of those interviewed, is another 
good reason to use DNA for all crime types. Another suggestion raised by some of the 
participants was that criminals were becoming smarter and the police should have more 
resources at their disposal to defeat them. One participant suggested that DNA was 
more reliable than the interviewing techniques employed by the police in the 1970s and 
1980s. This interviewee suggested that the police would subject suspects to duress in 
order to extract confessions from them. He believed the use of DNA would eliminate 
this need as DNA was infallible and could identify suspects without question, although 
this does not mitigate the reasons for using violence to extract a confession from a 
suspect. This belief was probably based on the concept that DNA removes the ability 
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for the police to subvert the evidence yet research has shown that the application of the 
science of DNA can still be abused (DiFonzio, 2005; Schweitzer & Saks, 2006).    
 
There is a clear mismatch between the idea of using DNA and the reality of dealing with 
the work load that occurs when hits are received from the ESR. It is obvious from the 
files that staff are not able to cope with the hits, especially in relation to volume crime.  
Yet those interviewed were keen for DNA to be used as much as possible, regardless of 
cost or time. Likewise, when questioned about the state of the current laws, at time of 
interview the majority of those interviewed believed that all who were arrested should 
have their DNA taken. Some of the participants believed that the bigger the database the 
more likely that offenders would be captured. However, the UK has the world’s largest 
databank but it does not have the highest hit rate in the world. GeneWatch UK (2006) 
and Goulka et al (2010) would argue that it is not the number of profiles on the 
databank that make it a success but rather a combination of having a high attendance 
rate at crime scenes and the right DNA profiles on the database. New Zealand’s hit rate 
is considered to be one of the highest in the world yet its database is nowhere near the 
size of the UK’s  (ESR, 2011a), further supporting the argument that it is not the size of 
the database that is important. 
 
The question of privacy was addressed by many of those interviewed. It was 
acknowledged that if a person was not charged or acquitted their DNA should be 
destroyed just as it is for fingerprints and photographs. Of those interviewed, two 
participants stated that the Guthrie Test should be made available to the police, backed 
up with the potentially naive belief that only bad people need to be fearful. They did not 
take into consideration the impact this might have on children's health. These comments 
showed a lack of understanding of the opinion the public may have of the police. 
 
In summation, the participants like the idea of being able to use DNA freely and at 
times feel hampered by the law. Almost all who were interviewed wanted some legal 
changes to make DNA easier to use. While most of the participants understood the need 
for privacy, the more radical ones could see no harm in using the Guthrie Test as a good 
databank for catching future criminals. The implications of using that databank in such a 
way would be significant for the health of newborns. There would also be considerable 
implications as to how the police would manage such information without abusing that 
power. The perceived legitimacy of the police would be more difficult to maintain, the 
governance of such a database would be extremely complex and quite beyond the 
police. It would need an independent body to oversee such an enterprise which would 
bring with it a whole new set of rules.  
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However, irrespective of the powers that the police currently have, it is still doubtful if 
the use of DNA evidence would be maximised. The previous amendments made to the 
DNA legislation do not appear to have made any improvements to the way police deal 
with the DNA hits. The participants are ready to identify the limitations of legislation, 
budget or resources but never comment on police behaviour and the restraints these 
cause. This entrenched behaviour and cultural views such as racial profiling and an 
absolute belief that police would never misuse a power are not unsurprising responses 
from police officers who quite possibly would not realise what they were doing, other 
than trying to catch offenders.  The views expressed by the participants suggest that 
time should be spent by the police improving their current processes in managing DNA 
intelligence links to maximise the DNA technology and legislation that they do have. 
 
The following chapter seeks to explain why police deal with DNA technology in the 
manner that they do as evidenced by the previous four chapters. The chapter will 
articulate police culture as adapted by Chan’s ‘theory’ of field and habitus of policing 
and how this affects their (the police) ability to successfully implement new technology.  
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Chapter 8: Field and Habitus of Policing 
8.0   Introduction and Setting DNA in Frame of other Technologies  
This chapter discusses how police introduce new technology to their work environment 
and what influences the successful application of this technology. It will be examined 
from the theoretical perspective of Chan's (2001) adaptation of Bourdieu's Field and 
Habitus. Chan refers to this as the field and habitus of policing, a theoretical construct 
that will be referred to throughout this thesis. For this reason, Bourdieu's further 
concepts on social, cultural and symbolic capital are not explored in any detail. Chan's 
work on the field and habitus is used to illustrate the reasons why police culture may 
inhibit the organisation's ability to implement change and therefore maximise the use of 
new technology. Some of the examples given in this chapter have been chosen to 
describe the history of previous attempts to introduce new technology into the police. 
These examples illustrate how the police manage these changes and whether a 
reluctance to change is part of the culture or based on previous negative experiences. 
Although the research is specific to DNA technology, understanding how any 
technology is greeted by the police enables the research findings to be put into context. 
Therefore this chapter also reviews studies of the impact of DNA technology on staff 
after the history of other new technologies and the police have been traversed.  
In line with the field and habitus of policing, this chapter will also examine police 
culture as any changes made to the working landscape (field) of the police has an 
impact and it is the culture (habitus) of the police which will enable or disable these 
changes. An important consideration for the police when making any changes to its 
working practices is how the public perceive their legitimate application of this 
technology. This is especially so if new legislation has been created to support these 
changes and if this legislation has an impact on the rights or freedom of individuals.  
For this reason this chapter will also review police legitimacy with examples pertinent 
to the New Zealand Police which may have eroded the police's legitimacy in the eyes of 
certain sections of society. Likewise the recent European Court ruling in R vs Marper 
and S is examined at length as this legal outcome called into question how the largest 
database in the world was being managed. This ruling could have implications for the 
management of all databases and highlights the importance of the legitimate use of 
these databases by the police. 
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8.1   Field and Habitus of Policing and Police Culture: Conceptual Framework 
The police have a working culture. There are a variety of terms for this culture, 
including “cop culture” (Reiner 1992), “canteen culture” or ”canteen talk” 
(Waddington,1999a) and ”working personality” (Skolnick, 1966). However, there is 
an acknowledged difference between cop culture which is the actual behaviour of the 
police and canteen culture which tends to be where police vent their more extreme 
views (Reiner, 2010). According to Waddington (1999a) this canteen talk –  the banter 
amongst police officers where only their peers are present – is merely an oral tradition 
which does not always translate into behaviour on the street.  Waddington (1999a) 
believes that these views are mainstream, functional aspects of police life and are not 
to be considered deviant or bad. Traditionally, when commentators talk about police 
culture the term is used in a negative sense as if everything that is bad about the police 
is due to its culture (Crank, 2004; Chan, 1996; Prenzler, 1997). That being said, there 
are two negative aspects of police culture that will be addressed in this section: racism 
and sexism. Although these topics are not central to the research, it would be remiss 
not to devote the following two paragraphs to them as allegations of racism and 
sexism have been levelled at the police (see Chapter 3 section 3.1.2), and these 
allegations impact on its ability to appear legitimate in the eyes of the public. 
 
Much has been written on racism within the police (see Black, 1970; Crank, 2004; 
Scarman, 1981; Skolnick; 1966; Reiner, 2010; Reiss, 1980) and it is not intended to 
conduct an exhaustive review of the relevant literature here. This paragraph is to 
acknowledge the long-recognised phenomenon of racism within the police and the 
implications this has when the police attempt to legitimately apply new technology to 
a wary public. This is particularly valid when one of the participants in this research 
admitted to racial profiling when identifying persons from whom to take DNA 
samples (see Chapter 5 section 5.2). The concerns raised by commentators in New 
Zealand (Katene, 2009) quote the numbers of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples 
over-represented on DNA databases. These concerns are based on a negative history 
with several significant public-disorder events being attributed to heavy- handed 
policing tactics aimed at ethnic minorities. One example is the Brixton riots in London 
in 1981. Lord Scarman’s report (1981) on these riots highlights a breakdown in 
communication between the community and the police as being one of several causes 
of the riot (Ackroyd, 1993; Hough, 2007; Reiner, 1985). Brixton had a large ethnic 
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community and this group felt they were unfairly treated by the police, especially 
during stop-and-search procedures. In 1981 the police were using a law dating back to 
1824 to justify their right to stop and search people. This law was referred to 
colloquially as the ”sus” law as anyone could be stopped and searched by the police if 
it was suspected they might be planning to commit a crime (John, 2006). The 
Metropolitan Police accounted for 55% of the UK’s sus charges in 1976, yet London 
accounted for only 15% of the population. Of the arrests made under the sus law, 42% 
of those arrested were black, as opposed to 12% of all arrests (Open University, 2009). 
Another significant event was the death in 1992 of Stephen Lawrence, a black 
teenager from South London, and the subsequent mishandling of his homicide 
investigation by the police. One of the outcomes of the ensuing inquiry was that police 
were said to be institutionally racist. In his 1999 report, Sir William McPherson stated 
that the Metropolitan Police Service had failed to properly investigate the death of 
Stephen Lawrence because of the colour of his skin.  He attributed this to institutional 
racism whereby an organisation would discriminate through unwitting prejudice, 
ignorance and racist stereotyping (McPherson, 1999). This is as a result of entrenched 
views, attitudes and behaviour and this culture can be applied to all aspects of 
policing, for example when dealing with new ideas or changes to their working 
environment.  The public perception of the police being a racist and sexist institution 
will have consequences when legitimacy is in question. This type of institutionalised 
behaviour could be carried over into sexist behaviour which is discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
The very nature of police work attracts a certain type of person (Reiner, 2010). This 
person, usually a male, will enjoy the exciting aspect of police work, of catching the 
bad guys and keeping the streets safe. For this reason, policemen have a reputation for 
machismo (having a strong or aggressive masculine pride) (Fielding, 1994; Frewin & 
Tuffin, 1998; Smith & Gray; 1985). As a consequence the police are seen as a macho 
organisation and not necessarily a conducive environment for women to be accepted 
into on equitable terms (Fielding, 1994). The use of force is seen as a requirement for 
all policing institutions as a means of upholding the law. Therefore this work is seen as 
being physically unsuitable for women as they are perceived by police culture to be 
weaker than men (Fielding, 1994). Linked with this view is the manner in which 
crimes against women have traditionally been investigated by the police 
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(Westmarland, 2008). The now infamous documentary on Thames Valley Police 
dealing with a rape victim has become mandatory viewing on how not to deal with a 
victim of any crime. This documentary was aired in 1982, much to the embarrassment 
of the police, and resulted in many reviews on police handling of sexual-assault 
victims (Mesure & Hamilton, 2012). Yet the percentage of reported rapes in the UK 
which resulted in a prosecution in 2012/13 was 11% (Morris, 2013), suggesting that 
the investigation and prosecution of sexual offences against women was still 
problematic. Jordan (2004) suggests that these figures will not improve until the police 
change the way in which they view women, which historically has been with distrust. 
A mindset of stereotypical assumptions and being offender focused has prevented any 
discernible change to the way in which female victims of sexual offending are 
handled. Any unit that investigates crimes against women and children is invariably 
staffed by women police officers as, anecdotally, male officers do not consider the 
work “sexy” and the organisation does not appear to place any kudos on this work. 
These views can make a difficult work environment for women and impact on the 
service offered to women victims of crime (Westmarland, 2008).  
It is this same culture which provides the glue that keeps police officers doing what 
they do, good and bad. Waddington (1999a) states that ”no culture is free standing: 
police sub-culture does not just exist, but exists for a reason” (p.295) From a New 
Zealand perspective van der Hayden (1997) identifies that some of the policing 
symbols, ideology, values and assumptions create ‘organisational cohesiveness’ (1997, 
p.6). These are useful ‘anchors’ and enable the police to do what they do often in 
trying circumstances. However, he suggests  that the while the police need to change 
its organisational culture in order to offer the best service to the public, the trick is 
identifying which of these anchors are valuable and which are not.    Skolnick’s view 
of ”working personality" was as a result of interviewing police and criminals as well 
as spending time with detectives, including observing investigative interviews 
conducted by them. Reiner’s (1992, 2010) views are based, inter alia, on analysis of 
media and social reactions to police behaviour. Indeed, there are so many studies on 
police culture that there is room for only a selected few to be mentioned in this work.  
 
Reiner (2010) identified four themes in policing: mission, action, cynicism and 
pessimism. This mission is exciting and action-oriented and involves catching the bad 
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guys and locking them up or punishing them. Cynicism and pessimism may manifest 
themselves in officers after the reality of police work is realised. Reiner (2010) posits 
that many police officers join the police as they believe victims of crime are at the 
centre of policing, thus making the work seem worthwhile. However, this supposes 
that police officers consider being victim focused as exciting. The reality, of course, is 
that the majority of policing is mundane and pedestrian (Waddington, 1999b). A great 
deal of police time is spent on paperwork and work that is more akin to social work as 
often when no one else is able to deal with it is the police who are left to clean up 
(Skolnick, 1966; Waddington, 1999b; Westmarland, 2008).  Therefore the reality of 
policing can sometimes trigger cynicism and pessimism in police officers (Reiner, 
2010; Vick, 1981.) The reaction of individual officers to this reality would depend on 
what drove them to join the police in the first place. If they were drawn to the mission 
and the action but discover that this is not the mainstay of policing they may struggle. 
Police culture can be a support system for these officers. The so-called canteen culture 
is where the talking is done, the job talked up or exaggerated, and is its own therapy 
session where a hard day can be excised. Waddington (1999a) refers to this as the 
”repair shop” of policing (p.295).  The research that was conducted on canteen culture 
identified that what was said in the canteen did not necessarily translate into what was 
actually done on the streets (Policy Studies Institute, 1983; Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 
1999a). This reinforces Waddinginton’s belief that the views expressed in the canteen 
were a way for the officers to vent and not necessarily an expression of any strong 
beliefs – in short a way of combating pessimism. However, Chan’s paper is a re-
conceptualising of police culture, drawing on Bourdieu’s field and habitus and 
focusing on resistance to cultural change which may be influenced by this pessimism. 
 
Chan’s view of the field and habitus of policing is that when new recruits join the police 
they enter the organisation with their personal views of the world already formed, based 
on their life experiences. This is their habitus. When they first join an organisation such 
as the police with its own culture, they can initially feel like a fish out of water (Chan, 
2004). In order to be socialised into this new environment they adopt the values of the 
police so as to fit in and be accepted by their peers.  They need to adapt to fit a police 
role so they conform to become part of the team (Frewin & Tuffin, 1998). After a time 
they become comfortable in their environment and are accepted as being part of the 
team. This becomes their field (working environment) and (reworked) habitus (culture). 
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When the police make changes that affect the working practices (or the field) of the 
organisation, staff who have worked in that environment for some time and have formed 
their culture based on the old habitus may struggle to cope (Chan, 2004). Therefore, 
understanding what happens to the workplace when new technology and new 
processes/procedures are introduced is helpful in establishing what makes this change 
effective. 
 
Chan proposes that a useful way to conceptualise technological change is to examine its 
relationship to the field and habitus of policing. Bourdieu (1930-2002) describes a field 
as a system of social positions. These are semi-autonomous, structured, social spaces 
characterised by discourse and social activity (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). He states 
that all human action takes place within social fields which are arenas for the struggle of 
resources. Habitus is the means by which the ”social game” is inscribed in biological 
individuals; that is habitus is adopted through upbringing and education (Woolfreys, 
2000). Bourdieu posited that ”capital” was an index of social power and that within 
”fields” people tried to distinguish themselves from others by acquiring capital. This 
capital could be represented by position and power: for example, money and property or 
”symbolic cultural capital” (Carrington & Allan, 1997). In the context of policing, 
capital and symbolism could be described as officers gaining promotion (or working 
their way up the ranks), giving them power over other staff.  The symbol of this power 
is displayed by the insignia on their uniforms.   
 
Chan adapts Bourdieu’s perspective that changes in the social game (field) would create 
new necessities that might require the creation of new (cultural) strategies (habitus) for 
coping (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Chan argues that the new computer technology 
has fundamentally altered the field of policing through the various resources (capital) it 
provided and the constraints (necessities) it imposed on police work. The research 
shows that information technology can be less effective than one would hope (Manning, 
1992) or highly successful (Harper, 1991). Several studies have looked at police 
interaction with new technologies and officers’ acceptance of/resistance to these new 
processes (Chan, 2001; Chan, 2003; Chan et al, 2001; Davis, 1989; Colvin & Goh, 
2005; Nunn, 2001a). Research has shown that understanding the impact of technology 
on the police might explain why it was either accepted or rejected by officers (Manning, 
1992; Smith, Caputi & Rawstorne, 2000).  However, in adopting Chan's view of the 
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field, coping strategies need to be in place for officers to accept technology. These 
coping strategies may involve communication, training and a collective understanding 
and acceptance as to why these innovations are required. This method may prove more 
successful than crossing fingers and hoping for the best. 
 
Chan’s focus on the field and habitus of policing examines how police staff manage 
change (Chan, 2004). For the purpose of this research, the researcher has adapted 
Chan’s use of field and habitus to focus on what happens when the field changes and 
established police officers are unable to adapt their habitus to cope with this change. 
They are comfortable with what they know and will accept new technology only as long 
as they do not need to alter their behaviour. As argued by Hovarth, Meesig and Lee: 
 
"In many fundamental respects, the police criminal investigation process has 
remained relatively unaffected by the significant changes that have occurred 
in policing, the crime problem and technology in the past 30 years (2001 
p.5)" 
 
These findings from their 2001 national survey (United States) of police policies and 
practices confirm that the police do not like nor do they manage change well and their 
way of managing this change is to adopt the technology and not change their processes. 
This behaviour can be seen in the data gathered for this research from the subject 
district and is fully explained in Chapters 4 - 7.  
 
The next paragraphs look at the history of the police adoption of new technology, why 
this technology was needed and what the outcomes of these innovations were for the 
police and society. Technology is broken down into two groups: information technology 
or IT; and technology in general. IT is given its own group as it has a very specific role 
to play and is often seen as a management tool rather than a technology that will assist 
the police to investigate crime.  
 
8.2   Technology   
Technology has been used in the criminal justice system since the 19th century. The 
introduction of fingerprinting, wireless communication, the motor car and other devices 
have long since become accepted practice and therefore mundane (Grabosky, 1998). 
Notable technological changes first began when officers moved from walking the beat 
173 
 
into patrol cars. This benefit of police being mobile was that officers could reach the 
scene of an incident quickly and have a more effective coverage of the area (Uchida, 
2004).  In 1929 when radios were put into police cars in the US it was believed by some 
that by that one simple act all crime would be eliminated (Kelling, 1978). The radio also 
meant better supervision of the officers by their sergeants (Uchida, 2004), which meant 
greater accountability to their senior officers. Personal radios were seen as a safety 
measure for officers as well as making them more effective (Kelling, 1978). Other 
innovations such as helicopters, computer-aided dispatch, radios and surveillance 
equipment were all seen to help the functioning of the police (Chan, 2001; Colton, 
1973; Uchida, 2004). The idea that the telegraph, telephones and radios would speed up 
the flow of information and therefore make the police more efficient has been a long- 
held wish by those advocating such innovations (Benoit, 2001). Likewise the 
introduction of computer-aided dispatch (CAD) would improve the gathering and 
dissemination of information and enable the police to be more methodical in responding 
to calls for service (Colton, 1973).   
Manning (2001), however, does not believe that the introduction of technology or even 
information technology has done much to enhance the effectiveness of the police. He 
states that in spite of all the technological innovations introduced to the police in the 
US, they have spent most money on just two technologies: weapons and transport. 
Manning (2001) posits that it is a combination of technology and techniques such as 
crime mapping and crime analysis that are greater innovations in policing rather than 
pure technology. He argues that the police cannot hope to control crime and reduce the 
fear of crime while being almost entirely responsive and demand-driven (Manning, 
2001, p.101). Manning’s arguments are based on six years of observational studies on 
three US police departments and two British constabularies. His findings were that 
despite the many sophisticated technologies employed by the police to be more precise 
when combating crime, the results were not as impressive as they should have been. 
Police practices did not appear to change with the introduction of new technology but 
instead seemed to reproduce already entrenched behaviour.  
It is understandable that the police would wish to be innovative and try to compete with 
criminals on more even terms (Kelling, 1978; Nunn, 2001b), hence the continual 
introduction of technology. All these innovations were to make the police more efficient 
at the prevention of crime (Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005) by the identifying, arrest and 
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prosecution of offenders. Although as stated above, Manning (2001) did not accept that 
technology had made the police any more effective. According to Chan (2001), 
technology has historically revolutionised police practices and certainly with the advent 
of cars and radios it was believed that the police were modernising. However, Kelling 
(1978) suggests that there was no evidence to suggest that any technological devices 
(cars or radios) had significantly improved the effectiveness of the police service. In 
fact, he suggested that these new technologies were moving the police away from the 
public who continued to exhibit fears about crime. He argued that the police fulfilled 
many functions and with the continued introduction of technology they were focusing 
on only one aspect of their role. The practice of putting officers in patrol cars rather than 
having them walking the beat was one such example (Kelling, 1978).  This use of patrol 
cars has produced a “mutual withdrawal – the police from the citizens and the citizens 
from the police” (Kelling, 1978 p. 177). Further to this, the way police gather, analyse 
and disseminate this information is dependent on information technology. If technology 
were to further distance the police from the community, then the information that the 
police could receive from the public might be lost. However, the application of 
information technology was to have a completely different effect on the police. 
8.2.1   Information Technology 
All of the above innovations were implemented in order to catch offenders or to prevent 
crime but police reformers in the 20th century had hoped that police work and police 
management would become more scientific (Manning 1992). No doubt the scientific 
approach would provide more tangible results, backed up with solid methodology rather 
than the usual anecdotal evidence to promote the success of the police.  With the public 
having easier access to the police via the telephone and computer-aided dispatch, their 
expectations of the police became greater (Uchida, 2004). The police were now mobile 
and were able to provide more efficient coverage and quicker responses to calls for 
service (Uchida, 2004) which increased their workload and motivated them to look for 
technological solutions (Manning, 1992; Walsh, W, 2001). The idea of using computers 
to streamline work practices was taken up by the majority of jurisdictions to enable 
them to make better use of their limited resources. This introduction of new technology 
would have an impact on the culture of the police. 
When new technology is introduced to any organisation, there will be an impact on the 
working culture of that group. Manning (1992) suggests that new technology is a part of 
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any social organisation and, although this technology can change organisations, can it 
also be shaped by them. Technology may be accepted in its purest form or, depending 
on the organisation, it may well be altered (or ignored completely) to fit in with that 
culture (Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005). For example, understanding why people accept 
or reject computers has been one of the most challenging issues in information systems 
research (Smith, Caputi, & Rawstorne, 2000). The police may also have decided to 
introduce information technology in order to make themselves look good. It might give 
them the pretence of looking professional and progressive without actually making any 
changes to their work practices (Dixon, 1998; Willis, Mastrofski & Weisburd, 2007). 
The use of computer technology to report, monitor and even solve crime has been 
introduced for a variety of reasons. Arguably computers have been introduced purely 
for administration purposes and as a means of monitoring the work of the police rather 
than as a tool to help them be more effective (Manning, 1996). The data gathered by the 
police and other public agencies is also used as a way of being more accountable to the 
public in that it quantifies the work that is done by individual agencies (Manning, 2001).  
A large part of police work has been to accumulate information, directly or indirectly 
through their work. Many police personnel are employed solely to collate data as a by-
product of their work in strategic planning offices, media liaison, quality assurance 
teams and intelligence units (Sheptycki, 1998). Ericson (1994) refers to the police as 
”knowledge workers” or ”knowledge brokers” as they collect a large amount of data 
that is of use to other agencies. This information can include crash data to interested 
parties or crime statistics and victim data to agreed government departments. The 
collection and dissemination of this data can be time-consuming and cause frustration 
among officers as they do not believe they should be collecting such data purely for 
outside agencies (Chan, 2003).  They do not consider this to be their core business and 
yet they are spending more time on this work than on enforcing the law (Ericson, 1994; 
Haggerty & Ericson, 1999; Sheptycki, 1998). These constraints on police time are 
governed by legislation under which the police are legally required to provide this 
information (Chan, Brereton, Legosz, & Doran, 2001).    
A key difference for the police between technology and information technology is their 
perception of their roles and therefore their acceptance of them. If the technology 
introduced will support their action-oriented view of policing, such as weapons, cars, 
radios and CCTV, these will be more readily accepted. However, if the new technology 
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is to monitor performance or used as a tool to measure accountability, there is less 
enthusiasm for such tools. 
 
8.3   Intelligence-led Policing – A Case Study of IT 
Intelligence-led policing is an example of the police trying to maximise the benefits of 
using computers to gather and analyse information in order to direct patrols to be where 
they are likely to have the greatest impact.   
In modern times the police have embraced new technology as a way of enhancing, 
legitimising and quantifying their efficiency (Manning, 1996; Walsh, 2001). It was 
believed that information technology would be as readily accepted by the police as other 
technology had been (Chan, 2001). However, information technology (e.g. computers) 
required a greater change to working practices and the police culture. In 1993 the Audit 
Commission in the UK published a report, Helping with Enquiries, about crime 
statistics in the UK. Heaton (2000) describes this report as path-breaking as it was the 
first time that such a report sought to influence police operational activity. The report 
was timely as, despite an increase in government spending on policing which 
augmented the number of officers employed, recorded crime had continued to rise. This 
suggested that the police were not able to make an impact on crime by using 
conventional methods such as random foot and car patrols which were of little or no 
value in crime deterrence (Heaton, 2000; Loader, 1997). The Audit Commission 
promoted the concept of intelligence-led policing to tackle and incapacitate recidivist 
offenders (Heaton, 2000). The report revealed that a small number of people were 
responsible for a large number of crimes, referred to as volume crime. It was suggested 
that if the police targeted this group they might have an impact on crime (Heaton, 
2000). This innovation was considered important enough for the British Government to 
enact legislation requiring every police force to adopt the National Intelligence Model 
(Ratcliffe, 2003). The aim of intelligence-led policing was: 1) targeting offenders, 2) 
management of crime, 3) investigation of linked series of crimes, 4) application of 
preventative measures (Ratcliffe, 2003).  
However, translation into reality has difficulties. To make good use of this information 
requires trained data analysts but the appropriate analytical training is often not 
provided and staff are not given any clear definition of what is required (Radcliffe, 
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2003). As a result no changes are made and the same business practices prevail – but 
under a new name (Ratcliffe, 2003). The effective use of intelligence-led policing 
requires the analysts to understand the data and disseminate it to the front line. In a 
study conducted by Cope (2004), staff who worked in intelligence units in an urban and 
a county force in England were interviewed. The staff consisted of both police officers 
and civilians who were in the majority. The civilian analysts felt that they did not have 
the legitimacy of the sworn analysts when they were passing on their information to 
police officers. They felt that they lacked credibility in the eyes of the officers and so 
their information also lacked credibility. Cope found that in-depth analysis of the data 
was rare as the staff lacked training and ability. Analysts were often working with only 
half of the data because of a lack of information. Officers questioned the quality of the 
data going into the computer, clearly forgetting that they were the ones supplying the 
bulk of this information. Front-line officers were an integral source of quality 
information but their reluctance to share this information meant that potentially 
excellent intelligence was not passed on. Information is a source of power and 
information technology can lead to power struggles (Chan, 2001). The front-line 
officers had power over the analysts and they were unable to see that their attitude had 
repercussions for the entire organisation.  This meant that intelligence-led policing was 
not being utilised to achieve maximum results. Analysts were constrained by the 
traditional, rigid policing methods and the need- to-know culture of the police where 
officers share knowledge with their colleagues only if they believe it is essential 
(Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). 
Unfortunately, intelligence-led policing has also been linked to quality assurance 
analysis which sometimes confuses the work of analysts and causes good intelligence to 
become lost in a surfeit of information (Ratcliffe, 2003). This is likely to occur when 
senior managers confuse the roles of intelligence analysts with performance analysts. 
They use intelligence gathering as performance indicators and absorb their time with 
managerial issues, neglecting the purpose for which they were employed. Intelligence-
led policing was instigated to identify recidivist offenders and then target them as a 
means of reducing crime rates. But, as in any other organisation, the police can 
sometimes get caught up in bureaucracy and lose sight of their primary objectives 
(Goldstein, 1979). There can also be a disconnection between the “street cop” and the 
“management cop” where the street cop believes that decisions on what the police 
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should be doing are made by police officers who have forgotten what it is like to be on 
the front line (Reuss-Ianni 1983). Anecdotally, the headquarters of the New Zealand 
Police is referred to by front-line staff as “bullshit castle”, further supporting this claim 
by Reuss-Ianni  
When implementing big changes in an organisation such as the police, sound strategies 
need to be in place to utilise technology. Strategies need to take into consideration the 
capacity for the police subculture to subvert change (Chan 1997; Mastrofski & Uchida, 
1993). What is required is a fully thought out strategic plan that defines the expectations 
of the organisation and gives the staff the tools required to make the most of the 
technology.  If this support is not there the technology can quickly become underused, 
redundant or even an irritant due to the amount of work it can cause. Likewise if the 
organisation does not manage this change well, the new technology may not be fully 
utilised but rather is there in name only. They may change the name and say the 
technology is being fully utilised but make no effort to change the processes so that the 
new technology does not yield any benefits.  If the officers think that the organisation is 
changing too fast they may feel as if they no longer fit within it and they may then leave 
or become disgruntled with their jobs (Chan, 2007).  The past experience of officers can 
also be a reason why new technology is treated with suspicion. Information technology 
and forensic technology are both required if they are to be successful. The difficulty is 
that the police want the technology but they do not want or may not have the ability to 
make the changes required to maximise the benefits. The police have a clear command 
structure and guidance on how new technology will be introduced comes from the 
executive. If it is unable to convince staff to use this technology then some of the blame 
must be leveled at it. If clear guidelines are in place, backed up by the correct 
technological support and the appropriate consultation, there is no excuse for the police 
not to make effective use of DNA technology to investigate crime. Combined with the 
effective use of DNA technology is the need for the police to be seen to be applying this 
technology legitimately.  
8.4   Organisational Legitimacy 
Authority, power and domination are relevant to organisations which in order to be 
effective also need legitimacy. The level of legitimacy will differ depending on the 
organisation. 
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Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p.574). 
Suchman’s definition of legitimacy, as seen above, gives a wide view of legitimacy in 
that it can be different things to different people, depending on their perceptions and 
assumptions. Legitimacy is a means of justification (Maurer, 1971) in that an 
organisation justifies itself to its peers or superiors, or cultural conformity (Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer& Selancik, 1978) rather than overt self-
justification. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) wrote that organisations wanted to be accepted 
by society and achieved this by aligning their values with the acceptable norms of 
society. This suggests that organisations legitimate themselves by conforming to 
accepted norms or it could be that organisations are established within existing norms 
and values because that is all they know. This may be why a certain type of person is 
attracted to a certain organisation (such as the police) as they are able to relate to the 
existing norms and values of that organisation. However, Suchman (1995) goes on to 
say that organisations seek legitimacy for a variety of reasons and the effectiveness of 
legitimation efforts may depend on the goals and objectives against which these efforts 
are measured. Suchman (1995) argues that legitimacy enhances both the stability and 
the comprehensibility of organisational activities. If people understand what an 
organisation does and why it does it they are more inclined to support it. Likewise, if the 
subordinates within an organisation understand what they do and why, they are more 
informed about their work and are able to contextualise what they do. Legitimacy leads 
to persistence and people are more inclined to supply resources to an organisation that 
appears to be desirable, proper or appropriate (Parsons, 1960). Not only does legitimacy 
affect how people act towards the organisation but it also affects their understanding of 
it. People will perceive a legitimate organisation as more trustworthy if they know what 
that organisation is doing and why. This can be achieved only if that organisation is 
accountable in some way for illustrating what they do and why, that is to have a 
rationale for their actions.  Suchman (1995) also refers to an organisation seeking 
“active support” or “merely passive acquiescence”. The distinction is that if an 
organisation has no reliance on the public and prefers to have as little outside 
interference as possible, the threshold of legitimation may be quite low. However, an 
organisation that is dependant or answerable to a particular audience would have a 
much higher threshold of legitimation.  The police would fall into the latter category. 
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8.4.1   Police Legitimacy 
Active support from the public is of great importance to a police organisation. The 
police rely on the public to provide them with information in order to help them prevent 
crime or catch offenders so it is easier to influence people if they can see it is to their 
benefit. People give the police power over them by expecting and wanting the police to 
enforce legislation which will keep them safe. However, Weber (1968) suggests that 
people obey the rules voluntarily as it is in their interests to do so. They are willing to 
hand over this power to the police if the police are accepted as being a legitimate 
organisation. Being legitimate enables organisations and authorities to be more 
successful without the need to resort to the threat of force (Tyler, 2006a).  Another 
reason why people obey the laws is that it is the right thing to do morally. Hinds and 
Murphy (2007) suggest that people defer to and obey legitimate institutions, not because 
of fear of sanctions, but because they respect the institution’s authority. Legitimacy is 
one of a number of ways to validate this control of behaviour (Smith, 2007). Therefore 
the police need the support of the public if they are to be effective in their work (Tyler, 
2004; Hinds & Murphy, 2007). This support can be as simple as obeying a traffic 
direction or passing vital information to the police regarding criminal activity. The work 
of the police is much easier if the public voluntarily defer to their position of authority 
and this deference is linked to the perceived legitimacy of the police. One reason for the 
public’s deference is that they see the police as being a legitimate authority and are 
therefore entitled to be obeyed (Tyler, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). This motivation 
to obey the law is distinct from the belief that one is likely to be caught and punished for 
breaking the law (Tyler, 1990).  
The public judge police legitimacy by the way they exercise their authority and these 
assessments are separate from their perceived effectiveness in fighting crime (Tyler, 
2004). Procedural-justice judgments feature heavily in the public perception of police 
legitimacy in the US. Smith (2007) posits that people will more readily accept the 
authority as legitimate if they believe that they are being treated fairly. Tyler (2006b) 
writes that police and courts should focus on following fair procedures in the judicial 
system rather than attempting to deliver outcomes such as the punishment of offenders 
or crime control. Research has shown that legitimacy is a social value and that people’s 
support for the police is distinct from police performance (see Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). 
This indicates that police have more control over how they treat people than they do 
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over the crime rate (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). By regulating their behaviour, the police 
can engender support and trust from the community and be seen to be more effective in 
their work. Smith (2007), however, makes a valid point when talking about the research 
completed regarding police legitimacy in the US. The research has been interpreted as 
showing that experience of the police behaving fairly strengthens belief in the 
legitimacy of their authority. He goes on to say that fair treatment has more influence 
than the result favouring the person concerned. The far-reaching conclusion of this 
research is that authorities gain cooperation not primarily by achieving outcomes that 
benefit the community (such as lowering crime rates or through fear of punishment) but 
by following procedures that are experienced as being fair. Smith (2007) adds caution to 
these conclusions by saying the scope of the US procedural justice is limited and it does 
not follow that procedural fairness is the sole or central foundation of legitimacy in all 
societies at all stages of development. That being so, research in the US completed by 
Tyler and Sunshine (2003) supported the argument that legitimacy is a social value 
distinct from performance evaluations.  It may well have been that operating to 
maximise these performance measures caused greater alienation between the police and 
the public. In asking for more powers, the police were arguing that they could reduce 
crime if only they were given more technology and more powers to allow this 
technology to be implemented. Yet if the technology or the powers were not managed 
well, this could cause greater deterioration in relations between the police and the public 
(Ackroyd, 1993).   A lot of police work requires face-to-face interaction with the public 
and sometimes a dependence on technology keeps the police distant from the very 
public that they serve.   
Every new law passed that may result in less freedom for citizens is going to cause 
fierce debate. The legitimacy of the organisation pursuing these law changes and 
enacting these laws is always going to be called into question. An example of this was 
in England and Wales with the introduction of the national DNA databank and the ever-
increasing powers being given to the police. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(PACE) 1984 gives the police in England, Wales and Northern Ireland their powers and 
also protects the rights of the population when dealing with the police. PACE covers all 
aspects of arrest, detention, identification, searching and the taking of intimate and non-
intimate samples.  With the creation of the national DNA databank in the UK in 1995, 
PACE was amended to give the police powers to obtain and retain DNA samples but 
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with strict conditions. The existing requirements for fingerprints and photographs to be 
destroyed as soon as practicable after a person was acquitted or the decision not to 
prosecute was made would be the same for DNA samples. In addition, any information 
collected from these samples could not be used in evidence or for the investigation of 
any other offence. The premise was that the rights of the individual were protected and 
their DNA profile could not be used in any subsequent proceedings against them.  Two 
high-profile cases caused this law to be changed. One case related to the rape of an 
elderly woman. DNA identified the offender and he was charged with the rape. At his 
trial his barrister successfully argued that the police retained his client’s DNA sample 
when it should have been destroyed as he was acquitted for the offences in which his 
DNA was taken. This made the current DNA evidence inadmissible. The second case 
related to a murder and, as in the first case, the DNA was retained when it should have 
been destroyed. The individual had his murder conviction quashed on appeal as the 
DNA evidence was ruled inadmissible (Higgins & Tatham, 2009). In response to these 
two cases, Section 64 of PACE was amended to allow the retention of fingerprints and 
DNA samples of those subsequently acquitted or where proceedings had been 
discontinued.22 The importance of this law change was that DNA taken from someone 
who had been in custody could be used in subsequent proceedings or investigations. 
However, the difficulty of this law change was that Section 64 would be at odds with 
Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides: “Everybody 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” 
(Council of Europe, 1950). As is the practice in the UK, when all legal recourse there 
has been exhausted, the fight is taken to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).  
Two such cases followed this course of action which would challenge Section 64 of 
PACE. 
8.4.2   S and Marper v. the United Kingdom 
On 19th January 2001 an 11-year-old boy was arrested and charged with attempted 
robbery. Due to his age he could be referred to in public only as ”S” to protect his 
privacy. His fingerprints and a DNA sample were taken. He did not have any previous 
convictions, cautions or warnings. On 14th June 2001 he was cleared of the offence. On 
13th March 2001, Marper was arrested and charged with harassment of his partner. His 
                                                            
22
 The Chief Constable could agree to destroy them in exceptional circumstances. 
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fingerprints and a DNA sample were taken. Prior to the case coming to trial, his partner 
decided to withdraw her allegation as they had worked through their differences and 
were now reconciled. On 14th June the case was formally discontinued. Solicitors for 
both the accused wrote to the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire asking that the 
fingerprints and DNA samples be destroyed. The Chief Constable refused as the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 allows the police to take and retain indefinitely, 
without consent, fingerprints and DNA samples from a person of any age who has been 
arrested in connection with a “recordable” offence (Hepple, 2009).  As a result a judicial 
review was requested by the solicitors of both the accused, stating that the powers under 
which they were retained were incompatible with Articles 8(1) and 14 of the European 
Convention. Article 14 provides as follows:  
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status (Council of Europe, 1950).  
This Article is not a free-standing right but depends on the engagement or breach of 
another Convention right (Higgins & Tatham, 2009). The cases went to the Divisional 
Court, the Court of Appeal and finally the House of Lords. The Divisional Court 
dismissed the applications as it felt that Article 8 had not been breached as the 
“interference was in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society for the 
prevention of crime” (Higgins & Tatham 2009, p.210). The Court of Appeal agreed 
with the Divisional Court, saying that although the retention of the samples breached 
Article 8(1) it was justified by Article 8(2) which states:  
 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Council of Europe, 1950).  
 
The Court of Appeal identified “that the adverse consequences to the individual were 
proportionate to the benefit to the public and the successful prosecution and prevention 
of crime” (Higgins & Tatham, 2009, p. 211). The House of Lords also dismissed the 
appeal saying that merely retaining the fingerprints and DNA samples did not constitute 
an interference with respect for private life. Furthermore, they stated that if there was 
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interference under Article 8(2) it was justified on the grounds of prevention of crime.  
One dissenter, Baroness Richmond, felt that retaining the fingerprints and samples did 
constitute interference but that there were justifications in both these cases to do so. 
In 2008 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
unanimously held that the practice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland of 
indefinitely retaining fingerprints and DNA samples and profiles of unconvicted persons 
without their consent was a violation of the right to private life guaranteed by Article 8 
of the ECHR (Hepple, 2009). Clearly the ECHR took a different view from that of the 
English judiciary.  The English judges agree that the use of DNA technology is a 
legitimate way to identify or exonerate offenders. They also believe that the larger the 
DNA database the more effective it will be, that any minor inconvenience to people is 
justified and that having one’s DNA on a database causes no great shame (Hepple, 
2009). The judges of the ECHR took issue with the retention of samples and data from 
people who had not been convicted of an offence and ”that the potential incompatibility 
with respect to the existing retention provisions within PACE was their blanket and 
indiscriminate nature” (Higgins & Tatham, 2009 p.215). The conflict between the 
English court and the European court relates to whether the end justifies the means. All 
the English courts summed up their decisions by saying that the retention was necessary 
to prevent crime, protect the wellbeing of the country or that the public need 
outweighed the individual’s rights. The European court disagreed with this, believing 
that the English legislation failed to “strike a balance between the competing public and 
private interests” (Hepple, 2009, p.256). Foster and Steventon (2009) argue that the 
English Government will need to formulate a legislative response to ensure that the 
detection and prosecution of crime is able to balance the privacy and fair-trial rights 
with the public interest (as discussed in Chapter 1.5). They also suggest that “the 
domestic courts may need to take a less deferential and more balanced approach in such 
cases” (p.217). According to the English judges, the science of DNA is legitimate and 
the law is legitimate but the ECHR argues that it is the application of the law that is not 
legitimate.    
The UK Government will need to be very sure that the laws governing the taking and 
retaining of DNA samples are justified. This justification will need to be seen in the 
results, successes or effectiveness of the national DNA databank. GeneWatch UK 
(2010) accuses the government of misleading the public about the benefits of expanding 
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the national DNA databank which now includes the records of about one million people 
who have never been convicted of a crime. GeneWatch UK (2010) states that crimes 
brought to court following DNA matches have not increased since 2002/03 despite the 
DNA database more than doubling in size. Coupled with a judgment from the ECHR 
that criticises the laws, it may be more difficult to continue to convince the British 
public of the efficacy of such all-encompassing laws. The public may be even less 
inclined to support laws that allow the DNA sample of an 11-year-old boy never 
convicted of an offence to remain on a database. It is at this level that the police need to 
be sure that what they are doing has the support of the majority of the citizenry. By 
following this course of action the police are making their work more difficult. They 
can be seen as negligent, irrational or unnecessary if they lack acceptable legitimate 
accounts of their activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1991). In this case how do you persuade 
the citizenry that what you are doing is good for them if you cannot prove it? Moreover, 
what standard can the public expect from the police if they do not know what that 
standard should be? 
 
8.5   Discussion  
Chan’s adaptation of field and habitus was chosen as a theoretical framework for this 
thesis to explain the behaviour of the police when confronted with new technology. This 
framework has limitations in that it cannot explain each and every finding of the 
research.  The culture (habitus) and the environment (field) have a role to play but this 
does not remove individual personalities, limited skill sets and personal accountability 
at all levels within the organisation. The organisation has a responsibility to provide the 
staff with the tools and training to do their job. However, individuals are responsible for 
their own performances and likewise those in positions of responsibility should be held 
accountable for their performance and the performance of their staff. This would 
include the attendance at training and the acknowledgement and application of national 
policies.  It is also the case that differences between individuals and differences in the 
organisational structure will be mitigated by the overall police culture in that people do 
not work in a void.  All individuals work within the New Zealand Police organisation 
which means they are part of the structures, they assist with the design and they 
perpetuate this culture.  Therefore, for reasons already stated above, all the findings 
cannot be attributed to police culture but having an understanding of the role culture 
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plays within the Police and the limitations it may impose can assist with understanding 
the results. 
 
This chapter has reviewed how historically the police have introduced technology to 
their organisation and for what reasons. It has also discussed what may impede its 
ability to successfully adopt new technologies. For example, police culture informs how 
the police will be able to adapt their processes to allow for new technologies (Chan, 
2001; Chan, 2003). Linked to this is the police history of introducing new technology 
for a variety of reasons and, depending on what those reasons are, ensuring the success 
or failure of the introduction (Innes, Field & Cope, 2005). Therefore if the technology 
relates to something that the police believe is part of their core function, this will assist 
in the successful implementation of the technology. It is identifying this core function 
that may prove to be difficult as the police has a view of what its role is within society 
and at times the reality is that this may be more social worker (Skolnick, 1966; 
Waddington, 1999; Westmarland, 2008) than avenging angel, although the police would 
probably prefer the latter. The police create their own field well: their own niche within 
the overall field or working environment that is comfortable to them and allows them to 
continue with the same habitus or culture that they know. When changes are made that 
push them outside their usual frame of reference, the struggle to cope may lead to them 
reverting back to what they know. Therefore, what the technology is used for is a key to 
the level of enthusiasm with which it will be embraced (Chan, 2001, Chan, 2003, Chan 
et al, 2001; Davis, 1989; Colvin & Goh, 2005; Nunn, 2001a). If the technology supports 
action-oriented policing (new weapons, new cars, radios) it may be more readily 
accepted; however, if the technology is introduced to monitor performance the 
enthusiasm will lessen. The advent of DNA was readily accepted by the police as a 
great tool to solve crime but, in order for DNA to be used effectively, processes and 
procedures that the police are not traditionally fond of needed to be completed. If the 
field changes and it impacts on the habitus, the police will struggle to cope with DNA 
and its full benefits will never be realised. However, the police are not beyond change 
and, given the right strategies for coping, these changes can be effected. 
Also discussed in this chapter has been the importance of police legitimacy which is 
paramount in the effectiveness and success of the police as they rely heavily on 
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information from the public to be able to do their job. In order to keep public support, 
the police need to behave in a manner that is acceptable to the community and this sets 
the outer limits. Research has shown that the public want to be treated fairly by the 
police (Hough, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) and that they are more concerned with 
procedural fairness than the number of people arrested or convicted (Smith, 2007; Tyler, 
2006). It is important to remember that what distinguishes the police from other state 
services is their power to use coercive force. The community needs to be able to 
supervise that use of force in order to be reassured that the police are being fair in the 
use of their power. Herbert (2006) posits that the police are willingly given this 
authority by the public so they can be protected from the less-savoury members of their 
community. In addition, the police do not have enough resources to actively police the 
entire community so they rely on citizens to provide them with information so that they 
can catch criminals or even prevent crime.   
The successful integration of new technology depends on what changes are made to the 
police culture. There needs to be a real understanding of the environment as well as the 
attitudes. The police are capable of change if they are assisted through this 
transformation (Chan, 2010). If the organisational framework is established and there is 
support from supervisors, the culture will shift to accommodate the change. Chan agrees 
that the police are able to change but it is important when new technology is introduced 
that new frameworks are implemented to manage this change. These rules need to 
include the reason for the technology, what it will bring to the organisation, what it will 
bring to society and what it will bring to the officers. Only then will the police be able 
to legitimately make the best use of DNA technology to investigate crime.  
The following chapter will provide the summation of this research. It reiterates the 
research question, picking out the key points to ensure the research question has been 
answered. The Discussion chapter provides updates to some themes that have been 
mentioned in the thesis as well as making recommendations for the police to improve its 
use of DNA technology to investigate crime. The chapter concludes with suggestions 
for future research.
188 
 
Chapter 9: Discussion 
9.0   Introduction 
This research has answered the question "Does Police Culture Prevent the New Zealand 
Police from Making the Best Use of DNA Technology to Investigate Crime?" 
International literature confirms that DNA is an effective means by which to identify 
offenders and the police should make better use of it (see Dunsmuir et al, 2008; Goulka 
et al, 2010; McCulloch, 1996; Roman et al 2008; Smith & Flannigan, 2000; Tilly & 
Ford, 1996; Williams, 2004; Wilson et al, 2011). This research has uniquely added to 
the international literature through a New Zealand case study and the results of this 
study will be reviewed in this chapter. The thesis has looked at the police use of DNA 
technology using four key themes: the police use of technology, the organisational 
framework for the use of this technology, police culture (using the theoretical construct 
of Chan’s”field and habitus” of policing) and the outer limits placed on the police by the 
public – legitimacy. These four key themes and their implications are summarised in 
this chapter. 
 
As a starting point to the research, the New Zealand national DNA database was 
reviewed to establish if the police make use of the information stored there. However, 
the effectiveness of the database in itself was not within scope of the study.  The 
achievements and weaknesses of the New Zealand database have been discussed in the 
thesis (see Chapters 1. Sections 1.4.1 and 1.10) as a means of giving context to this 
study. More importantly, the creation of this database for use by the police cannot be 
looked at in isolation as there are many implications for the police whenever any 
different technology is introduced to the organisation (Manning, 1992). Moreover, DNA 
has proven to be a very emotional subject and as a consequence the impact on the 
community cannot be underestimated (Kimmelman, 2000). The introduction of DNA 
evidence by the police has had implications for the government, the police and the 
community and it is essential that the issues raised by all parties involved are addressed. 
It is also important to look at how the police have historically introduced new 
technology, why there has been a need for this technology and the impact this 
implementation has had on the organisation. A key component of this is the resistance 
of police culture (habitus) to change when new technology is introduced.  
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Having an understanding of the impact of previous technological advances on the police 
may give a better insight as to why DNA technology may not be fully appreciated or 
maximised by staff. Likewise, it is also beneficial to understand the effect previous law 
changes have had on certain sections of society and why, as a consequence, they may be 
reluctant to embrace such changes. In this final chapter the main threads of the research 
presented in previous chapters will be discussed separately and then drawn together. 
Due to the dynamic nature of the subject topic there will also be comment made on 
some of the recent changes in legislation and processes within the New Zealand Police. 
At the end of this chapter there are recommendations about how the New Zealand 
Police could make better use of DNA by the tightening of processes employed in the 
application of DNA evidence. Considerations for future research are also made. 
 
9.1   Explanation no. 1: Police Use of Technology and the Limitations to Use of 
DNA because of the Field and Habitus of Policing  
In answering the research question, one of the key issues to emerge was why the police 
continue to struggle when trying to effect change. This cultural resistance to change is at 
both middle-management and front-line level. A resistance to change can prevent the 
implementation of sound business practices. This leads to limited buy-in from staff as 
they do not perceive the value of this new technology (Chan, 1997; Mastrofski & 
Uchida, 1993). Throughout its history there have been changes in the police 
organisation for a variety of reasons. These range from purely budgetary considerations 
to a desire to modernise and, with the advances in technology to assist, to become an 
effective and modern police service (Chan, 2001; Colton, 1973; Innes et al, 2005; 
Manning, 1992). Even though the field the police inhabit may change (and has often 
done so) the habitus, which is their guiding rule, struggles to change and this may 
impede successful change management. It has been discussed at length in Chapter 8 that 
police culture should not always be considered a bad thing and according to 
Waddington (1999a) this culture exists to enable police officers to do their work. 
However, in this instance the focus is on how the culture can prevent the successful 
application of DNA technology.  
 
The interview participants were of the opinion that DNA was a great tool, one of many 
that they could use to investigate crime. They did not believe that the police were 
resourced or trained well enough to make full use of the technology. They believed that 
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the legislation was complicated, resulting in paperwork that was too arduous to support 
the use of DNA. Another common theme was that the officers were too busy to 
interview suspects and needed to get back out on the streets. Whether they really were 
too busy or preferred to be out on the streets is debateable but certainly police do see 
being on the streets as ”real policing” and exactly where they should be, not inside 
doing paperwork. The case files illustrated that it did not matter what legislation or 
training were available because the police still did not make use of DNA evidence and 
appeared to be content to close a file (stop working on it) even when the file contained a 
named suspect. What should happen is that such a file should not be closed until it has 
been resolved in some way. This highlights the difference of attitude between the police 
hierarchy or policy makers and the front-line staff who have a different view as to what 
they should be doing (Reuss-Ianni 1983). DNA is among many other tools available to 
them to investigate crime but while the police do have an organisational framework to 
ensure practices, processes and directives are in place to make the best use of this 
technology, this is no guarantee that staff will abide by these processes. This was 
evidenced by one participant in chapter 7, section 7.1 who said she did not agree with 
the initial policy regarding the taking of DNA samples so she ignored it.  This was only 
one participant’s view out of 28 but it is still worthy of note and not an uncommon 
phenomenon as research has shown (see Grant & Rowe, 2011 and Reuss-Ianni 1983). 
The police say that they are using DNA technology and have exploited some high-
profile cases to hail its benefits, yet recent research has shown that greater success could 
be achieved if it is used well to investigate volume crime (Wilson et al., 2011; Roman et 
al., 2008). The high-profile cases reviewed in Chapters 1 sections 1.4.1 and 1.10. refer 
to serious crimes which interview participants already acknowledge receive more 
resources and therefore achieve greater success. However, it has been articulated by the 
interview participants that less resources are directed to the investigation of volume 
crime even with DNA technology. This is in spite of successive New Zealand 
governments promising more DNA legislation to assist police to investigate volume 
crime (see Chapter 1 section 1.5) 
 
Why and how technology has been introduced into the police has implications for either 
its success or failure. Early technology was seen as a way of improving the service to 
the public as it would enable the police to respond to calls more quickly (Uchida, 2004). 
At a time when the police were unable to exactly account for their work, information 
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technology was seen as a way of monitoring the work of the police to ensure their 
accountability (Manning 1996). Overall there was a belief within the police that the 
introduction of information technology gave them a professional veneer, albeit at a 
superficial level. This introduction of technology, any technology, allowed them to 
pretend that they were making changes to their work practices (Dixon, 1998; Willis, 
Mastrofski & Weisburd, 2007). The police may be willing to make changes but 
preferably without making any changes to their methods of policing.   
 
The police are action oriented and will accept the introduction of technology that will 
enable this style of policing. A technology budget that was mostly spent on weapons 
and transport may support this argument (Manning, 2001).  However, the police appear 
uninterested in technology that will keep them from being on the street. The participants 
in this research have expressed the view that staff do not have the time to interview 
suspected burglars because they need to be back out on the street. Why they have this 
need has not been expressed but it may be that the desire is there rather than the need. 
Likewise, the organisational framework for the use of DNA technology has not been set 
up to encourage its effective use. The inability to embed organisational processes to 
enable efficient use of technology results in a reluctance by staff to change their 
behaviours. This may cause the police to revert back to old behaviours which in turn can 
result in the circumvention of any loosely applied new processes. This may be a 
subconscious reaction to continue to police in a certain fashion but can certainly be 
linked with the habitus of policing. Staff are comfortable working within an 
environment they know. If they are not given any guidelines to cope with changes to 
this environment they will struggle to use the new tools (Chan, 1997). 
 
If the police struggle to make effective use of new technology, they appear to have even 
less interest in information technology. As discussed in Chapter 8 section 8.2.1, the 
advent of information technology meant that the police became information gatherers 
and found themselves in the frustrating position of gathering data for use by other 
agencies (Chan, 2003; Ericson, 1994; Manning, 2001). This was not the original plan 
for information technology. What began as a means of quantifying and managing their 
work quickly became subverted for other purposes which in some cases increased the 
work load of the police (Ericson, 1994; Haggerty & Ericson, 1999; Sheptycki, 1998). 
The potential for the police to use computer technology to gather intelligence and make 
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informed patrolling decisions has never been fully realised (Ratcliffe, 2003). The police 
find themselves in a difficult position: they want and need technology but other factors 
can impede their ability to successfully utilise this. At this point police culture can play 
a part in the successful application of new technology. If the right support and training 
are given to staff and processes put in place to encourage and enhance the technology, 
then it can be successful (Goulielmous, 2005; Small, 2000).   
 
9.2   Explanation number 2: Police Legitimacy: Setting the Outer Limits: What the 
Thesis Can Tell About This Effect 
The relationship between the police and the community is symbiotic in that they should 
derive mutual benefits from each other. Generally, society will respect and value the 
police because they believe that the police will protect them from the bad elements of 
society (Herbert, 2006). However, there is also a desire from the community to be 
treated fairly and with respect by the police and the police rely on the community to 
provide them with information (Smith. 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004). 
The police need this support to be effective. The support will continue only if the police 
do not abuse their position of trust and power. This becomes even more significant 
when the police request greater powers in order to be more effective in their work. If 
these increased police powers have an impact on anatomical privacy there may be 
concern voiced by the public. 
 
DNA involves a biological sample and this usually elicits an emotional response for 
either cultural and/or ethical reasons. This biological sample can indicate a propensity 
for illness, possibly indicate the physical characteristics of a person, identify the 
provenance of someone and be used to link families (Kimmelman, 2000). All the above 
can make people very uneasy and, even if most of it can be mitigated, it is still a 
contentious subject. It is easy for the police and the government to make generalised 
statements that DNA is a great tool for identifying offenders and that it will be used 
only for the reason it was intended. To assuage some of this fear it is important that the 
police understand these concerns and establish what it is the community wants from 
them.  If the public expect the police to be a legitimate and trustworthy entity, then the 
police need to be seen to use their powers fairly and effectively.  
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There was a belief within the police that the introduction of new technology would 
improve their professional standing in the community (Chan, 2001; Harper, 1991; 
Manning, 1992; Uchida. 2004). However, there seems to be a disconnection between 
the police and the community. What the police believe is important may not be what the 
community deems to be so. Ironically, the introduction of more technology has added to 
this disconnection by appearing to remove the police from the community (Kelling, 
1978). As well as enhancing their professional image, technology was also meant to 
assist the police to identify, arrest and charge offenders. If criminals had access to the 
latest technology in order to commit crime, then the police should make use of the latest 
technology to identify them (Nunn, 2001b). Arguably this could lead to an increase in 
the resolution rate of crimes investigated which the police continue to use as a 
benchmark of their success.  This is in spite of the research conducted in the US which 
showed that what the public most wanted from the police was procedural fairness 
(Smith, 2007).  This might signal a widening gulf between police and community.   
 
The public disorder in England in the early 1980s led to an inquiry which identified the 
frustration felt by people who believed they were being unfairly targeted by the police 
(Scarman, 1981). This feeling of unfair treatment brought allegations of breaches of 
human rights. Likewise the application of the UK legislation to obtain and retain DNA 
samples led to court proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It 
was decided by this court that the UK was breaching the human rights of its people. In 
its findings, the ECHR stated that the UK legislation led to the blanket application of the 
law which did not have regard for the individual’s right to privacy (Higgins & Tatham, 
2009).  At the heart of the decision making by the UK government regarding its DNA 
legislation is the belief that the bigger the DNA database the more effective it is at 
identifying offenders which in turn will solve crime and subsequently lead to a 
reduction in crime. However, the size of the database in isolation is not the true measure 
of its success. A combination of having the right people on the database, more crime 
scenes attended, more samples lifted and robust systems in place to deal with the 
intelligence links would be the true measure of its success. This clear-up rate of 
unsolved crimes is the true measure of the success of DNA technology to investigate 
crime. It is important to remember that law changes have an impact on people and the 
concept that the rights of the many outweigh the rights of the few has historically been 
devastating to certain sections of society (Duster, 2006; Noble, 2009; Simoncelli, 2011; 
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Washington, 2010). The governance and application of DNA technology are vital to the 
legitimacy of the police, as is the effective use of DNA to resolve and reduce crime. 
 
9.3   DNA Public Understandings  
The breakthrough in the understanding of how genes work has proven to be a bonus for 
many reasons. Genetics have helped to identify and therefore rectify or prevent birth 
defects. However, history has shown that this same science has been used for nefarious 
purposes with Hitler's policies being one of the most repugnant examples, but it was the 
application of this science rather than the science itself that was questionable. This was 
also an issue with the discovery of the DNA fingerprint.  Jeffreys believed that his 
discovery would be of significant importance in assisting with the identification of 
people and could be put to good use (Jeffreys et al, 1985). In its early phases it had 
some successes that made it seem an infallible tool for identifying people. However, it 
needed to be tested in the courts before it could be accepted as reliable evidence. There 
were several instances when it was not applied correctly, both procedurally and 
scientifically (Imwinkelrid, 1991; Lander & Budowle, 1994; Lander, 1989; Lynch & 
Jasanoff, 1998). Juries needed to understand that DNA is found at very few crime 
scenes with the figure being estimated at less than 1% (House of Commons Home 
Office Affairs Committee, 2010). This would add to the probative value of DNA but 
often jurors did not understand the minutiae of the DNA evidence and neither did the 
judges or barristers. For these reasons it is very important that there are robust systems 
in place to ensure that DNA evidence is used ethically is enacted to support the 
obtaining and storing of a person’s DNA. There need to be informed discussion and 
consultation regarding the creation, maintenance and governance of DNA databases. 
People need to believe that this legislation is required and that it will be implemented in 
a fair manner.  It is important to acknowledge the fears of the population especially 
when some sections of society have historically been marginalised by certain laws. The 
application of DNA evidence cannot be taken lightly and this links with the need for the 
police to be seen as legitimate by all sections of society, specifically those sections 
which have less reason to trust the police. In New Zealand this would be Maori and 
Pacific peoples, evidenced by one participant who indicated a preference for using 
racial profiling to decide from whom to take DNA samples.  
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The concept of function creep is an important aspect in terms of DNA legislation (Dahl 
& Saetnan, 2009; McCartney, 2004; Briody 2004). Any increase in police powers to 
obtain and retain DNA needs to be very tight and carefully implemented.  The 
legislation needs to state clearly what the police may do and it is important that the 
police apply these laws in the spirit in which they were intended. This should strengthen 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The advent of familial linking is an example 
of function creep as this was not what the databases were initially intended for and were 
not specifically legislated to include. Commentators fear that people may come under 
genetic surveillance by the police, the government or private companies looking to 
make a profit based on this information which raises concerns that the initial rationale to 
establish DNA databases has been expanded without proper consultation (Krimsky & 
Simoncelli, 2011; Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010). The fear is that without strict controls 
the information contained in these databases could be used for purposes other than those 
intended. This is why lengthy consultation is required when the subject of DNA is 
debated. It is also why it is important to be able to show the community how effective 
DNA has been in the identification and prosecution of offenders because if the database 
is not being used effectively there is little reason for laws that allow citizens’ rights to 
privacy to be used in this way. 
 
9.4   Burglary   
The New Zealand Government and the New Zealand Police have stated that a reduction 
in burglaries is a priority (Controller & Auditor General, 2006). Both acknowledge that 
burglaries have an impact on the victims’ quality of life and that burglaries are a volume 
crime. Burglaries in all jurisdictions have a low resolution rate and it is noted that some 
burglars may move on to commit more serious crimes (Zedlewski & Murphy, 2006). 
For these reasons there is a real desire to reduce burglaries. With the introduction of 
Prevention First (2011) the police are still committed to reducing the number of victims 
of crime and an increase in the number of burglary resolutions would be a proactive 
way to use DNA technology in order to assist with the reduction of victims. This 
increase was to be achieved by attendance at all burglaries, more crime-scene samples 
being sent to the ESR and a quicker turnaround time from the ESR. While the police 
showed improved attendance and the ESR improved their turnaround times, there is no 
evidence to suggest that more burglars were arrested or that there was a reduction in 
burglaries. The request to the government by the police for more powers to take DNA 
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samples was predicated on the police being able to apprehend more burglars and 
therefore reduce volume crime. As shown in Chapter 4, the police have failed to 
improve their resolution rates in relation to reported burglary offences. What has been 
shown is that DNA is a good tool for identifying offenders but the police have not been 
able to arrest those offenders. This study indicates that the police struggle to cope with 
the work load although not all participants accepted this and believed it was just an 
excuse. The police have made changes to the way in which they investigate burglary by 
ensuring that every scene is attended and forensically examined, where possible, and 
this has resulted in more crime-scene samples being sent to the ESR.  However, the 
police are able to get only half the process right. What happens to the information 
received from the ESR is an important aspect of this process and it is at this point that 
the police appear to lose momentum. There is no evidence to suggest they are 
overwhelmed by the work, or at least not all the time, but rather revert to what they are 
most comfortable with, which is to give the appearance of  making the best use of DNA 
technology.  However, when the layers are peeled back it becomes obvious that in 
reality the police fail to fully make use of DNA evidence to investigate and resolve 
crime. 
 
9.5   The Use of DNA to Investigate Serious Crime 
It has already been stated in chapter 6 section 1 that there were a limited number of 
serious crime files available for this research. However, as described, this number 
should not impact on the ability to draw useful conclusions from those files that were 
available.  The participants in the interviews believe that DNA technology is a good 
method for the identification of suspects. They also state that DNA is just one tool 
which can assist them to investigate crime. In fact, the majority of those interviewed 
believed that police officers were the most useful crime-fighting tool as DNA was not a 
replacement for basic investigative tools. The participants were referring to interviewing 
people, conducting search warrants and knocking on doors in order to conduct a full and 
thorough investigation.  The participants’ responses suggest that it would be more 
beneficial to invest in people rather than in technology. Although the technology is of 
use, if staff are not there to use it, it could become redundant very quickly. While it was 
acknowledged that DNA is very effective in identifying offenders in serious crime, 
DNA evidence alone should not be relied upon to take a case to court. It was noted by 
the participants that DNA evidence had some excellent uses.  If a case included DNA 
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evidence, an offender would sometimes plead guilty which meant that the victim was 
spared the distress of having to give evidence. The police did not have to cast such a 
wide net as DNA evidence narrowed the search area which resulted in a less labour-
intensive enquiry. As shown in Chapter 6, DNA evidence appeared to be more effective 
in relation to serious crime in that it was used to successfully prosecute or in some cases 
eliminate suspects. Serious crime types have a higher resolution rate than volume crime 
and those investigating serious crime appear to have more resources and fewer 
budgetary constraints than those investigating volume crime (see Chapter 6 section 6.2). 
If this level of resource was given to volume crime the resolution rate might well be 
higher. 
 
9.6   The Operational Use of DNA: How it Works on the Ground  
DNA evidence is very effective for identification. There have been many examples 
given previously on the successes of DNA in identifying offenders, including cold cases 
both in New Zealand and abroad.  But how successful are the New Zealand Police in 
using DNA evidence to fight crime and what are the obstructions to this successful 
application? Participants like DNA technology but they all cautioned its use.  They 
stated that once a DNA result is received is when the real investigative work begins; the 
police are overwhelmed with work and cannot cope with results received from the ESR 
and the paperwork involved in taking DNA samples is confusing and time consuming. 
DNA technology has the potential to be very effective in investigating crime but, like all 
technology, there is no guarantee that the police use of it will be successful. Paperwork, 
work load and expectations can all make this technology less effective. 
 
9.7   The Perceived Constraints on the Use of DNA 
DNA evidence is effective at identifying suspects so should be used all the time but if 
not then some questions should be asked as to why not. Certainly the legislation has 
been amended over the years to enable the police to make better use of DNA 
technology. However, some of the participants interviewed felt that DNA should be 
taken from everyone arrested as soon as they were brought in to the police station. It 
was believed that by doing this their identity would be confirmed. This cannot be done 
as the technology does not allow the police to instantly identify a person using DNA 
although it can be done with fingerprints as the supporting technology is available. A 
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couple of the participants stated that it would be good if the police had access to the 
Guthrie Test database as the bigger the database the better it is for identifying offenders. 
The New Zealand database proves this concept to be wrong. The largest database in the 
world does not have the highest hit rate. New Zealand has the highest hit rate, proving 
that what is important is a combination of the right profiles on the database and as many 
crime-scene samples as can be gathered. 
 
9.8   Updates: Post-field Work Developments  
The technology involved in the use of DNA evidence continues to be updated and 
upgraded which is equally true of the science of DNA. The DNA legislation in New 
Zealand has also had several iterations, giving the police more powers to obtain and 
store DNA profiles.  As this legislation has changed the police have altered some of its 
processes to coincide with these changes. Some of these changes have been made at the 
suggestion of audits or reviews conducted by government departments such as the 
Auditor General (2004), as discussed in Chapter 4. Many of these changes have 
impacted on the way in which police deal with DNA evidence and for this reason and in 
order to put the research in context some of these updates are addressed in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
Investigative Interviewing 
In 2008 the New Zealand Police implemented an investigative interviewing strategy to 
improve interviewing, the quality of investigations and professionalism of staff 
(Cunningham, 2010, p.7). The New Zealand Police used the PEACE model which was 
adapted from the English model of the same name. The PEACE acronym relates to the 
different stages of an interview:  
• Plan and prepare  
• Engage and explain  
• Account  
• Close 
• Evaluate (Cunningham, 2010)   
This training was implemented with the aim of having constables qualified to a level 
where they would be able to interview suspects, victims and witnesses using a set 
system. The intent was to have all district staff trained by December 2010. One of the 
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perceived benefits of the PEACE framework was obtaining more information from the 
person being interviewed. The evaluation of this training showed that there was an 
increase in staff confidence in their interviewing skills (Cunningham, 2010). This 
implementation strategy would go some way to mitigating the belief expressed by a 
number of participants interviewed that police officers were either incapable or lacked 
confidence in interviewing suspects. This implementation strategy also suggests that the 
organisation now has an expectation that officers will see interviewing as an integral 
part of their job. From this it is expected that a DNA alert would be dealt with 
expeditiously and a suspect would not be released until that alert was resolved 
satisfactorily. The researcher was told by some police officers that the belief amongst 
them is that the PEACE model is now outdated and no longer in use by many 
jurisdictions but this is anecdotal evidence and was not pursued further. 
 
ESR Turnaround Times 
The New Zealand Police and the ESR had an agreed turnaround time of six to eight 
weeks for DNA analysis during the research timeframe.  The files examined 
demonstrated that the ESR was very consistent with these timeframes but this did not 
appear to have any impact on the police’s ability to apprehend or charge the identified 
suspects. However, if the ESR was able to speed up these timeframes, identifying and 
interviewing a suspect as soon as possible after the offence could allow the police to 
recover property and possibly prevent further offending. Therefore a pilot model was 
established in April 2010 in one New Zealand police district to test the feasibility of the 
ESR changing its turnaround time from six to eight weeks to five days.  This project 
worked so well it was decided that the national turnaround time should be five days. 
This research did not cover this period and it is not known what effect the five-day 
turnaround has had on the work load of the police in relation to DNA intelligence links. 
 
Gatekeepers 
It was noted in the files that officers sent samples to the ESR when other evidence was 
available and DNA was clearly superfluous to the investigation. The police tread a fine 
line when deciding what evidence should be presented before the court.  Due to the 
ubiquitous TV shows that publicise the use of DNA evidence and erroneously suggest 
that DNA is found at all crime scenes, the expectations of jurors have been heightened. 
The police are required to present the best possible evidence to the court in order to 
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prove an extensive investigation.  However, every sample that is sent to the ESR costs 
the New Zealand Police money and therefore careful consideration does need to be 
given before a sample is sent for analysis. Due to these fiscal constraints the police have 
discretion as to what samples are appropriate for sending to the ESR. The evidential 
value of the sample would be a guiding factor. The topic of budget was discussed in the 
interviews with participants acknowledging the need for fiscal responsibility. In order to 
prevent superfluous samples being sent off for analysis, the New Zealand Police has 
now put systems in place to ensure that this is the exception rather than the rule. The 
National Forensics Manager for the New Zealand Police states that designated detective 
senior sergeants are the gatekeepers between the police and the ESR and should be 
sending only relevant samples to it. As well as the financial implications, he cautioned 
that with the new turnaround timeframes the last thing needed is a backlog at the ESR. 
It is also clear that the police are not able to deal with the current work load so adding to 
it would only cause greater strain on the budget limitations and time pressures currently 
faced by officers. 
 
National Intelligence Application Updates 
The police computer has been upgraded so that the details of crime scenes can now be 
entered onto it as well as what samples, if any, were found at the scene. This has 
enabled forensics to be tracked more readily than previously. The system allows for 
DNA samples and scene updates to be logged in the NIA.  However, it is still not able to 
be updated with the results from the ESR.  The police have many competing priorities 
when they are upgrading their computer. These are managed as well as they can be but 
there are always extra unexpected pressures placed on them, such as the Rugby World 
Cup being hosted by New Zealand. Upgrade work on the police computer that was 
earmarked for forensics had to be set aside for specific Rugby World Cup 
enhancements. However, this juggling of priorities is the reality for any police 
jurisdiction.  
 
Some of the changes that have been discussed within this thesis were made to enable the 
police to make better use of DNA whilst acknowledging the many demands placed on 
the police for improved technology. The accepted norm (by the police) was that they 
(the police) were already making good use of it but these changes would enhance this 
use. It has already been discussed that although there may be policy and guidelines for 
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officers to follow, this is no guarantee that they will if the front-line do not subscribe to 
the philosophy (see chapter 2 section 2.0 & chapter 7 section 7.1).  The investigative 
interviewing training now provided to all officers removes the excuse of officers not 
interviewing suspects with a DNA alert because they lack the skills.  However, this will 
not necessarily change the behaviour of officers if the staff are not held to account for 
not following this policy. Changes in legislation and faster turnaround times by the ESR 
should compliment police use of DNA. But once again, if there is no accountability or a 
desire to improve their performance, these changes will have no obvious impact on how 
the police investigate crime.   
 
9.9   Recommendations 
The successful application of DNA technology to the New Zealand Police depends on a 
number of factors. These factors, which are not specific to the New Zealand Police but 
are also relevant to many jurisdictions, include police culture, legislation and training. 
The New Zealand national DNA database is effective. It has the highest hit rate in the 
world, indicating that it contains the right profiles. The relationship between the ESR 
and the police appears to work well with agreed timeframes consistently being met. The 
quality of analysis is of a high standard, as noted by the ASCLD/Lab accreditation.  
These make for a credible database. Unlike the UK's database, it is not alleged that the 
database holds DNA profiles from innocent people. However, this research has 
identified that if a person's DNA is found at the scene of a crime that is no guarantee 
they will be interviewed regarding this intelligence link. The most telling data within the 
research was that suspects were repeatedly being arrested and brought to the police 
station yet they were never interviewed over the intelligence link noted on the police 
computer.  The police understand and value the use of DNA as a good method by which 
to identify a suspect. This is evidenced by the financial investment made by the police 
in its forensic budget as well as by the requests from the police to the government for 
more powers to retain DNA profiles. The benefits of DNA technology have already 
been highlighted several times in this thesis and it is clearly appreciated by the New 
Zealand Police. However, there is a breakdown in the application of DNA and in the 
information contained within the national DNA database. The New Zealand Police have 
made some changes in the way they utilise DNA technology.   
• The ESR has a five-day turnaround 
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• There are gatekeepers within each district to enforce robust policy 
regarding what is sent to the ESR to prevent a potential backlog of work 
and waste of money 
• The police computer has been updated to log and track DNA samples 
obtained from people, to log crime-scene samples, where they were 
located and by whom and when the samples were sent to the ESR  
• Intelligence links received from the ESR are now electronic in order to 
streamline delivery 
Many computer updates and processes have been employed to improve the use of DNA 
evidence. However, dealing with the intelligence link once it has been received from the 
ESR still does not appear to be a priority and the National Manager of Forensics is still 
unable to discover the overall outcome of these intelligence links. Suspects are still 
entered on to the police computer as linked to a crime scene with no guarantee that they 
will be actively pursued or interviewed should they come to police attention. Even with 
the above improvements, the New Zealand Police are still unable to state how many 
people have been convicted due to DNA evidence or the time taken from initial police 
attendance at a crime to a final disposition. This would suggest that this research still 
remains relevant until the New Zealand Police are in a position to provide answers to 
the above statement.   The police use of DNA technology to investigate crime is only 
partially effective. They will not make the best use of it until they commit to proactively 
responding to the intelligence links received from the ESR.  
 To fully realise the benefits of DNA technology, districts need to: 
• Inform staff of the value of DNA evidence and its level of importance within 
the New Zealand Police strategic framework 
• Implement a clear organisational framework for the use of DNA technology 
• Fully train staff on the processes/technology/paper work and organisational 
expectations required to successfully use DNA technology 
• Prioritise intelligence links received from the ESR using the current tasking 
and co-ordination framework of the New Zealand Police 
• If an alert has been entered on to the NIA and that person is arrested, they 
cannot be released without the alert being dealt with in a significant manner 
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• If an alert is to be put on the NIA a full investigation file must be completed 
and the information entered on to the NIA so that when the person is arrested 
they can be interviewed 
• Managers within the New Zealand Police should be fully informed as to 
what the police are trying to achieve by using DNA technology 
• Managers within the New Zealand Police should ensure that the above 
actions are complied with in their district  
There needs to be accountability and direction from the leadership of the New Zealand 
Police that DNA is a priority and that districts need to task their staff accordingly Staff 
need the right support, guidance and training to maximise DNA technology and to apply 
it fairly without jeopardising the legitimacy of the police. Supporting staff with training 
and clear direction will not dramatically alter their fields and not require a change to the 
habitus. Therefore the culture will be supportive and there will be buy-in from front-line 
staff (Chan, 2001). 
 
9.10   Further Research 
The New Zealand Police would benefit from more research in the way they make use of 
DNA technology to investigate crime. This research should involve a larger number of 
files and a greater number of interview subjects including examples of metropolitan, 
provincial and rural stations. Incorporating these different styles of policing would 
ensure a comprehensive view of what the New Zealand Police actually do with DNA 
technology. A key aspect to the research should be extracting specific figures from the 
NIA which tracks the outcome for suspects who have a DNA alert against their name.  
It would be beneficial to the research to include stakeholders and partner agencies in the 
study. Interviewing people from the wider justice sector on their views of DNA use in 
court proceedings, including judges and barristers, would provide a viewpoint from a 
partner agency. Given that one officer indicated it was acceptable to practice racial 
profiling, it would seem that a further study should take other stakeholders into 
consideration. The opportunity to hear first hand from New Zealand civil liberty and 
minority groups about their experiences, concerns and opinions on police use of DNA to 
investigate crime would add an invaluable dynamic to the research.  
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9.11   Conclusion: Has the Research Question Been Answered?  
Does Police Culture Prevent the New Zealand Police from Making the Best Use of 
DNA Technology to Investigate Crime?  The data obtained from the subject district 
indicates that, in at least one district, culture is one reason that may impede the police.  
However, the New Zealand Police is a national police service and, with the exception of 
certain nuances in each district, the process for applying DNA technology to the 
investigation of crime should be the same throughout the country.  The subject district is 
one of the largest districts in the country and it has the highest number of reported 
crimes. It has a high turnover of experienced staff leading to less likelihood of 
entrenched behaviour.  Therefore it is a fair assumption that if DNA technology is not 
being used well there it is not being used to good affect anywhere. For these reasons it 
can be concluded that the research has shown that, all rhetoric aside, the New Zealand 
Police fail to make the best use of DNA technology, especially to investigate volume 
crime.    
 
DNA has been used in the New Zealand Police for 15 years. It is no longer new 
technology and yet the police still appear to struggle with its effective application. 
Those interviewed state that DNA is a great investigative tool but that the police make 
its use too complicated. However, it does need to be stated that the police are bound by 
legislative requirements that can add to the complication. The participants said that the 
paperwork was too confusing or that staff were too busy to deal with alerts. Another 
reason was that staff either did not know how to interview or lacked confidence in their 
ability to interview. This combination of issues meant that the national DNA database 
was not being used effectively by the New Zealand Police. This is an example of what 
happens when technology is introduced and processes are not put in place before the 
new technology is rolled out: there is an inability or reluctance by the police to 
introduce an organisational framework for the use of this technology. When staff are 
unable to manage, they find other ways to cope which, in some instances, can mean 
subverting the system or ignoring it completely. This is when police culture disables the 
effective use of this technology. Chan (2001) would state that the rules of the game had 
changed and the police relied on coping mechanisms to survive. However, by changing 
the field but not altering the habitus these coping mechanisms are a way of making 
sense of these changes (Chan, 2007). Likewise, if the police choose to change the 
habitus without altering the field, once again they are doomed to failure (Waddington, 
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1999a). Both the field and the habitus need to be changed, if only slightly, in order to 
make sense of the ongoing progress in society that will impact on the police. Advances 
in technology are one such example and the cause of this study. A robust organisational 
framework for the use of DNA technology will help staff manage the field and therefore 
assist them with the required changes in their habitus.  
 
The police requested legislation from the government to support their use of DNA 
technology. As a result the police needed to make changes within their organisation to 
manage the use of DNA evidence. However, the government also imposed rules on the 
use of DNA evidence by the police in the form of legislative requirements. The police 
do not have control of these requirements which may place more pressure on the police 
to manage them. These changes included new legislation to support the taking and 
retaining of DNA samples, new paperwork to ensure the authenticity of the volunteer’s 
permission, more data entry to track the DNA evidence and more paper work when an 
intelligence link was received from the ESR. This caused the policing environment to 
change. Without the proper support the police would struggle to cope with the work as 
the rules had changed. One way to cope with this new environment was to ignore the 
changes and continue as before or make small changes so as to appear to have embraced 
them. On the surface the police appear to fully use DNA evidence but, in reality, in 
many cases they simply store the information without making any real effort to arrest 
the named suspects.  
 
This research has shown that the method by which the police capture statistics and the 
disparate approach to data entry have meant that the data reviewed is flawed and it has 
been difficult to get a clear picture on the use of DNA technology to resolve crime. 
Nonetheless, based on the limited data available (and acknowledging that there is a 
consistent application of flawed data)  it can be concluded that by using DNA the police 
have not been able to prevent crime and, in fact, when given a named suspect have still 
been unable to resolve a crime. Yet they have made attempts to improve their 
performance. The position of crime scene attendant was created specifically to enable 
victims of crime to receive a better service from the police. These CSAs primarily 
attend burglaries and forensically examine the scene with the purpose of identifying the 
offender. Scenes of crimes officers and CSAs have been encouraged to send as many 
samples as possible to the ESR, as the more samples that are sent the greater are the 
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chances of identifying a possible offender. Any recovered samples are sent to the ESR 
which responds to the police within the agreed time lines. These turnaround times have 
been decreased considerably in order to make the entire process more efficient. By the 
time intelligence links from the ESR are returned to the police time and money have 
been heavily invested in identifying the possible offender in order to resolve the crime 
and this has been the driving force behind the police use of DNA technology. 
 
DNA evidence is collected at less than 1% of crime scenes (House of Commons Home 
Office Affairs Committee, 2010). In New Zealand in 2005 the number of files notated 
as having DNA at the scene in the Auckland City District was 302.  This number was 
obtained from the 53,615 reported offences for that year (Statistics New Zealand, 2010). 
Of 8,920 burglaries reported 84 files had DNA attached to them. Of the 302 files, only 
146 were available for viewing. It was established that only 78 of these files had 
attached charges, meaning that the identified offenders had been arrested, charged and 
prosecuted. The remaining 68 files had alerts placed on them identifying them as files 
with named offenders whose DNA had been found at the scene of a crime.  The 
implication was that should these people come to the attention of the police they would 
be interviewed regarding the DNA evidence found at the crime scene. However, 55 files 
had named offenders stating that DNA evidence had been linked to them and a crime 
scene and although they had been in police custody, some several times, they had never 
been interviewed or charged for that offence. Given the already low percentage of DNA 
found at crime scenes and the investment made by the police in DNA technology, these 
figures are a shocking indictment.  These results question the commitment the police 
have made to use DNA to its fullest potential. In simple terms, a large amount of money 
and a great deal of time are spent in trying to identify an offender who may or may not 
be held to account for the offence to which they are connected. On a superficial level it 
appears that the police want to make the most of any technology that may assist them to 
solve crime.  However, the police as an organisation do not like change and they 
certainly do not like change invoked by new legislation being imposed on them. This 
reluctance to fully accept new legislation may well be an unconscious reaction rather 
than a determined refusal to accept outside influences. A perception of being too busy 
due to a lack of organisational support will result in the same inability to make full use 
of the technology. This puts the onus back on the police executive to fully engage their 
staff when making changes to their work environment.  
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 While the police are keen to introduce new technology they would prefer to use it 
without the need to change their processes. A desire to look professional does not 
automatically translate into a desire to change the style and method of policing and this 
impacts on the police’s ability to successfully implement change within the 
organisation. This style of policing may prevent them from fulfilling their promises to 
reduce crime, catch offenders and maximise DNA technology. Included with this is a 
failure to be conscientious in their use of DNA technology, thereby breaching the 
public’s trust and calling into question the need for legislative change. Although the 
introduction of investigative interviewing is a positive step for the police, there is still 
the need for a shift in mind set. The research results show that the police are willing to 
attend crime scenes (although for burglaries in the subject district this is carried out by 
non-sworn staff) and this appears to be carried out well as perhaps it is considered to be 
real police work. When the results are received by the police and it is time for 
paperwork, interviewing or locating the suspect, it is considered the more mundane side 
of policing at which they are less successful. Viewed from Chan’s field and habitus of 
policing, police culture can have an impact on the successful implementation of new 
technology. Police culture can impede change within the organisation as they have a 
definite comfort zone which does not allow any great change to their practices. This 
research has identified that police practices have not changed with the advent of DNA 
technology, thereby impeding the ability of police officers to realise the full benefits of 
DNA in investigating crime. The interview participants comment on being busy and the 
need to get back out on the streets. However, this view is merely one aspect of a greater 
issue which is the entrenched behaviour of the police that is encouraged by the lack of 
an organisational framework when introducing new technology. This research has 
discovered that despite all the time and energy the New Zealand Police have spent on 
DNA technology, they have not reduced crime or in some cases even solved crime in 
spite of their use of DNA technology.  The empirical evidence gathered from police 
files, interviews and other literature showed that although the New Zealand national 
DNA database functions as intended, the police do not make effective use of it. The 
New Zealand Police do not make the best use of DNA technology to investigate crime 
as an action-oriented police culture, combined with a lack of an enforced organisational 
framework for DNA use, and a lack of accountability for performance affects the desire 
and the ability to make the most of its potential. 
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Glossary 
ACPO                      Association of Chief Police Officers 
ASCLD/LAB          The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, Laboratory 
           Accreditation Board 
CCTV                       Closed Circuit TV 
CIB                           Criminal Investigation Branch 
CSA                          Crime Scene Attendant 
CSI                            Crime Scene Investigation 
DNA                         Deoxyribonucleic Acid 
ECHR                       European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR                      European Court of Human Rights 
ESR                           Environmental Science and Research Ltd 
FGC                          Family Group Conference 
FBI                           Federal Bureau of Investigation 
INCIS                       Integrated National Crime Information System 
LAPD                       Los Angeles Police Department 
LCN                         Low Copy Number 
LET                          Law Enforcement Team 
LES                          Law Enforcement System 
MPS           Metropolitan Police Service 
MOU                      Memorandum of Understanding 
NIA                          National Intelligence Application 
NPIA                        National Policing Improvement Agency 
NYPD                      New York Police Department 
PACE           Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
PNC                         Police National Computer 
SOCO                      Scenes of Crimes Officer 
STU                         Strategic Traffic Unit 
WTA                        Wanted to Arrest 
WTI                         Wanted to Interview 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – 4000 – Dishonesty Codes for National Intelligence Application 
(Police Law Enforcement System Code Book, 2004) 
 
4110 -  burgles for drugs 
4111 - burgles for drugs over $5000 by day  
4112 - burgles for drugs $500-$5000 by 
day  
4113 - burgles for drugs under $500 by day  
4114 - burgles for drugs over $5000 by 
night  
4115 - burgles for drugs $500-$5000 by 
night  
4116 - burgles for drugs under $500 by 
night  
4119 - burgles for drugs  – other  
 
4120 - burgles  
4121 - burgles over $5000 by day  
4122 - burgles $500-$5000 by day  
4123 - burgles under $500 by day  
4122 - burgles over $5000 by night  
4123 - burgles  $500 --$5000 by night  
4124 - burgles under $500 by night  
4127 - remained with intent  
4129 - burgles – other  
 
4130 - burglary associated offences 
4133 - possessing instruments for burglary  
4134 - disguised for burglary  
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4136 - armed with intent to commit burglary – firearm  
4137 - armed with intent to commit burglary – other 
weapon  
4138 - possession instrument to commit burglary (SO 
Act)  
4139 - other burglary associated offences  
 
4150 – aggravated burglary offences 
4155 - commits burglary with weapon – firearm 
4156 - commits burglary with weapon – other 
4157 - remained after burglary with firearm 
4158- remained after burglary  – other weapon 
4159 - other aggravated burglary offences 
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Appendix 2 – Statistics Clearance Codes for National intelligence Application 
 
AL Referred to LLA 
C Custody 
F Family group conference 
K Caution – child or young 
person 
M Mental health issues 
N No offence disclosed 
O Other 
P Prosecution 
R Diversion 
U Youth court 
V Warned – child or young 
person 
W  Warned – adult 
X  Unknown 
Y  Youth Aid 
Z  Not applicable 
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Appendix 3 – Apprehension Codes for National intelligence Application 
 
A  Alarm  
B  Beat constable  
C  Complainant's help  
D  Disposal avenues  
E  External publicity  
F  Forensic  
G  Guard of watchman  
H  Computer info (not MO)  
I  Interview  
J  Jail interview or evidence  
K  Knowledge of member  
L  Local enquiries  
M  Modus operandi  
N  Non police  
O  Other means  
P  Patrol  
Q  Quick response to call  
R  Road block/check point 
S  Search warrant 
T  Turn over in the street 
U  Other offender identified  
V  Offender contacted voluntarily 
W  Witness information 
X  Unknown/unascertainable 
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Y  Internal publicity 
Z  Not applicable 
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Appendix 4 – indicative Questions 
 
1. What do you think is your most useful investigative tool? 
 
2. What do you think about DNA? 
 
3. In what ways do you think it aids investigation? 
 
4. How often do you think it should be used? 
 
5. Do you consider DNA to be all you need for a successful investigation? 
 
6. When you receive a DNA hit are you pleased or is it just more paper work? 
 
7. Do you take notice of DNA alerts on offenders? What action do you take if there is 
an alert? 
 
8. Are current laws adequate for obtaining DNA samples? What changes would you like 
to see? 
 
9. What training if any have you had in relation to DNA? Was it adequate? 
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Appendix 5 – Interview Codes 
 
A Detective Inspector 
B Detective Senior Sergeant 
C Detective Senior Sergeant 
D Detective Senior Sergeant 
E Detective Sergeant 
F Detective Constable 
G Detective Constable 
H General Duties Constable 
I Detective Senior Sergeant 
J Detective Senior Sergeant 
K Enquiry Sergeant 
L Detective Inspector 
M General Duties Constable 
N Detective Constable – burglary 
O Constable – burglary 
P CSA Sergeant 
Q General Duties Constable 
R SOCO 
S CSA 
T O/C Station (Senior Sergeant) 
U CSA 
V General Duties Constable 
W Enquiry Sergeant 
X Enquiry Constable 
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Y Senior Sergeant – custody 
Z Sergeant – CAT 
AA Section Sergeant 
AB Scientist - ESR 
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Appendix 6: Do you take notice of DNA alerts on offenders? What action do you 
take if there is an alert? 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A Loss of knowledge due to perfing. Younger staff don’t know what to do 
or they will say that it is not our area, not our file or they can’t find the 
file. 
B People need to know the process.  Tendency to deal with their own case 
quickly to get out and answer more calls.  Need to deal with all crimes. 
Get away from “too busy”. Be preventative. 
C Absolute failing in our system. It shouldn’t be happening. Poor 
supervision/lack of commonsense. BUT who deals with the files?  
D An expectation that staff would deal with DNA hit on NIA if staff can 
find the file. 
E Contact O/C of file. Junior staff are scared of alerts as they don’t know 
what to do. Don’t leave watch-house until WTI/WTA/DNA cleared. 
Linked to poor interviewing skills and lack of staff training 
F Mind set that they need to deal with lock up and get back out on the 
street.  Different mentality for street cop – big rush.  Part of the stage of 
their career. 
G Nil 
H Find file and do research before interviewing. If can’t then tell the O/C 
details of the person. 
I Should deal with files. At very least alert O/C but shouldn’t go to court 
without dealing in some way.  Comms are pressurising officers to get 
back on the streets. Lack of interviewing skills. Old DNA hit, assumed 
that it was already dealt with. 
J Police process issues. Too much work, staff think that they are too busy. 
Comms pushing staff to get back out on the street. Can’t find the file. 
Wide range of reasons but NOT good. It is a big problem. 
K Will prefer to deal but might not if not our area. Workload or the file 
might be poor or can’t find the file. 
L Structure of work groups – can’t locate the file. Lack of supervision – 
lack of competence in interviewing. Pressure to get back out on the 
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street.  Need seniors in the watch-house who can ensure the work is done 
before the offender leaves custody. 
M Never seen a DNA alert but seen heaps for F/P. Would try to deal with 
the file but TP need to get back out of the street. Op demand meant 
someone could come in and help. If see that the person has been in 
custody loads of times it is assumed that the alert has been dealt with. 
One occasion person had alert but had already been dealt with but the 
alert had not been cleared. Think people may ignore the alerts as they are 
lazy or North Comms  insisting they go back out and answer calls – want 
to help your colleagues.  Not confident interviewing someone. Have 
enough of your own work, don’t want to take on extra files. 
N Alerts are ignored. Can’t be bothered or too busy or lack of resources for 
front-line staff. Lack of support and a belief that someone else will do it. 
O Try to deal with alert. At the very least let the O/C know. If can’t get the 
file then it is pointless to interview. Time/pressure/adding to workload. 
P Minimal amount done. Rely on the alert. Don’t know what to do. Can get 
the file but then don’t know how to write up the summary of facts. Too 
scared to try. 
Q Deal with alerts like all over WTI. Get the file and interview the person. 
If it is an old alert it is often thought that it must have been dealt with. 
Unsure what to do, can’t find the file, too busy or uninterested. 
R Anecdotally believe that the officers do not have the time to deal with the 
alerts. 
S Not surprised as know that alerts can be ignored. Believed that they take 
the easiest road and believe that someone else will deal. 
T Would deal if I could. If I can get the file. If not then let the O/C know.  
GDB are not investigators. They have pressure to get back on the road. 
Also they do not have the experience to investigate the more serious 
crimes. 
U Don’t know why they aren’t dealt with. Perhaps laziness but am not sure. 
V The person who has the file should deal. Can’t interview properly when 
you don’t know the full case. Interviewing blind. I car staff are also too 
busy and there is a lot of pressure on them. Tonight there are 2 I cars for 
the area and 1 Q car. Their interviewing skills are fine.  
W Poor management. Don’t think the seniors want to piss off the cops by 
making them deal with DNA files. Poor interviewing because of lack of 
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practice. Should interview everyone. No excuse. 
X If you don’t have the file then it is too difficult to interview. Lack of 
experience leads to poor-quality files which become very time 
consuming to deal with. 
Y North Comms pushing for guys to get back out on the street. Not 
experienced interviewers. Need to ask myself whether it is appropriate to 
take a car off the road to deal with a DNA hit.   
Z Internal processes. Too busy is crap. You are only as busy as the job you 
are dealing with. 
AA Depend on what I am doing. If a Friday night on crime squad then there 
wouldn’t be a hope. Depends on resources. Can be laziness that stops 
some people. Lack of knowledge or pushed back out on to the streets. 
Young staff can’t interview. 
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Appendix 7: When you receive a DNA hit are you pleased or is it just more 
paperwork? 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A I am pleased. Let’s get it to intel and see what else he has done. Many of 
our offenders live in CM and we don’t have the time to keep knocking on 
doors in CM. More files coming in all the time. 
B Pleased. Receive hit which has a 10-day turnaround for it to be actioned. 
Give to Intel and then give to volume crime squad and get straight on to 
it.  
C Wrong samples being sent for volume crimes. Small return from trace 
samples. 
D This unit gets loads of DNA hits so not too exciting. Timeliness 
important as can reduce crime by locking up offenders – recidivist 
offenders prevalent in volume crime. 
E Rapt to receive DNA hit. 
F Hugely pleased. More sex offenders on the database. 
G Can understand that they would be low priority if getting many hits. 
Great for their line of work – sex assaults. 
H Great. Hadn’t wasted their time. Will be linked to other crimes. 
I Welcomed when received. More evidence or will identify a suspect. 
J Oh pleased, it’s excellent. 
K Pleased, pretty straightforward. Named suspect now go and find him but 
this can be hard to do as they are active offenders. Sometimes have to 
inactivate but don’t like doing that. 
L It’s good news, great news. It is to be celebrated. Allows one to focus on 
the enquiry. 
M I’ve only ever had fingerprints. I mean I’ve never really been in an 
investigation in my career. I mean I’ve had a section and then TP so I’ve 
never really had to deal with a DNA hit. 
N Always happy as it shows that the system works. Good to charge the 
offenders repeatedly – recidivists. Priority to deal with DNA hits. 
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O Just another file amongst many. Good in that I can clear this one and get 
on with the more complicated ones. Too much work. 
P Thrilled as it means that the team is sampling correctly.   
Q Never had one but would love to get one. 
R Don’t receive hits as it is not my job. 
S Don’t receive them. 
T Don’t see it as more paperwork but rather as another witness. 
U Don’t receive them.  
V It would be good, seeing a result for the work. 
W That’s a tough one as I have trays of files. Forensic file is treated like any 
other file, managed and auctioned asap. However, I am frustrated by the 
types of samples sent off for sampling. A toothbrush found in the back of 
a car. Good DNA files are great but poor ones add more work for no 
outcomes. 
X No. Easy to resolve. If get too many at once it can drain resources.  
Y Don’t have the staff to deal.. Can’t find the files – front-line staff often 
inexperienced. 
Z Huge shot in the arm for an investigation as it focuses you but doesn’t 
prove the case. 
AA It would be a giddy up especially if a big result. 
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Appendix 8: How often do you think DNA should be used? 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A Should be using it for all. Another investigative tool just as the media is. DNA 
actually identifies someone or eliminates them from the enquiry. Very important. 
B One of the tools. Not be all and end all. However, with sexual assault it is a 
significant tool. 
C Best evidence rule. Incumbent on the police to provide the best evidence. 
Burglary can be overkill but what would you drop? Could be criticised if didn’t 
present all evidence. 
D Serious crime 100% of the time. Less serious and had other evidence and person 
declines to volunteer suspect sample then maybe not as important. It will always 
be a case by case.  
E All the time. 
F Becoming more part and parcel of what we do. Can become a bigger part than it 
is currently. 
G All the time (side tracked). 
H If the sample is located and identified to a person then every time. Covering all 
bases. 
I Considered in every investigation. How might DNA advance the investigation? 
Whenever have the opportunity to exploit DNA technology then do it. 
J Needs to be used so that processes can be developed and improved. Police bosses 
just manage risk rather than challenge for continuous improvement. 
K Whenever it can. Including volume crime as these guys progress to more serious 
crimes. If going to the bother of taking swabs then may as well use it for all 
crimes. 
L Every time or as often as possible. Good evidence so why not use it as. (Good 
comment about allegations of interviews conducted under duress in the 70s and 
80s). 
M If applicable, every time that it can be. DNA unique. Can trust DNA, it doesn’t 
lie. 
N Everyone arrested should have their DNA taken as it would make the police’s 
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job easier. Every crime scene one should think forensically. Don’t lose anything. 
O All the time if available. How big is our database and how well do we process 
crimes. (DNA pretty cut and dried.) 
Q Always looking for it as part of your evidence base. 
R Collected always and used when necessary. 
S Not covered in the interview. 
T Should be able to use for any crime but never going to have the staff to 
investigate minor crimes. (Good talk about volume crime.) 
U Tight budget. Some times of the year can’t send anything off (burglary squad). 
V As often as possible. DNA saves time. Narrows down suspect list. Narrows it 
down to one person, one target. 
W All scenes, all offenders to go through the watch-house. Databank wider. 
X As often as possible. 
Y Cost effectiveness. Can’t use it all the time. If could then that would be fantastic. 
Like idea of getting DNA off everyone who is arrested. Increase pool size. 
Z Should be used on all cases like F/P. Should include it whether ultimately use it 
at court is another issue. Don’t exclude – can’t go back once it is gone. 
AA All the time. Lost opportunities if only targeting specific groups. DNA all scenes 
– public would be surprised if we didn’t. Not enough resources – poor excuse for 
not doing something. 
AB When it will assist. Factor in the cost compared in relation to the offence. Needs 
to be relative to the offence. 
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Appendix 9: Are current laws adequate for obtaining DNA samples? What 
changes would you like to see? 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A Don’t think wide ranging enough. Anybody arrested should give DNA 
and if acquitted then it should be destroyed. 
B Should be able to compel anybody who is a suspect. If arrested and 
charged then DNA should be taken. If acquitted then DNA is 
destroyed. 
C No. Everyone who is arrested should have DNA taken (arrested, not 
charged). Everyone through the watch-house should have their DNA 
taken (good comments about filtering). 
D If could take everyone’s DNA through the watch-house that would be 
good for the police. Would need more staff in the watch-house and the 
ESR would need more staff to deal with the extra workload.  Police 
would need more staff to deal with the results from the ESR. 
E Absolutely not. DNA should be taken from every person that goes 
through the watch-house. Compulsion order weighted in favour of 
suspect. 
F No, not really. Administration and powers. DNA upon arrest is 
fantastic. Part and parcel of arrest. Not fussed if DNA not destroyed. 
Haven’t done anything wrong then nothing to worry about. 
G No. Don’t make sense to me. 
H No. DNA should be a process taken at the watch-house with everything 
else (F/P and photo). If not convicted could be a fair reason to destroy. 
I Everyone through the watch-house should have DNA taken just as with 
F/P – method of ID. Compulsion orders are convoluted and time 
consuming. 
J No. DNA should be taken on arrest. DNA new-millennium fingerprint. 
Overarching issue of fairness – should be fair but should also be 
efficient. Destroy if acquitted. 
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K Expensive because we have to keep taking samples each time. Take 
sample at arrest – in fact at birth. Solve a heck of a lot of crime – 
human rights  – but what is the big deal? 
L No, I think that they are nonsense. Everyone in the watch-house – 
DNA identifies them. DNA on arrest and destroy if acquitted. Already 
have that process. 
M Too hard. Everyone in custody – DNA taken. Acquitted – destroyed. 
N No. Compulsion orders are too time consuming, too expensive and too 
hard. In the watch-house – DNA. Acquitted – destroyed. 
O Law out of date. DNA on arrest. Destroy if acquitted. 
P Yeah, I do actually. Tricky question. Potential to be set up. People feel 
strongly about DNA. 
Q No. Everyone through the watch-house  – DNA. Acquitted – 
destroyed. 
R No knowledge of the law. 
S Don’t know a lot about it. 
T Yeah, adequate. Couldn’t cope with any more. Still have to have strict 
rules. 
U No knowledge. Like the idea of having everyone’s DNA once arrested 
but privacy issues. Can’t see it happening. 
V No. Immigrants should give DNA samples and newborns. Should all 
be on database. Help DVI and people who turn up dead. Guthrie Test 
on database – comprehensive library. People out there who have 
committed heinous crimes – never caught – never given DNA sample. 
W No, take DNA on arrest. 
X Not particularly. Cumbersome process. Jump through too many hoops. 
DNA on arrest. Should be destroyed if acquitted (comments about 
acquittal and file destruction). 
Y No. Anyone arrested. (good comment about more work involved but if 
it clears up one more rape, the better). 
Z There’s weaknesses that are being addressed but spirit of intentions 
yes, it does adequately cover – but flaws. Consensual road (voluntary) 
biggest flaw. If people decide to withdraw we would lose a lot. Not 
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convicted  (more discussion about new Bill). 
AA I want access to the database that the hospitals have (Guthrie Test). 
Utopia for the police but privacy issues. Retract permission – everyone 
on arrest. (more discussion here). 
AB Initially the laws were good. New technology – crime has changed – 
then laws amended. Voluntary coming to an end – time for a review. 
Law inadequate for U17yrs. Two things inadequate but otherwise they 
are good. 
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Appendix 10: Do you consider DNA to be all you need for a successful 
investigation? 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A Some cases yes – but in other cases you don’t have it the jury might 
expect it. 
B No – one of the parts – not whole case. 
C You’d have to access it probably – not sole evidence. 
D No, no – depends where DNA is found – explanation available – 
corroborative evidence. 
E Sometimes yes – good victim plus DNA. 
F Definitely not all but maybe some cases. By and large no. 
G No I don’t – has to be corroborated. 
H Have solely convicted – more helpful to have more links. 
I Emphatically no – dangerous. 
J No – sometimes not black and white. Similar fact evidence. 
K No – ideally more corroborating evidence. 
L No – reconstruct the scene. Interviews – circumstantial – don’t want to 
rely on it. 
M Probably not – always an explanation. Not black and white – enough in 
some cases – but not all. 
N No. Good interview as well. 
O Yeah – pretty cut and dried. Pretty irrefutable –- no questions over 
where it came from then yes. 
P Need to make up the full picture. 
Q No – need other stuff. It’s just not solo. 
R No, the more you have the better. Not be all and end all. 
S No. Talking about securing a conviction you’d definitely need more 
than just DNA – loopholes. 
T Don’t know if would say all you need. DNA plus interview. Need 
interview  – can be excuse for DNA. 
U No – need more than that. Might be legitimate reason for DNA. 
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V No. Prove how DNA was at scene – interviews. 
W No – confession – push for it. Biggest thing I push for. Enough 
experience no? Enough training, no. * Good answer* 
X Not at all, all forms part of it. Key part – prove it was suspect. 
Y No (interview) yes. 
Z No – tool box – can’t hang hat on it. 
AA No – other corroboration. 
AB That would be interesting – but stats don’t stack up. 
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Appendix 11: In what ways do you think it aids investigations? 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A DNA found, immediately gives us a focus. 
B Actually puts someone at the scene – pretty good line of enquiry. NB 
working out how DNA at the scene. 
C Gives you a starting point but don’t maintain tunnel vision. Gives you 
focus but be careful. 
D Identifies suspects – identifies particular person who was at scene when 
offence committed. 
E Especially aids in stranger type scenarios – sexual assaults etc – can 
confirm penetration etc. 
F ID and speeds up ID of people. 
 
G Strengthens a case – rule out person – speed – certainty. 
 
H Increases thought processes of people going to scenes – being more 
creative at what test. Good way of identifying offender – pretty hard to 
cancel out that you were there for a lawful purpose. 
 
I Ability to identify a single person from item found at the scene. Speed 
up process but would never hang hat on DNA. 
J Able to use scientists to give evidence not employed by the police. Net 
narrow. 
K Very hard for offender to justify why DNA found in stolen car. 
L Now have decent-sized database – can focus. 
 
M Can prove person was at scene. 
 
N Stronger word at prosecution time. 
 
O Most effective way in identifying someone. 
 
P Got the person at the scene – hard for them to explain at interview. 
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Q The obvious one is finding possible offenders – DNA is another good 
tool not just solely by itself. 
 
R When there is no other option – no line of enquiry – it aids it – another 
tool. 
 
S Have solid questions to ask at interview. 
 
T Lines of enquiry when might not have any. Might not catch them now – 
but down the road. 
 
U Effective at identifying offender. Doesn’t mean offender will be charged 
and convicted. 
V Can confirm that someone was at the scene when they try to deny it. 
 
W Places people at scenes. 
 
X Clearly identifies the individual. Problems with identical twins. 
Y DNA says person was there but still have to prove that person 
committed the offence. 
 
Z You can just prove or disprove. It allows you to be more focused 
perhaps once you get back to the bare basics. 
 
AA Target suspects and eliminate suspects. Narrows the net. 
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Appendix 12: What do you think about DNA? 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A Not our bread and butter – next best thing. Need DNA. 
B Yes – key parts – need to be fiscally responsible. 
C Fantastic investigative aid – but be circumspect –- analyse – what does 
it mean? 
D Great tool – growing too big – almost as if DNA hits greater than staff 
we have available. 
E Fantastic crime-fighting tool. Crucial element – every investigation – 
brilliant – great. 
F Immediately highlighted the difficulties with the paper work. 
G Because of its certainty – because that is what a jury is looking for in its 
own mind’s eye. 
H Well, I think it is good. It helps resolve crimes in a faster fashion. 
I I think it has made our job easier in some respects and more difficult in 
others – it is very much a double-edged sword. 
J It is a vital tool in our investigation, detection of offences, investigation 
of offences and the prosecution of offenders. 
K I think it is great. I think it is very worthwhile – advancement – as far as 
policing in general – everyone should have to give DNA. 
L I think DNA is a very useful investigative and prosecutorial tool for 
sheeting home criminal responsibility. 
M Limited understanding of it. It seems like a good tool to me – obviously 
I mean if you have nothing to hide every single person should be DNAd. 
N DNA is a great tool – can be made complicated by procedures in the 
police. 
O It is really good because it is so specific. 
P Love it – because it is so conclusive. 
Q I think it is another good tool not just solely by itself. 
R Oh, it does wonders. I think it is definitely something that we are going 
to progress from a forensic, from crime point of view, certainty from a 
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science point of view as well – finding cures. 
S It has been good to know that it is there for us to use. It is taken 
seriously. It is great to have. 
T I think it has become a great tool for us to obtain or to help us 
investigate crimes and solve crimes. 
U That it is useful. 
V I think it is good if it is collected in a sensible manner rather than going 
by numbers to actually choose the people who you are going to get 
DNA from. 
W Something you cannot live without. As a crime investigation tool it is 
very good. 
X A fantastic tool. I think everyone should be on the database. 
Y Fantastic, fantastic tool. 
Z It is great. It is a great tool in the tool box as I say when they do the 
training and as a lot of other people actually realise it ain’t the be all and 
end all – it gives us some assurance as to where we should be focusing 
or excluding. 
AA I love it. It is a huge tool – possibly under-utilised. 
AB It is a very clever science. 
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Appendix 13: What do you think Is your most useful investigative tool? 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A DNA is definitely in terms of the technology these days a great assistance for 
investigations as long as it doesn’t usurp the actual investigators, doing proper 
investigations and just relying solely on DNA. 
B What’s that, the investigation process? There’s forensic evidence which is 
obviously significant for us but the best part, the most important part of that 
investigation process is the ability of qualified or skilled interviewers really to 
solicit information. 
C My staff. 
D The skill of your staff. You know your training of your staff and ability to analyse 
files, digest information and go out, follow up enquiries to come to a good 
conclusion. 
E Probably, most definitely my useful investigative tool is staff. 
F I’d have to say DNA would probably be one of the top ones. 
G Which I answered was interviewing. 
H Knocking on doors and talking to people. 
I Good detectives. 
J The most useful investigative tools are witnesses. 
K The telephone. 
L DNA. 
M Communication. 
N In the burglary squad, I’d say DNA would be one of them along with fingerprints 
obviously, positively identifying offenders that way and also CCTV footage is 
very important and admission from the offenders obviously very important when 
you get the offenders as well. 
O My experience. 
P CCTV and DNA. DNA would be the most conclusive. 
Q Okay, obviously our equipment that we use. 
R Probably staff. 
S I’d say it’s actually the guys on the ground. 
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T I’d say actually people to start with, witnesses, but then probably the most 
important thing is forensics. 
U A combination of tools, yeah I’m just trying to think off hand. 
V Forensics. 
W Motivated investigator. 
X I guess you’d have to say some sort of forensic evidence or certainly forensic and 
CCTV or surveillance footage would probably be the two main ones that we deal 
with, that would be of most significant benefit. 
Y Staff. 
Z A detective and his ability to interview because there are two parts to that. 
AA Common sense. 
AB I think it’s extremely important it is not the only crime-fighting tool, so it is one of 
a choice so it’s not just about DNA but if you are looking to use DNA then it is 
very useful.  
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Appendix 14: What training have you had in relation to DNA? Was it adequate or 
would you like to see more? 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A There was training. It was a huge booklet – training in the field – 
probably why some people were put off. 
B Training received on detective course – once a year – co-ordinator – but 
bigger picture not explained.  
C Self taught. DNA legislation yes, never taken a DNA sample – not had 
any training  
D May have attended training when it first came out. No training for 
taking crime scene samples. No refresher  
E Minimal training at scene capture. Attended several ESR training 
sessions. 
F More training required at DC level – contamination issues. 
G No specific training in DNA – general forensics training – taking DNA 
samples from people. 
H Sure, had training but couldn’t remember the specifics. 
I Almost zero. A reminder once a year would be nice. 
J District training – re legislation etc – CIB seminars – adequate. 
K CIB routinely trained crime scene investigation. 
L Had training – wouldn’t hurt to have refresher now and then. 
M Been taught about DNA in Police/ESR/CIB courses – yeah adequate 
training. 
 
N College only. No training at district – paperwork too confusing. 
O CIB induction course – mock crime scenes with ESR – good enough but 
everyone should do it. 
P Various informational things – not a detective. 
Q Received no training because don’t do it. Have had training but  never 
use it because have staff who do it. 
R Had DNA squad come and do DNA package. Training from sgt re 
buccal. Need more training on paperwork. 
S Collecting of DNA yes. Not too much – prefer to learn on the job. 
T Training on the job – SOCO course. 
U Initial training, then refreshers. Yeah, training adequate and good. 
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V One-day course at ESR. Quite good. Not adequate. CSA course but not 
SOCO.10-minute training. Need more for taking sample and paperwork. 
Need more training. Staff flounder. 
W No training. Missed the training. Shown by someone else. Paperwork is 
bad, cases lost? 
X Very little. District training. Would like more training. 
Y Several practical training sessions. Training adequate. 
Z None. Trained myself. Learnt as went along – blooding. Interested in 
something you follow it up. 
AA District line up. Self taught – really keen on the subject. 
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Appendix 15: Views on officer’s interviewing skills if mentioned by the 
participants 
 
Interviewee Answer 
A PEACE model. 
B Skills being lost – not being taught. 
C Not mentioned. 
D Not mentioned. 
E Abysmal. 
F Not mentioned. 
G Not mentioned. 
H Not mentioned. 
I No time to spend on interviewing therefore they can’t. 
J Small mention (possibly). 
K Shouldn’t – be quite simple. 
L Not mentioned. 
M Not mentioned. 
N Not mentioned. 
O Not mentioned. 
P Not mentioned. 
Q Not mentioned. 
R Not mentioned. 
S Not mentioned. 
T Not mentioned. 
U Not mentioned. 
V Believes police are good at interviewing. 
W Not enough training or enough experience. Encourages his staff to have 
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another person monitor the interview so that it gives the interviewer 
time to think of questions. As a supervisor he tries to look at interviews 
and give his staff feedback. He is looking for confessions. 
No, I think overall there’s a lack of experience in front line. 
X No, I think overall there’s a lack of experience in front line. 
 
Y No, they’re bringing in this peace training which I understand is pretty 
good but they target the NCO level to start with and I mean I think that 
was a waste of time because realistically the NCOs aren’t going to be 
conducting interviews and I think that was ridiculous. 
Z Believes that interviewing is one of the most important investigative 
tools the police have – did not delve as to whether the police were any 
good at interviewing – not sure why I didn’t. 
AA Doesn’t believe the officers can talk to their colleagues let alone 
interview offenders.  Officers think that they ask one question, get an 
answer and that is the end of it.  
AB Not mentioned (not police). 
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Appendix 16: Australian New Zealand Standardised Offence Categories 
 
Homicide and related offences 
Acts intended to cause injury 
Sexual assaults and related offences 
Dangerous or negligent acts endangering persons 
Abduction, harassment and other related offences against the person 
Robbery, extortion and related offences 
Unlawful entry with intent, burglary, break and enter 
Theft and related offences 
Fraud, deception and related offences 
Illicit drug offences 
Prohibited and regulated weapons and explosive offences 
Property damage and environmental pollution 
Public order offences 
Offences against justice procedures, government security and government operations 
Miscellaneous offences 
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Appendix 17 Roles of Interviewees 
Role of 
Interviewee 
Number 
Interviewed 
Serious 
Crime 
Volume 
Crime 
Responsible 
for Budget 
Responsible 
for 
Deployment 
Reactive Frontline 
Policing 
Detective 
Inspector 
2           
Detective 
Senior 
Sergeant 
5           
Detective 
Sergeant 
2           
Senior 
Sergeant 
2           
Sergeant – 
Inquiry 
1           
Sergeant – 
CSA 
1           
Sergeant – 
BIU 
1           
Sergeant – 
Section 
1           
Detective 
Constable 
2         
Detective 
Constable – 
Burglary 
1         
Police 
Constable 
6         
SOCO 1         
CSA 2         
ESR – 
Scientist 
1       
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Appendix 18 Heuristic of Files Reviewed 
Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
050607/598
7/06/2005 
26/06/200
7 
17/08/2007 
No charge in 
relation to this file. 
N/A 
No. Has not been charged since this offence, but will appear in court on 
30/7/08. 
030331/249 29/03/200
3 
21/06/200
5 
20/07/2005 
No charge in 
relation to this file. 
File states that 
suspect could not 
be located.  
N/A 
Yes. Although file states suspect could not be found. Suspect was in police 
custody twice during the interim.  
030408/692
7/04/2003 1/06/2005 11/07/2005 12/07/2005 1 day No. Offender charged immediately after DNA hit received.
050714/859
2/06/2005 9/02/2000 
28/6/05 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
990520/173
2/11/2005 
10/5/06 & 
25/5/05 
22/12/2005 30/11/2006 6 months 
Yes. Has various other charges within six-month interim. Was not arrested 
until after second DNA sample taken. 
050225/561 23/02/200
5 
8/03/2001 
18/7/05 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
7/06/2006 
11 
months 
Yes. Arrested once during interim. 
050329/923 29/03/200
5 
9/5/2000 
& 15/11/5 
6/7/05 
(received after 
2nd DNA 
sample) 
9/06/2006 
11 
months 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
050530/289 30/05/200
5 
30/7/01 & 
2/10/03 
30/06/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
030313/994 12/03/200
3 
8/06/2005 5/07/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050309/153
9/03/2005 
11/09/200
2 
6/07/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050510/565
8/05/2005 3/04/2005 5/07/2005 7/10/2005 3 month Yes. Only 1 other charge during interim. 
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Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
000728/105 27/07/200
0 
8/06/2005 5/07/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
021126/376 26/11/200
2 
7/02/2005 9/06/2006 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A No. Has not been in police custody since DNA hit. 
050718/370
18/7/5/ 5/02/2004 
14/9/05 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
4/04/2007 
3 years, 2 
months 
No. 
020423/328 19/04/200
2 
19/07/200
5 
17/08/2005 11/11/2005 3 months No. 
050815/916 10/08/200
5 
11/06/200
2 
27/09/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050727/820 24/07/200
5 
7/11/2005 16/12/2005 27/07/2006 7 months No. 
040910/336
4/09/2004 
28/06/200
5 
8/11/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A No. Has not been in police custody since DNA hit. 
050627/843 24/06/200
5 
16/05/200
4 
3/08/2005 13/06/2006 
10 
months 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
050708/616
8/07/2005 
30/08/200
5 
16/08/2005 13/03/2006 7 months Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
050823/821 21/08/200
5 
9/09/2005 
DNA hit not 
received 
14/08/2007 2 years 
Yes. Although DNA hit never received, offender arrested numerous times 
since offence date. 
970902/086 1/9/97 & 
7/12/02 
14/06/200
5 
30/08/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been in police custody three times since DNA hit. 
020613/848 12/06/200
2 
14/07/200
5 
9/08/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
020121/779 21/01/200
2 
13/07/200
5 
15/08/2005 2/06/2006 
10 
months 
Yes. Arrested once during interim. 
050720/998 18/07/200
5 
19/08/200
5 
27/09/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A 
Yes. Arrested on same date as DNA hit for unrelated offences and has not 
been in police custody since. 
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Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
050705/605
4/07/2005 
6/3/5 
(offender 
1) 30/1/3 
(offender 
2) 16/7/5 
(offender 
3)  
13/10/05 
(offender 1) 
14/10/05 
(offender 2) 
13/10/05 
(offender 3) 
None of the 
offenders charged 
in relation to this 
file. 
N/A Yes. All three offenders have been arrested numerous times since DNA hit.
050830/537
9/08/2005 
14/01/200
1 
4/10/2005 9/11/2005 1 month No. 
050724/918 24/07/200
5 
15/08/200
5 
30/11/2005 31/01/2006 2 months No. 
060629/099
5 & 
050819/058
14/08/200
5 
7/07/2003 27/09/2005 15/02/2007 
1 year, 5 
months 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
051017/418 13/10/200
5 
27/04/200
5 
7/12/2005 12/10/2006 
10 
months 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
051101/740 30/10/200
5 
8/04/2005 13/12/2005 12/07/2006 7 months No. 
050604/264
4/06/2005 7/06/2002 13/12/2005 17/11/2006 
11 
months 
No. 
050906/246
2/08/2005 
31/12/200
2 
4/10/2005 5/09/2006 
11 
months 
Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
010623/940 16/06/200
1 
19/09/200
5 
8/11/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
020918/220 18/09/200
2 
19/05/200
5 
4/10/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been in police custody once since DNA hit. 
051113/387 10/11/200
5 
13/07/200
2 
13/12/2005 25/06/2007 
1 Year, 6 
months 
Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
041025/669 22/10/200 19/09/200 15/11/2005 Not charged in n/A Yes. Has been in police custody once since DNA hit. 
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Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
4 5 relation to this file. 
050715/977
14/78/5 3/10/2004 8/11/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been in police custody twice since DNA hit. 
040905/110
3/09/2004 
28/10/200
5 
30/11/2005 14/08/2007 
1 year, 9 
months 
Yes. Was arrested twice during interim. 
040425/308 22/04/200
4 
3/11/2005 13/12/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been in police custody twice since DNA hit. 
041213/128 10/12/200
4 
13/08/199
9 
8/02/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
041231/034 31/12/200
4 
Unknown 8/02/2005 31/03/2005 1 month No. 
051114/523 10/11/200
5 
15/08/200
2 
21/03/2006 7/11/2006 8 months No. 
050907/383
2/09/2005 
11/12/200
4 
18/10/5 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
6/07/2006 9 months Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
020519/479
Various 
29/03/200
0 
23/11/2004 3/05/2007 
2 years, 6 
months 
No. 
041223/662 21/12/200
4 
30/01/200
3 
8/02/2005 4/05/2005 3 months Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
030720/844 24/07/200
3 
26/10/200
5 
9/12/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
030728/405 28/07/200
3 
18/01/200
6 
7/02/2006 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A No. Has not been in police custody since DNA hit. 
050105/087
3/01/2005 
24/10/200
1 
8/02/2005 20/07/2005 5 Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
051101/649 31/10/200
5 
8/07/2004 13/12/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
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Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
050111/556
4/01/2005 
28/02/200
1 
2/03/2005 15/06/2005 3 months No. 
040522/270 21/05/200
4 
19/01/200
5 
1/03/2005 20/06/2005 3 months No. 
040809/355
9/08/2004 
27/07/200
4 
8/03/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
020624/301 24/06/200
2 
23/12/200
4 
15/03/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
030304/646
4/03/2003 
23/03/200
5 
3/05/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
031220/320 20/12/200
3 
26/12/200
4 
15/02/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
030419/523 19/04/200
3 
10/01/200
5 
1/03/2005 18/04/2005 1 month No. 
041019/009 17/10/200
4 
1/12/2004 15/03/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
040206/339
6/02/2004 4/05/2006 24/05/2006 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A No. Has not been in police custody since DNA hit. 
041212/551 10/12/200
4 
26/07/200
4 
25/1/05 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
011219/722 14/12/200
1 
7/01/2005 1/03/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit.  
041024/218 23/10/200
4 
Unknown 22/02/2005 31/03/2005 1 month No. 
041214/525 13/12/200
4 
4/02/2003 
20/1/05 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
31/05/2005 4 months Yes. Has been in police custody twice since DNA hit. 
247 
 
Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
030530/397 28/05/200
3 
8/2/05 
(offender 
1)  
Unknown 7/06/2005 Unknown 
Yes. Only one other charge during interim between offence date and 
conviction. 
041212/661 10/12/200
4 
30/08/200
2 
25/01/2005 14/02/2006 
1 year, 1 
month 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
041112/863 11/11/200
4 
11/12/200
4 
18/1/05 (this 
not specified 
in NIA) 
5/05/2005 4 months Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
041127/894 25/11/200
4 
17/03/200
4 
11/01/2005 21/12/2005 
11 
months 
Yes. Was arrested three times during interim. 
041124/553 24/11/200
4 
28/02/200
5 
18/01/2005 16/06/2005 5 months No. 
050130/361 27/01/200
5 
13/02/200
1 
22/03/2005 9/05/2007 
2 years, 2 
months 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
050216/407 16/02/200
5 
11/05/200
0 
2/9/3/5 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
041006/270
6/10/2004 
27/12/199
9 
11/01/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
041125/200 25/11/200
4 
21/10/200
4 
18/01/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
041005/043
5/10/2004 7/08/2000 25/01/2005 23/02/2007 
2 years, 1 
month 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
000209/931
8/02/2000 
17/12/199
9 
18/06/2003 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
051020/129 18/10/200
5 
8/09/2004 15/11/2005 20/11/2007 2 years Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
050704/265 27/06/200
5 
27/08/200
4 
23/08/2005 15/06/2006 
10 
months 
Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
060328/344
3/08/2005 
23/09/199
24/05/2006 19/09/2006 4 months No. 
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Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
7 
050704/240
1/07/2005 9/10/2000 16/08/2005 14/02/2006 6 months No. 
040923/996 22/09/200
4 
24/09/200
4 
17/01/2005 27/01/2005 0 months No. 
980719/663 19/07/199
8 
22/10/200
2 
30/6/05 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050219/705 18/02/200
5 
25/12/199
9 
27/04/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
040627/830 27/06/200
4 
19/09/200
5 
8/11/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A No. Has not been in police custody since this offence. 
050111/556 10/01/200
5 
28/02/200
1 
2/03/2005 15/06/2005 3 months No. 
970914/611
7 & 
051108/300
13/9/1997 
& 
5/11/2005 
17/06/200
2 
13/12/2005 8/03/2006 3 months No. 
050225/572 24/02/200
5 
8/10/2004 6/04/2005 2/05/2007 
2 years, 1 
month 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
040428/745
4 & 
040112/127
28/04/200
4 
19/12/200
6 
21/7/5 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
27/10/2005 3 months No. 
041112/211 12/11/200
4 
30/06/200
5 
4/10/2005 2/08/2005 
Offender 
charged 
2 months 
before 
DNA 
result 
No. 
249 
 
Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
050415/519 15/04/200
5 
31/08/200
5 
11/10/2005 2/02/2006 4 months No. 
981103/780 30/01/199
8 
19/02/200
5 
13/04/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A No. Has not been in police custody since this offence. 
040730/235 30/07/200
4 
25/02/200
5 
12/04/2005 8/07/2005 3 months Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
991214/504 13/12/199
9 
7/03/2005 19/04/2005 23/06/2005 2 months Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
050312/436 11/03/200
5 
2/05/2005 12/04/2005 18/05/2006 
1 year, 1 
month 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
040101/482 28/12/200
3 
2/02/2005 19/04/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050127/095
2 & 
041215/209
26/01/200
5 
16/11/200
1 
12/04/2005 5/10/2005 6 months Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
050329/033 29/03/200
5 
26/05/200
6 
20/06/2006 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050109/779
2/01/2005 
12/05/200
6 
4/5/5 (this not 
specified on 
NIA) 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been in police custody four times since DNA hit. 
031016/694 16/10/200
3 
21/03/200
8 
4/5/5 (this not 
specified on 
NIA) 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050331/782 24/03/200
5 
15/06/200
5 
12/07/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
041007/779
6/10/2004 
15/06/200
5 
12/07/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
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Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
041031/351
6 & 
041221/674
31/10/04 
& 
19/12/04 
29/03/200
5 
3/05/2005 15/08/2005 3 months Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
050310/352 10/03/200
5 
1/08/2003 17/05/2005 9/08/2005 3 months No. 
031211/193 10/12/200
3 
20/12/200
4 
18/05/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050406/647
6/04/2005 
27/12/199
9 
17/05/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050407/795
7/04/2005 
3/5/02 & 
19/9/02 
17/05/2005 13/04/2007 
1 year, 
11 
months 
Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
020129/432 29/01/200
2 
7/03/2005 9/05/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050423/599 23/04/200
5 
20/12/200
4 
24/05/2005 23/01/2006 8 months Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
050523/092 10/05/200
5 
4/04/2005 31/05/2005 19/10/2005 5 months Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
050323/741 23/03/200
5 
6/04/2005 
& 21/6/5 
17/05/2005 27/09/2005 4 months Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
050331/676 24/03/200
5 
23/04/200
4 
1/06/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050331/026
8 & 
050427/094
31/03/200
5 
26/07/200
4 
31/05/2005 22/12/2005 7 months Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
050513/907 13/05/200
5 
26/07/200
5 
13/09/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
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Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
041009/695
8/10/2004 Unknown 31/05/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050216/442 20/1/05 & 
11/5/05 
30/07/199
9 
23/03/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050418/430 17/04/200
5 
2/04/2004 7/06/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050525/990 24/05/200
5 
4/03/2004 21/06/2005 9/02/2006 8 months Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
020721/708 21/07/200
2 
19/05/200
5 
7/06/2005 14/02/2006 8 months Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
021122/463 16/11/200
2 
16/05/200
5 
8/06/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
010717/919 17/07/200
1 
29/04/200
5 
28/06/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A No. Has not been in police custody since this offence. 
050514/419 14/05/200
5 
1/08/2003 21/06/2005 30/09/2005 3 months Yes. Was arrested numerous times during interim. 
040927/622 11/07/200
3 
17/05/200
5 
16/6/04 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA result. 
050611/092 11/06/200
5 
3/09/2001 5/07/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050704/270
3/06/2005 
20/04/200
5 
30/6/05 (this 
not specified 
on NIA) 
30/09/2005 3 months Yes. Only one other charge during interim. 
050329/983
physical 
file not 
found 
          
030520/231 Large POI 
file 
    Convicted and 
sentenced 
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Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
24/03/04 
050216/442 Large POI 
file 
          
010414/556 13/04/200
1 
11/01/200
5 
24/02/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A 
Several attempts made to contact offender. However, he was never found 
or spoken to. 
050502/049
1/05/2005 Unknown 27/05/2005 13/06/2008 1 month No. 
010503/326 Large POI 
file 
  15/06/2001 Offender charged.     
050326/774 24/03/200
5 
2/03/2005 3/05/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A 
Offender was already being held in Auckland Remand Prison on another 
offence and, due to the time factor, it was advised that the offender not be 
prosecuted for this offence. 
040825/563 24/08/200
4 
14/04/200
5 
13/05/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file 
but requested to 
pay reparation. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050622/654 22/06/200
5 8/07/2004 26/07/2005 
5/12/05 and 
20/12/05 
5 months Yes. Was arrested several times during the interim. 
031116/600
8/11/2003 
25/01/200
5 8/11/2003 
Not charged in 
relation to this file 
but requested to 
pay reparation. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050718/370 18/07/200
5 5/02/2004 14/09/2005 3/10/2005 
1 month No. 
041221/912 22/12/200
4 
Several 
offenders 22/03/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes/ Has been arrested several times since DNA hit. 
070122/125 Nil 
offenders 
listed in 
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Offence 
date 
Date DNA 
taken 
Date DNA hit 
received 
Date charged 
Time 
lapse 
between 
DNA hit 
and 
charge 
In police custody during interim? 
file 
981105/521
Nil 
offenders 
listed in 
file 
          
050106/388
4/01/2005 
18/02/200
2 
8/02/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050124/534 21/01/200
5 
22/03/200
5 
15/03/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050301/198 28/02/200
5 
8/11/2004 3/05/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested numerous times since DNA hit. 
050328/516 28/03/200
5 
6/06/2002 3/05/2005 
Not charged in 
relation to this file. 
N/A Yes. Has been arrested several times since DNA hit. 
040416/298 16/04/200
4 
26/10/200
4 
21/06/2004 4/10/2004 4 months No. 
041125/217 25/11/200
4 
Nil 
offenders 
on file 
        
020120/465 20/01/200
2 
2/02/2005 2/04/2005 20/08/2002 
3 years 
prior to 
DNA hit 
No. 
050326/778
6/08/2005   18/05/2005 30/08/2005     
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Date information sheet produced: 17/07/08 
Project title 
The DNA Database as a Crime-Fighting Tool – An Analysis of the Functioning 
and Effectiveness of the New Zealand Model 
An invitation 
I invite you to take part in an analysis of the functioning and effectiveness of 
the New Zealand National DNA database. This research is being conducted by 
Catherine Gardner, O/C of the File Management Centre at Auckland Central 
Police Station. The research is for my PhD which I am studying part time at 
Auckland University of Technology (AUT). Your participation is entirely 
voluntary and you may withdraw at any stage prior to the completion of data 
collection. 
What is the purpose of this research? 
To analyse the functioning and effectiveness of the national DNA database.  
To establish what effect, if any, DNA evidence has on the investigation of 
volume crime. 
To establish what are the views of the practitioners in relation to the use of DNA 
in crime investigation. 
This research is part of a PhD and presentations will be written for 
publication in academic and law-enforcement journals or forums so that 
what is learned will benefit the New Zealand Police as a whole. It will not be 
possible to identify you in any reports, presentations or articles written on the 
project.  
How was I chosen for this invitation? 
You have been chosen for this research because DNA features in some 
aspect of your work. 
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What will happen in this research? 
You will be interviewed on audio tape with your permission and notes will 
also be taken by me. The interview will be semi-structured which means 
some questions will be asked but they will mainly be to provoke discussion.   
What are the discomforts and risks? 
There may be some risk or embarrassment should you express a view that is 
not in accordance with current Police policies.   There maybe a possibility of 
discomfort should talking about DNA bring back unpleasant memories of cases.  
How will these discomforts and risks be alleviated?If you take 
part in this research, you have the right to: 
Ask any questions about the project at any time. 
Provide information on the understanding that it is completely confidential and 
your information will be seen only by the researchers.  
Refuse to answer any questions asked in the interview. 
Postpone or discontinue the interview at any time. 
Withdraw from the project at any time without penalty. 
Have your information removed from the project up until the data collection has 
been completed.  
If you experience any discomfort after the interview you will be referred back to 
the Police Welfare Officer or an independent counselling service at AUT. 
What are the benefits? 
You will be taking part in a project that should give the police a better 
understanding of the effectiveness of DNA in the investigation of crime. This 
type of research has never been done before and will be of benefit to the 
New Zealand Police. 
How will my privacy be protected? 
All participants will be given a numerical designation so that your name is 
never used at any stage during the research, nor will it ever be published in 
any of the findings. The audio tapes will be transcribed by a professional 
audio typist who will sign a confidentiality agreement. Material on computers 
will be protected by a password that only the researcher and transcriber will 
know. After this it will be stored in a secure place at the Auckland Central 
Police Station. At the end of the project all tapes and transcripts will be 
offered back to you. If you don’t want them they will be destroyed. You will 
be given a consent form to sign confirming your willingness to be 
interviewed. 
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What are the costs of participating in this research? 
There will be no financial costs. There will be half an hour to one hour of 
your time taken for the interview. It is anticipated that the interviews will take 
place in work time. 
What opportunity do I have to consider this invitation? 
Whilst there is a fairly tight time frame for these interviews you will have 
several weeks to consider the invitation. 
How do I agree to participate in this research? 
You need to sign the consent form which has been given to you with this 
information sheet and return it to Catherine Gardner.  
Will I receive feedback on the results of this research? 
Yes, you will. On the consent form there is a space for you to indicate 
whether you would like be sent a summary of the research findings.  
What do I do if I have concerns about this research? 
Any concerns regarding the nature of this project should be notified in the 
first instance to the Project Supervisor, Dr John Buttle,  
john.buttle@aut.ac.nz or phone 921 9999 extn 8964. 
Concerns regarding the conduct of the research should be notified to the 
Executive Secretary, AUTEC, Madeline Banda, madeline.banda@aut.ac.nz 
or phone 921 9999 ext 8044. 
Who do I contact for further information about this research? 
Researcher contact details: 
Catherine Gardner  
catherine.gardner@police.govt.nz  
(09) 302 6530   
Project supervisor contact details: 
Dr John Buttle     
john.buttle@aut.ac.nz  
(09) 921 9999 extn 8964 
Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on type the 
date final ethics approval was granted, AUTEC Reference number type the reference 
number. 
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Appendix 20: Consent form 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
 
Project title: The DNA Database as a Crime9Fighting Tool - An Analysis of the 
Functioning and Effectiveness of the New Zealand Model 
Project Supervisor: Dr John Buttle 
Researcher: Catherine Gardner 
 I have read and understood the information provided about this research project in 
the Information Sheet dated dd mmmm yyyy. 
 I have had an opportunity to ask questions and to have them answered. 
 I understand that my identity and my responses in the interview are confidential.  
 I understand that the interview will be audio taped and transcribed and that the 
researcher may take notes. 
 I understand that I may withdraw myself or any information that I have provided for 
this project at any time prior to completion of data collection without being 
disadvantaged in any way. 
 At the end of this project, or If I withdraw, I understand that the relevant information 
about myself will not be used and tapes or transcripts, or parts thereof, will be 
returned to me or destroyed, 
 I agree to take part in this research and understand that the data may be used in 
future publications and presentations in a professional or academic context in such a 
way that I cannot be identified. 
 I wish to be sent a summary of the research findings (please tick one): Yes No 
 
Participant’s signature: .....................................................………………………………………………………… 
Participant’s name: .....................................................………………………………………………………… 
Participant’s Contact Details: 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Date:  
Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on type the date on 
which the final approval was granted AUTEC Reference number type the AUTEC reference 
number 
Note: The participant should retain a copy of this form. 
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Appendix 21 Confidentiality Agreement 
 
Confidentiality agreement 
 
 
Project title: The DNA Database as a Crime-Fighting Tool - An analysis of the 
Functioning and Effectiveness of the New Zealand Model 
Project Supervisor: Dr John Buttle 
Researcher: Catherine Gardner 
 
 I understand that all the material I will be asked to transcribe is confidential. 
 I understand that the contents of the tapes or recordings can be discussed only with 
the researchers. 
 I will not keep any copies of the transcripts or allow third parties access to them while 
the work is in progress. 
 
 
 
Transcriber’s signature: .....................................................………………………………………………………… 
Transcriber’s name: .....................................................………………………………………………………… 
Transcriber’s contact details (if appropriate): 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Date:  
 
Project supervisor’s contact details (if appropriate): 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on 13/10/08.   
AUTEC Reference number 08/184 
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